

LAPOP's  
AmericasBarometer  
takes the

# Pulse of Democracy in Grenada

REPORT EDITORS

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20  
23



AmericasBarometer  
*Barómetro de las Américas*



## Our Mission

LAPOP Lab is a center for excellence in international survey research. Located at Vanderbilt University, our mission is to:

- Produce high-quality public opinion data
- Develop and implement cutting-edge methods
- Build capacity in survey research and analysis
- Generate and disseminate policy-relevant research

The lab is run by experts in survey methodology who innovate approaches to public opinion research. The team is dedicated to collaboration and pedagogy. The lab's work facilitates evidence-based dialogue and policy decisions about a broad range of issues related to democratic governance.

## A Letter from USAID

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is a proud supporter of the AmericasBarometer, an award-winning project that captures the voice of the people of the Americas. Drawing upon survey data from over 34 nations from North, Central, and South America, and the Caribbean, the AmericasBarometer informs discussions over the quality and strength of democracy in the region.

Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer measures attitudes, evaluations, experiences, and behavior in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. Survey topics include the economy, rule of law, state capacity, trust in institutions, individual values, corruption, security, and more.

USAID relies on the AmericasBarometer to inform strategy development, guide program design, and evaluate the contexts in which we work. The AmericasBarometer alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to key challenges. Importantly, the project provides citizens with information about democratic values and experiences in their country, over time, and in comparison to other countries.

**Chantal Agarwal**  
Agreement Officer's Representative  
Democracy Human Rights and Governance Team  
Office of Regional Sustainable Development  
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean  
United States Agency for International Development

While the AmericasBarometer is coordinated by LAPOP Lab at Vanderbilt University, it is a collaborative international project. LAPOP consults with researchers across the Americas, local survey teams, USAID, and other project supporters at each stage. These rich discussions increase the relevance and validity of questionnaires; improve sample designs; build and maintain state-of-the-art quality control protocols; and support the development and dissemination of data and reports. As a collaborative project, the AmericasBarometer also builds capacity in public opinion research via knowledge transfers to local teams, student participation in the project, and frequent workshops.

USAID has been the largest supporter of the surveys that form the core of the AmericasBarometer. In addition, each round of the project is supported by individuals and institutions. USAID is grateful to that network of supporters, the LAPOP team, their outstanding former and current students, the many experts and institutions across the region that contribute to and engage with the project, the local fieldwork teams, and all those who took the time to respond to the survey.



# LAPOP


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## UNDERSTANDING THE FIGURES IN THIS REPORT

AmericasBarometer data are based on national samples of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each data point (for example, a country's proportion of citizens who support democracy) has a confidence interval, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Many graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account this sampling variability. When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap to a large degree, the difference between the two values is typically not statistically significant; conversely, where two confidence intervals do not overlap, the reader can be confident that those differences are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.

Estimates for the 2023 AmericasBarometer are based on weighted data where applicable. Due to sampling discrepancies, calibration weights are generated for national surveys in Ecuador, Trinidad & Tobago, The Bahamas, and Brazil by strata based on population distributions for urban/rural population, gender, and age. Weights for Haiti and Nicaragua (telephone surveys) are calculated by estimating baseline probabilities adjusted for eligibility and non-response, then calibrated to the distributions of gender, education, age, and region in the most recent previous face-to-face AmericasBarometer country surveys. Cross-time and cross-country weights are standardized so that each country/year has the same effective sample size. Data for this report are based on the pre-release dataset; analysts may find small differences in point estimates when using publicly released datasets due to ongoing data cleaning and quality control.



**COVER ART**  
**'Plagas de jardín' [Garden plagues]**  
50 x 52 cm, oil on paper, 2020, by Sylvia Fernández

Sylvia Fernández (Lima, 1978) graduated with a gold medal in Fine Arts from Corriente Alterna, in Lima, Peru, in 2002. Her painting explores the abstract boundaries of the mind and body and its relationship with nature, time and memory. <https://www.sylvia-fernandez.com>

Sylvia is represented by **Galería del Paseo** Founded in 1998 in Montevideo, Uruguay—and present as well in Lima, Peru, since 2003—Galería del Paseo promotes young Latin-American artists in the field of contemporary arts. <https://www.galeriadelpaseo.com>

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# Introduction

Spencer Thomas<sup>1</sup>

Grenada is considered a highly desirable place to live, as it is consistently ranked one of the safest countries in the hemisphere.<sup>2</sup> The AmericasBarometer data demonstrates that Grenada stands out as a beacon compared with its neighbors on the issues of crime, violence, and the rule of law; on the economic situation of ordinary citizens; and on governance and politics.

While the statistics on these categories in Grenada are largely positive, it is clear that there is room for improvement and for strengthening national systems to anticipate declining conditions.

On crime, violence and the rule of law, data from the AmericasBarometer survey reinforce that Grenada has low levels of organized and violent crimes, supported by a strong legal framework. Crime victimization, insecurity and gang violence

in Grenada are among the lowest in the region. Notwithstanding the foregoing, there have been slight increases in crime victimization, fear of being a crime victim and perceived gang activity. Crime and insecurity are not concentrated in any specific group, but men are more likely than women to be victims of crime. While the majority of Grenadians feel safe in their neighborhoods, there is a need for more investments in crime prevention and detection capacity.

On the economic situation in Grenada perceived and lived by its citizens, there is mixed opinion, but negative views on the economy are dominant. This is particularly the case following the impacts on the economy by COVID-19. Lack of employment opportunities, poverty, food insecurity and water insecurity are the major concerns of citizens. It is clear that economic outcomes are unevenly distributed in Grenada along the lines of gender, economic status, education levels and geography. As one example, educated men are more likely to report improved personal finances. High levels of poverty exist in Grenada, with many respondents in that category reporting pessimism about their future finances and prospects of escaping the poverty trap. Water insecurity is a key concern with a significantly higher problem in the island of Carriacou than in the rest of the country. There is great skepticism on the ability of existing social programs to ameliorate the economic challenges identified. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Grenada's assessment on the economy is more positive than most of the countries in the hemisphere.

On the issue of governance and politics, it is generally felt that Grenada is in a good place relative to most of the countries in the region. Grenada's political system is majoritarian in general, and the country meets the definition of a democracy. National elections have been characterized by the dominance of a two-party system and elections are generally free from violence and fraud. Political confidence and trust in public

<sup>1</sup> Spencer Thomas, BA, MSc, PhD., MSc (Regulation), is an energy and development economist and a public utility regulator. He is a former permanent secretary in the Ministry of Finance of Grenada.

<sup>2</sup> See <https://ocindex.net/rankings?f=rankings&view=List>

institutions like the electoral system, political parties, parliament, and police are high. Views on actions of political elites and on corruption are highly positive and improving, with particularly high ratings of political responsiveness. Specific support for democracy in Grenada is also high compared to other countries in the hemisphere. On these issues, however, there is a gap in perception on overall democracy in Grenada as the younger population is seen to be more skeptical. There is room for improvement in democracy and for strengthening of public institutions in Grenada. This notwithstanding, perceptions of negative democratic traditions and political corruption are lower in Grenada than most countries in the hemisphere.

In summary, while democracy is under stress in many countries in the hemisphere, this is not the case in Grenada. The views on democratic performance in Grenada are largely positive. The public views on low crime rates, low levels of political corruption, free and fair elections, high level of trust in public institutions, economic recovery, and government performance are well above the average. In this regard public pressure for radical changes to the democratic order in Grenada is lower than in many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).

## BY THE NUMBERS

**1,100**  
interviewers

**2023**  
AMERICASBAROMETER

**41,524**  
interviews

**180**  
core questions included in  
most countries

**415**  
country-specific questions

**26**  
COUNTRIES

Argentina  
Belize  
Bolivia  
Brazil  
Canada  
Chile  
Colombia  
Costa Rica  
Dominican Republic  
Ecuador  
El Salvador  
Grenada  
Guatemala  
Haiti  
Honduras  
Jamaica  
Mexico  
Nicaragua  
Panama  
Paraguay  
Peru  
Suriname  
The Bahamas  
Trinidad & Tobago  
United States  
Uruguay

### INTERVIEWER TRAINING

**24**  
local firm  
trainings

**420**  
training  
hours

### CAPACITY BUILDING IN SURVEY RESEARCH IN 2023

**33** events

**600+** hours

**1,390** attendees

### THE AMERICASBAROMETER SERIES

**10** waves of  
surveys across  
20 years

**34** countries

**385,000+**  
interviews



# Crime, Violence, and Views of the Rule of Law

Matthew M. Singer<sup>1</sup>

Insecurity and crime are significant problems across much of the Americas.<sup>2</sup> Grenada, however, is an exception. External reports rate it as one of the safest countries in the hemisphere, with particularly low levels of organized crime and violent crime.<sup>3</sup> The strength of its court system and its low crime rate are factors that the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs specifically cites as evidence that Grenada has a strong legal framework to protect investors.<sup>4</sup>

The 2023 AmericasBarometer shows that reported levels of crime victimization, insecurity, and gang violence in Grenada are among the lowest of all the countries in the survey. However, levels of crime and insecurity, while still low in comparative terms, have increased since the 2016 survey. This has coincided with falling trust in the country's legal institutions. Rising crime and declining trust in justice systems suggest that further work is needed to strengthen legal protections and police responses in the country.

## MAIN FINDINGS

- Levels of crime victimization and feelings of insecurity in Grenada are lower than in nearly every other country in the AmericasBarometer survey.
- There have been slight increases in crime victimization, fear of being a crime victim, and perceived gang activity compared to the 2016 AmericasBarometer survey in Grenada.
- Trust in the police and confidence that the justice system will punish criminals have fallen since 2016.
- Individuals who have been crime victims or who feel insecure in their neighborhoods are less likely to trust the police or judicial system.
- Issues related to crime and insecurity are not concentrated in any specific demographic group: there are few differences in crime experiences and feelings of insecurity between urban and rural areas, between the wealthy and the poor, or between ethnic groups.
- Women are more likely to report feeling insecure in their neighborhoods, are more likely to believe that drug trafficking is a problem, are less trusting of the police, and are less confident that the criminal justice system can effectively punish criminals. These findings suggest that there are opportunities for law enforcement agencies to better respond to women's concerns.
- Younger respondents also feel comparatively secure but express low levels of trust in the police.

**CRIME VICTIMIZATION HAS INCREASED SINCE 2016**

The AmericasBarometer measures crime victimization directly. Respondents are asked:

*Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats, or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?*

In 2023, 14% of Grenada’s citizens report having been crime victims (Figure 1.1). This percentage is well below the 22% in the average country included in the 2023 AmericasBarometer. However, the 14% of the public that were crime victims in


2023 is double what was reported in 2016 (Figure 1.2), suggesting that crime, while low, is a growing problem in Grenada.

Crime victimization rates do not vary significantly across the different regions of Grenada. Crime victimization rates are also similar across demographic groups. Multivariate analysis shows that experiences with crime are not significantly different in urban and rural areas or across age cohorts, wealth, levels of education, or differences in ethnicity or skin color.<sup>5</sup>

However, there is a significant gender gap in crime victimization, such that crime victimization rates are substantially higher for men (17%) than they are for women (12%).<sup>6</sup>


In 2023, one in seven of Grenada’s citizens report having been crime victims. This is well below the regional average for the 2023 AmericasBarometer, but it is double the rate reported in Grenada in 2016.

**Figure 1.1** Crime victimization rates are lower in Grenada than in most countries in the 2023 AmericasBarometer



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer 2023

**Figure 1.2** Crime victimization has increased in Grenada since 2016



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2016-2023



## 85% FEELINGS OF INSECURITY ARE LOW BUT INCREASING

of Grenadians feel safe in their neighborhood, a 8-percentage point decline from 2016.

While the direct victims of crime experience material losses and the negative physical and mental health effects of that victimization, people can be afraid of crime even if they have not personally been a crime victim. The AmericasBarometer measures feelings of insecurity by asking respondents whether they feel safe in their neighborhood:

*Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?*

The majority of Grenada’s citizens feel very safe in their neighborhood (Figure 1.3). However, while the percentage of people who feel very safe has remained roughly the same since the last AmericasBarometer survey in Grenada, the percentage of Grenadians who feel somewhat safe has decreased, and the percentage of individuals who feel somewhat or very unsafe has doubled.


Despite the growing number of people who feel unsafe, levels of insecurity in Grenada remain comparatively low compared to the other countries in the survey (Figure 1.4). In the average country, over 40% of the public feels somewhat or very unsafe in their

neighborhood. Grenada, The Bahamas, and El Salvador, in contrast, have the lowest levels of insecurity of the countries that were surveyed.

There are also geographic differences in levels of insecurity within Grenada. Residents of Carriacou are particularly likely to feel safe while residents of St. George have higher levels of insecurity despite their lower-than-average reported crime victimization rates. However, there are few demographic differences in who feels insecure in their neighborhood. Levels of insecurity are not statistically correlated with living in urban areas, with education or wealth, or with skin color. Women are more likely to feel insecure


than men are, but this difference is relatively small.<sup>7</sup> Individuals in the age 16-25 age cohort are also statistically more likely to report feeling safe in their neighborhood when other factors are controlled for, but these differences are also small.

Figure 1.3 Most people feel very safe in Grenada, but levels of insecurity have grown



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2016-2023

Figure 1.4 Feelings of insecurity in Grenada are lower than nearly all countries included in the 2023 AmericasBarometer



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer 2023

### GANG PRESENCE AND VIOLENCE ARE GROWING

One potential source of fear of crime is the presence of organized criminal groups such as gangs operating in different neighborhoods. The AmericasBarometer directly measures this perceived threat by asking respondents:

*To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none?*

Most Grenadians say gangs have no presence in their neighborhoods (Figure 1.5). Gangs are also less common in Grenada than in other countries in the region; this question was only asked in 4 Caribbean countries but the 14%

of Grenada’s resident that lives in neighborhoods where gangs have “a lot” or “somewhat” of a presence in their neighborhood is smaller than the shares of the public in The Bahamas (22%), Trinidad & Tobago (28%), or Suriname (31%). However, the number of people who say they have gangs operating at least a little in the neighborhood has grown dramatically since 2016, signaling that gangs seem to be a growing threat in Grenada.

Levels of gang activity also are stable across most of Grenada, with the exception of Carriacou where only 1% of households reported experiencing it in their neighborhood. Then, just as feelings of insecurity are spread evenly across the population, there are few demographic differences in who reports that gangs

**14%**


of Grenadian adults say their neighborhood is affected by gangs “somewhat” or “a lot.”

are affecting their neighborhood. Similar percentages of men and women report threats from gangs, and exposure to gangs does not vary by levels of wealth, urban or rural residency, skin color/ethnicity, or education level. However, young individuals are more likely to report gang activities: more than 20% of the 16-25 demographic say gangs affect their neighborhoods a lot or somewhat, whereas only 6% of those aged 56-65 and 3.5% aged 66+ report the same level of gang exposure.

The AmericasBarometer also asks respondents about the kinds of illegal activities that gangs may be engaged in. Respondents were directly asked if gangs had murdered anyone in the respondent’s neighborhood in the last year or if they had injured at least one person in their


neighborhood. Murder is relatively rare in Grenada; only 2% of people live in a neighborhood where gangs have committed a murder.<sup>8</sup> However, 36% of Grenada’s citizens live in neighborhoods where someone has been injured by gangs. More generally, individuals who live in neighborhoods where gangs have a large presence are also substantially more likely to be crime victims or to feel that their neighborhood is unsafe (Figure 1.6). Even in neighborhoods affected a lot or somewhat by gangs, levels of reported crime victimization and insecurity are lower than the average country in the sample. Nevertheless, the limited but growing gang activity in the country is contributing to the increased crime victimization and insecurity rates in the country.

**Figure 1.5** Gang presence has increased in Grenada since 2016



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2016-2023

**Figure 1.6** Gangs contribute to Grenadians’ reported crime victimization and feelings of insecurity



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2023



### TRUST IN THE POLICE AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM HAS DECLINED

The 2023 AmericasBarometer suggests that while crime remains low in Grenada relative to other countries in the hemisphere, it is rising. This uptick in crime has the potential to undermine the public's confidence in the institutions entrusted with establishing law and order. For example, the AmericasBarometer measures the level of public trust in the police force with the question:

*To what extent do you trust the Royal Grenada Police Force (RGPF)?*


Respondents answered using a scale from 1 "not at all" to 7 "a lot." The share of the public with trust in the police has fallen from 49% in 2016 to 42% in 2023

(Figure 1.7). This change is particularly strong at the extreme ends of the scale: the share of the public that has the lowest level of trust in the police (responding "not at all") has increased from 10% in 2016 to 19% in 2023, and the percentage with one of the two lowest levels of trust in the police has increased from 15% to 27% over that same period.

Despite the decline in how the public views the police, trust in the police remains higher in Grenada than in many countries in the Americas; 38% of the public trust the police in the average country surveyed in 2023. There are only eight countries where trust in the police is significantly higher than in Grenada (Figure 1.8). While the police have lost a degree of public support, they continue to have a large reservoir of trust they can build on.


While the police have lost a degree of public support, they continue to have a large reservoir of trust they can build on. Trust in the police remains higher in Grenada than in many countries in the Americas.

Figure 1.7 Trust in the police has declined in Grenada since 2016



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2023

Figure 1.8 Trust in police in Grenada is above the regional average



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer 2023

**53%**  
of Grenadians trust the judiciary to punish criminals, the third-highest rate in the region.

A similar pattern emerges in how Grenadians evaluate the justice system. The AmericasBarometer survey asks:


*If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty?*

A majority of the public has either a lot or some confidence that the justice system would punish the guilty (Figure 1.9), but that level of trust is a marked decline from the 2016 AmericasBarometer. Yet even with that decline, Grenada continues

to have some of the highest levels of confidence in the justice system among countries included in the survey, with only El Salvador and Suriname having higher levels of confidence in the justice system (Figure 1.10).


There are no significant differences in views of the police or the justice system across Grenada's parishes. There are also not many demographic differences in how the public views Grenada's police and justice systems. Trust in the police is, however, much stronger among the older age cohorts (Figure 1.11).

**Figure 1.9** Grenadians' confidence that the justice system will punish the guilty has fallen since 2016




Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2016-2023

**Figure 1.10** Confidence that the justice system will punish the guilty remains higher in Grenada than in most countries in the region



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer 2023

**Figure 1.11** Younger residents in Grenada are less trusting of the police



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2023



Grenada's comparatively low levels of crime should be a source of support for the existing political order. However, the evidence of growing crime and falling trust in the justice system compared to the previous AmericasBarometer survey creates potential threats.

Trust in the police does not differ by gender, but trust in the justice system is substantially lower among women than among men even though men are more likely to be crime victims than women are.<sup>9</sup>

Views of the police and the justice system also reflect personal experiences with the legal system. Crime victims and those who feel insecure in their neighborhood are less trusting of the police<sup>10</sup> and less confident that the system can capture

and punish guilty criminals.<sup>11</sup> These differences are not deterministic; many crime victims and those who feel insecure continue to trust the police and the justice system. But both crime victimization and feelings of insecurity have a negative association with trust in the police. However, these trends suggest that many crime victims and those who live in higher crime areas see flaws in the justice system and remain pessimistic that it can enforce the law.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNANCE IN GRENADA

The data from the 2023 AmericasBarometer present a mixed story about insecurity and crime in Grenada. From a comparative perspective, Grenada remains a fairly secure place where reported crime is low and where fear of crime is not particularly common. However, indicators of crime and insecurity from the 2016 AmericasBarometer survey have worsened. Crime victimization has increased, fear of crime has increased, reported gang activities have increased, and reported drug activity has increased. Much of these increases have been in the intermediate categories. Meaning that overall levels of crime and insecurity remain low, but they are a growing problem.

Insecurity and crime have negative effects on those who are exposed to it and on the countries where they live. A fear of crime reduces economic investments in high-crime areas<sup>12</sup> while fear of crime and crime victimization generate negative mental health outcomes and lower levels of life satisfaction.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, countries with high levels of crime and insecurity often see citizens become dissatisfied with the political actors and institutions that have not fully guaranteed the rule of law and left citizens vulnerable, weakening support for democracy.<sup>14</sup> Grenada's comparatively low levels of crime should thus be a source of support for the existing political order and a strength as it seeks economic investment and tourism.

However, the evidence of growing crime in the current AmericasBarometer compared to the previous one creates

potential threats to these broader systemic outcomes. This is visible in the survey trends showing that trust in legal institutions, while higher than in many countries, has fallen over time in Grenada, and those who feel insecure are particularly distrusting of police and lack confidence in the justice system's capacity to enforce the law. These data suggest that even while the legal system is strong from a comparative perspective, greater attention to and investment in preventing crime is needed in Grenada.

The AmericasBarometer also suggests that insecurity is not limited to poor areas or urban areas or areas dominated by specific ethnic groups. These characteristics have few connections to crime victimization, exposure, or insecurity. However, views of the legal system differ across age groups and gender lines. These differences do not necessarily reflect personal experiences with crime. Younger people, for example, are significantly more likely to be aware of gang activity around them but are more likely to report that they feel safe in their neighborhoods and don't believe that drug trafficking is a problem. Yet young people have less trust in the police. A similar pattern exists across gender lines: while men are crime victims more often than women, women are more likely to feel unsafe, more likely to believe that drug trafficking is a problem and are less confident that the criminal justice system can effectively punish criminals. This insecurity and distrust among women suggest that the state can do more to help them feel safe and protected while the police have opportunities to build support among the younger generations.

## Notes

- 1 Dr. Matthew Singer is the Alan R. Bennet Honors Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut. He is the editor of *The Latin American Voter: Pursuing Representation and Accountability in Challenging Contexts and Economics and Politics Revisited: Executive Approval and the New Calculus of Support*.
- 2 The percentage of people in the Americas who fear violence is higher than any of the other regions in the world. <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/EVP-2021-web.pdf>
- 3 For example, Grenada has the third lowest criminality score in the Americas on the Global Organized Crime Index (<https://ocindex.net/country/grenada>) and the fourth lowest homicide rate among CARICOM countries (Fabre et al. 2023).
- 4 U.S. State Department 2023.
- 5 I performed a logit analysis of crime victimization as a function of a dummy variable for urban/rural status, gender, education level, household wealth, age cohort, partisanship (differentiating those without partisan identification, those who identify with the NDC, those who identify with the NNP, and those who identify with other parties), and one of the following measures of ethnicity: skin color, self-reported ethnic identity (as a series of dummy variables), or native language (again as a series of dummy variables). However, several of the ethnic groups and language groups are very small and while these groups have divergent response patterns I focus primarily on the differences between black, mestizo, and indian respondents as no other group made up more than 2% of respondents whereas for language I focus on differences between those that speak English only and those that speak Grenadian Creole English because no other group makes up more than 2% of respondents. Partisanship is included to control for the tendency of government partisans to have rosy views of outcomes under the current government, although there is no evidence of that in these surveys (the results do not change if partisanship is excluded). Significant correlations are those that differ from 0 at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
- 6 In Grenada in 2023, there were not enough cases to report out on those who responded, “neither man nor woman,” “don’t know,” or “no response” to a question on gender. Since these categories are exclusive, we do not collapse categories. In Grenada in 2023, 0.09% of respondents identified as a gender other than man or woman, 0% said they did not know, and 0% gave no response.
- 7 In Grenada, 17% of women feel very or somewhat insecure compared to 14% of men.
- 8 Questions about whether gangs had committed murders or other crimes in your neighborhood were only asked of the 40% of the public who said that gangs affected their neighborhood at least a little. In 2023, 6% of those living in neighborhoods affected a little or more by gangs report that someone had been murdered.
- 9 Most men (58%) have a lot or some trust the system will punish the guilty, while 48% of women do. At the same time, 42% of men and women, each, trust the police.
- 10 In particular, 34% of crime victims trust the police compared to 43% of non-crime victims and 36% of those who feel unsafe in their neighborhood trust the police compared to 43% of those who feel safe.
- 11 Only 45% of crime victims and 37% of those who feel unsafe in their neighborhood are confident that the system will catch and punish the guilty compared to 54% confidence among those who were not crime victims and 56% confidence among those that feel safe.
- 12 e.g., Goulas and Zervoyianni 2015; Cabral et al. 2019.
- 13 e.g., Kilpatrick and Acierno 2003; Cohen 2008; Hanslmaier 2013; and Dustmann and Fasani 2016.
- 14 e.g., Pérez 2003; Fernandez and Kuenzi 2010; Blanco 2013.



## Preparedness for Weather-Related Events

Alexandra Rounds<sup>1</sup>

Over a third of Grenadians do not feel prepared for weather-related events.

Natural disasters are a notable threat to Grenada, with the country losing millions of dollars annually to weather-related events. These disasters include wind-related events, flooding, and rising sea levels. Experts predict that as the impacts of climate change intensify, Grenada remains particularly vulnerable. In the past, disasters like Hurricane Ivan in 2004 have caused significant economic and social loss for Grenadians.<sup>2</sup> In 2023, over one in three Grenadians does not feel prepared for weather-related events.

The 2023 AmericasBarometer measures disaster preparedness by asking the following question:


*Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements: You feel prepared for weather-related events.*

Respondents indicated their answers on a 7-point scale, where higher values indicate stronger preparedness for weather-related events. Responses are recoded into a dichotomous variable in which answers of 5-7 indicate that the respondent feels prepared for a weather-related event.<sup>3</sup>

The results show that in 2023, 35% of Grenadians do not feel prepared for a weather-related event, while 65% feel prepared.

Over one in three Grenadians does not feel prepared for weather-related events

Do you feel prepared for weather-related events?



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2023

Natural disasters pose a significant threat to Grenada, causing millions in losses annually. With over one third of Grenadians feeling unprepared for weather-related events, enhancing disaster readiness is crucial as climate change intensifies and increases the nation's vulnerability.


What individual characteristics predict feelings of preparedness for weather-related events in Grenada?<sup>4</sup> On average, women (62%) and those age 18-55 (63%) are the least likely to feel prepared for a natural disaster.<sup>5</sup> Notably, levels of household wealth, education, and urban/rural residence do not appear significantly related to disaster preparedness.

Overall, 35% of Grenadians do not feel prepared for weather-related events. Women and those age 18-25 are more likely to feel unprepared for these events. In recent years, the Grenadian government has been investing in the nation's resilience to natural disasters and progress has been made. However, there is still room to improve as the effects of climate change intensify and put many Grenadians at risk.<sup>6</sup>

Despite efforts to improve resilience, 35% of Grenadians still feel unprepared for weather-related events. Women and younger individuals are particularly vulnerable, highlighting the need for targeted disaster-preparedness initiatives.

**Women and younger Grenadians are the least likely to feel prepared for weather-related events**

• % who feel prepared for a weather-related event |—| 95% confidence interval



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2023

**Notes**

- Alexandra Rounds is a senior at Vanderbilt University majoring in Political Science and Spanish. After graduation, she hopes to pursue a career in business.
- International Monetary Fund 2022.
- Specifically, responses were coded into a binary measure by combining responses 5 to 7 into an “prepared” category, while placing the remaining responses into a baseline “not prepared” category.
- I estimated a logistic regression where the dependent variable is coded as 1 if the respondent feels prepared for weather-related events and 0 if not. I include sociodemographic predictors in the model—gender, age cohorts, education, wealth, and place of residence.
- In Grenada in 2023, there were not enough cases to report out on those who responded, “neither man nor women,” “don’t know,” or “no response.” Since these categories are exclusive, I do not collapse categories. 0.06% of respondents identified as a gender other than man or woman, 0.52% said they did not know, and 0.19% gave no response.
- International Monetary Fund 2022.

# The Economic Situation in Grenada as Perceived by and Lived by its Citizens

Matthew M. Singer

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the average CARICOM member country saw its volume of exports of goods and services fall by 27% and GDP shrink by 10% in 2020.<sup>1</sup> Grenada was hit particularly hard by the restrictions on global mobility, as 42% of its workforce is employed in tourism-connected industries<sup>2</sup> and its agricultural sector is export-focused. As a result, in 2020 Grenada's exports shrunk by 63% and its GDP fell by nearly 14%. Furthermore, its real-per-capita GDP was smaller at the end of 2020 than it had been in 2015.

Three years later, Grenada's economy continues to recover. While exports of goods and services further shrunk in 2021 before rebounding in 2022, GDP grew in 2021 and every year since. However, real per capita GDP is expected to still be smaller at the end of 2023 than it was at the end of 2019. These mixed trends raise questions about whether the public sees the economy is improving from the nadirs of 2020 or is focused on the slow pace of that improvement.

## MAIN FINDINGS

- Grenadians are more likely to say that their personal finances and the national economy have stayed the same in the last year than to have said they either improved or worsened, but negative views are more common than positive ones.
- While opinions of the economy are mixed, Grenadians are more positive about economic trends than are residents in most other countries in the Americas.
- Men, married individuals, and those with higher education are the most likely to report improving personal finances.
- While water scarcity is comparatively low in Grenada, over a third of Grenadians have worried that they will run out of food.
- Food insecurity is higher for women, the poor, and the uneducated. Poor families with children are particularly likely to have food shortages.
- Inclusion in the Support for Education, Empowerment, and Development (SEED) program does not significantly reduce the probability of reporting food insecurity.



The 2023 AmericasBarometer survey documents the great concern that Grenada’s citizens have about the economy as the recovery continues. When asked “what is the most serious problem facing the country,” 38% of Grenadians said that unemployment or a lack of jobs was the most serious problem, while another 28% emphasized “economic issues” more broadly. Taken together, 66% of the public identifies an economic problem as the most serious concern, while no other issue was the primary focus for more than 10% of the public. In sum, the economy is the dominant issue of concern for the nation’s citizens.

The slowdown in the economy is particularly likely to have implications for

the poor. Before the pandemic, Grenada had seen poverty levels fall significantly; while 37% of the country lived in poverty in 2009, only 25% lived in poverty in 2019.<sup>3</sup> This poverty reduction was driven by the growth of the economy and was slowed by rising inequality over this same period as the benefits of economic growth were unevenly distributed. The slowing growth rate of recent years may have left a large number of the nation’s citizens in precarious economic situations. While the AmericasBarometer cannot directly measure the levels of poverty in the country, it does highlight the high levels of food insecurity that continue to exist in the country. These data document the current state of poverty relief and opportunities for further social investments.

**36%**  
of the public thinks the national economy has worsened over the previous year.

**MANY CITIZENS PERCEIVE ECONOMIC DECLINE, BUT VIEWS OF GRENADA’S ECONOMY ARE MORE POSITIVE THAN MOST COUNTRIES IN THE AMERICAS**

Grenada’s citizens have a mixed view of the economy. The AmericasBarometer survey asks how people perceive the state of the national economy compared to the previous year and how their personal economic situation had changed in the previous year. Most people believe that the economy and their finances have remained the same as it was last year. However, the share of the public who say that the economy or their personal finances had gotten worse is larger than the share who saw that things had gotten


better (Figure 2.1). Despite two years of positive GDP growth in 2022 and 2023, a large portion of the public continues to view the economy negatively as the economy has not fully recovered.

But while Grenadians’ views of the economy are mixed, they are more positive than most people in the Americas. In the average country included in the 2023 AmericasBarometer, 14% of the public think the economy is better than it was a year ago and 18% have seen their finances improve in the last year. Among countries included in the AmericasBarometer, only Brazil has a significantly higher percentage of its population which reports that the national economy is improving than Grenada does, although several countries

The economy is the dominant issue of concern for Grenada’s citizens. Despite two years of positive GDP growth in 2022 and 2023, a large portion of the public continues to view the economy negatively as it has not fully recovered.

Figure 2.1 Grenadians have mixed views of recent economic trends

Evaluation of the economic situation in last 12 months



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2023

**27%**  
of Grenadians saw improvement in their personal finances over the past year.

have levels of public optimism that are equally positive as Grenada, and only Brazil has a significantly larger percentage of people whose personal finances have gotten better in the last year (Figure 2.2).<sup>4</sup>

There are few significant differences in economic views across Grenadian society. In a multivariate analysis, there are no significant differences in reported views of the national economy or personal finances between urban and rural areas, levels of household wealth, education level, marital status, skin color, native language, or self-reported ethnicity.<sup>5</sup> However, two groups are significantly more likely to say their finances have improved in the 12 months before the survey (Figure 2.3).<sup>6</sup> First, men

are more optimistic about their finances than women are.<sup>7</sup> Second, economic outcomes are unevenly distributed across Grenada: residents of the Western Region are less likely to have experienced improved finances than are regions of the other regions.

These data suggest that men have been best positioned to capture the benefits of recent economic improvements in Grenada. However, the lack of a correlation between household wealth or education and views of the economy suggests that the current recovery might be more pro-poor than previous eras of growth that had coincided with rising inequality.

**THE POOR, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN FACE INCREASED ECONOMIC INSECURITY IN THE FORM OF FOOD AND WATER SHORTAGES**

While the AmericasBarometer survey contains questions on how people view broad trends in the national economy and their finances, it also highlights more specific aspects of citizens' economic situations. While its data does not directly measure poverty, it contains a measure of food and water insecurity in the country. To measure food insecurity, respondents were asked:


*In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?*

Water insecurity is measured with the question:

*In the last 3 months, did you or anyone else in your household worry that you did not have enough drinking water to meet all your household needs?*

Despite the improving economy and the success in recent years in reducing poverty levels, food insecurity is common in Grenada; one in three households has run out of food recently (Figure 2.4).

**Figure 2.2** Views of the economy and finances are more positive in Grenada than in most countries in the Americas




Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer 2023

**Figure 2.3** Perceived improvements in personal finances differ by gender and region



**Figure 2.4** Food and water insecurity continue to be problems in Grenada



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2023


Access to water is more universal, but one in eight households has worried in recent months that they would run out of water. There is relatively little variation in levels of food insecurity across Grenada's regions. However, water insecurity is significantly higher in Carriacou than in the rest of the country, as nearly 30% of Carriacou's residents have worried they would be without drinking water in the last three months.

Levels of water insecurity in Grenada are low compared to other countries in the region. Just over 37% of the public in an average country in the hemisphere worried that they would run out of water in the last three months (Figure 2.5). Even in

Carriacou, the region of Grenada where water insecurity is highest, levels of water insecurity are below the regional average. Only Chile has significantly lower water insecurity than Grenada.


Levels of food insecurity in Grenada, however, are significantly higher than the regional average (Figure 2.6). Food insecurity is particularly high in Haiti and Jamaica and is generally higher in Central America and in the Caribbean than it is in Mexico or South America, but the 36% of Grenadians that have gone without food in the last three months is above the 31% who experienced food insecurity in the average country in the survey.

**Figure 2.5** Grenadians report levels of water insecurity that are lower than citizens from most countries in the Americas



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer 2023

**Figure 2.6** Food insecurity in Grenada is higher than most countries surveyed by the AmericasBarometer in 2023



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer 2023



The high levels of food insecurity in the region speak to lingering issues with reducing poverty in the country. The survey data from the AmericasBarometer also suggest that this food insecurity has widespread political consequences and is generating discontent with democratic institutions.<sup>8</sup> While individuals who have gone without food do not differ in their belief that democracy is the best system of government<sup>9</sup> or in their respect for the political institutions of Grenada,<sup>10</sup> individuals who have recently experienced food insecurity are less likely to believe that citizens' basic rights are protected by the political system of Grenada,<sup>11</sup> to feel proud living under Grenada's political system,<sup>12</sup> to say that citizens should support the political system of

Grenada,<sup>13</sup> to be satisfied with the way that democracy works in Grenada,<sup>14</sup> and to believe that Grenada is a democracy<sup>15</sup> even when levels of household wealth and other demographic variables are controlled for. Food insecurity has strong negative effects on system support, as citizens who have gone without become disillusioned with the current political system.

While levels of food and water insecurity<sup>16</sup> are widespread, not all citizens face equal risks of going without the basic staples. Not surprisingly, food insecurity is strongly correlated with household wealth; more than half of families in the lowest wealth level ran out of food in the last month while only 16% of families in the highest

**41%**

of women in Grenada say they have faced food insecurity, compared to 32% of men.


wealth level experienced the same dilemma (Figure 2.7).<sup>17</sup> Comparatively wealthy households are not fully insulated from the risks of running out of food, but the risks these households face of going without food are much lower. The poorest households also tended to have larger worries about running out of water, but, surprisingly, wealthy households also had fairly high levels of concern that their household would not have drinking water. However, even when differences in wealth are controlled for, there are further differences in food insecurity across genders and education levels. Women are much more likely to report that their household has gone without food and be worried about losing water. In contrast, the most highly educated individuals reported

lower levels of food and water insecurity even when wealth is controlled for, suggesting that they have access to resources that are not fully captured by the wealth indicator.

Another group that is strongly affected by food insecurity in Grenada is households with children. While roughly 31% of the households with no children under the age of 13 at home went without food in the previous three months, over 54% of households with three or more children at home experienced food insecurity. The risks of food insecurity are particularly high for poor households with more than two children at home; over 80% of households in the lowest wealth level that have three or more children went without food in the previous quarter and more than 71% of

Levels of water insecurity in Grenada are low compared to other countries in the region. The rate of food insecurity in Grenada, however, is significantly higher than average.

Figure 2.7 Food insecurity in Grenada differs by wealth, gender, and education



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2023

**54%**  
of households with three or more children face food insecurity.

households of households with three or more children in the second lowest level went without food (Figure 2.8). However, even households with the highest levels of wealth are at greater risk of food insecurity if they have multiple children at home. The survey does not measure whether it was the adults or the children who went without, but large families face insecurity at disproportionate rates.

The strong risk of food insecurity facing households with children suggests that further targeted interventions are needed to help this population. One existing program designed to target this group that is managed by the Grenadian government is the SEED initiative. This conditional cash transfer program provides payments to school children living in poverty, persons with disabilities, households with older persons, and individuals with chronic illness conditional upon school attendance (if there are children in the household) and regular medical examinations.

The AmericasBarometer measures which households received benefits from this program. More than 23% of households in the lowest two wealth levels received benefits from the program and more than 36% of households in the lowest three wealth levels with three or more children in them received SEED benefits. However, recipients of SEED benefits were no less likely to report lower levels of food or water security than were households with similar levels of wealth.<sup>18</sup> The data are unable to specify a reason for this lack of impact, so further exploration is needed to evaluate whether the payouts are not sufficiently large to prevent food insecurity, are not widely enough dispersed, or are not reaching the most insecure households but these data suggest that further opportunities to strengthen social safety nets in Grenada exist.

### IMPLICATIONS FOR GRENADA

A strong economy and stable economic position are widely desired; levels of life satisfaction tend to fluctuate with short-term economic swings<sup>19</sup> and are particularly low for those suffering acute poverty<sup>20</sup> and food and water insecurity.<sup>21</sup> The economy also has political implications. Politicians are held accountable for their management of the economy and generally see their support fall when the economy is perceived as performing poorly.<sup>22</sup> Then while the importance of economic performance for democratic stability should not be overstated,<sup>23</sup> weak economic performance, especially if sustained over time, undermines satisfaction with democracy<sup>24</sup> and can also make the breakdown of democracy more likely.<sup>25</sup>


This chapter highlights both positive and negative trends in Grenada's economy. On the one hand, Grenadians' assessments of economic trends in Grenada are more positive than most people in the hemisphere. This is likely to reinforce support for existing political institutions in the country. However, the high levels of food insecurity and the inability of existing social programs to ameliorate these issues are likely to generate resentment among those segments of the public whose basic needs are not being met.

The AmericasBarometer also reveals significant inequalities in how the population viewed their economic finances and experienced economic insecurity. The lack of a correlation between economic assessments and household wealth in 2023 suggests that large segments of the population are feeling the recent economic recovery. However, men and the very highly educated have more positive economic outlooks and lower levels of food

Weak economic performance, especially if sustained over time, undermines satisfaction with democracy and can contribute to democratic breakdown.

insecurity than the rest of the population. Poverty also continues to generate food insecurity. These inequalities may drive further divides within society, as poor economic performance and high levels of economic vulnerability can drive individuals to sour on the current political and economic system. Further steps can be taken to ensure that the benefits of economic growth in Grenada are available to all citizens.

Figure 2.8 Food insecurity is highest in Grenadian households with children, especially if they are poor



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2023

## Notes

- 1 CARICOM stands for Caribbean Community and Common Market. Data was drawn from the April 2023 release of the IMF's World Economic Outlook database.
- 2 World Bank 2021.
- 3 World Bank 2021.
- 4 There is not a significant difference ( $p < 0.05$ ) in the levels of positive assessments of the national economy in Grenada and in the Bahamas, El Salvador or Mexico, and there is not a significant difference in levels of positive assessments of personal finances between Grenada and Mexico, El Salvador, and Jamaica.
- 5 I performed an ordinal logit analysis of the perceived changes in the national economy and reported changes in respondents' personal finances as a function of a dummy variable for urban/rural status, gender, education level, household wealth, age cohort, partisanship (differentiating those without partisan identification, those who identify with the NDC, those who identify with the NNP, and those who identify with other parties), and one of the following measures of ethnicity: skin color, self-reported ethnic identity (as a series of dummy variables), or native language (again as a series of dummy variables). Partisanship is included to control for the tendency of government partisans to have rosy views of the economy. Significant correlations are those that differ from 0 at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
- 6 While I focus on views of personal finances here, these variables also contribute to positive views of the national economy. Duch et al. (2000) show that reported evaluations of the national economy are shaped by survey respondents' personal finances. A similar pattern occurs in these models; marital status, gender, and education levels all have a significant (or nearly significant) correlation with evaluations of the national economy, but these correlations are substantially weaker when respondents' perceptions of their personal finances are controlled for, suggesting that these demographic-level differences in the national economy reflect divergent trends in personal finances.
- 7 In Grenada in 2023, there were not enough cases to report out on those who responded, "neither man nor woman," "don't know," or "no response." Since these categories are exclusive, we do not collapse categories. In Grenada in 2023, 0.09% of respondents identified as a gender other than man or woman, 0% said they did not know, and 0% gave no response.
- 8 To measure the consequences of food insecurity in this paragraph, I modeled a series of questions on democratic support as ordered logit models as a function of food insecurity while controlling for a dummy variable for urban/rural status, gender, education level, household wealth, age cohort, partisanship (differentiating those without partisan identification, those who identify with the NDC, those who identify with the NNP, and those who identify with other parties), self-reported ethnic identity (as a series of dummy variables), and evaluations of the national economy.
- 9 Measured with the question: "Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?". Food insecurity is not significantly associated with the endorsement of democracy as the best system of government once other variables are controlled for.
- 10 Measured with the question: "To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Grenada?" with responses on a 7-point scale from not at all to a lot. Food insecurity is not significantly associated with respect for institutions.
- 11 Measured with the question: "To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Grenada?" with responses on a 7-point scale from not at all to a lot.
- 12 Measured with the question: "To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Grenada?" with responses on a 7-point scale from not at all to a lot.
- 13 Measured with the question: "To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Grenada?" with responses on a 7-point scale from not at all to a lot.
- 14 Measured with the question: "In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Grenada?"
- 15 Measured with the question: "In your opinion, is Grenada a democracy?" with responses being either a yes or a no.
- 16 Figure 2.7 graphs the trends for food insecurity, but water insecurity breaks down along similar lines.
- 17 I performed a logit analysis of risks of reporting food insecurity or water insecurity as a function of a dummy variable for urban/rural status, gender, education level, household wealth, age cohort, and one of the following measures of ethnicity: skin color, self-reported ethnic identity (as a series of dummy variables), or native language (again as a series of dummy variables). Significant correlations presented in the figure are those that differ from 0 at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
- 18 Specifically, there is no significant correlation between receiving SEED benefits and levels of food insecurity in a logit model when levels of wealth, a dummy variable for urban/rural status, gender, education level, household wealth, age cohort and self-reported ethnic identity (as a series of dummy variables) are controlled for.
- 19 Easterlin 2017.
- 20 Clarke et al. 2016.
- 21 Frongillo et al. 2017.
- 22 For Latin America, see Gelineau and Singer 2015.
- 23 Well-functioning institutions, high levels of commitment to democracy, and low levels of polarization at the elite and mass levels are likely much more important to prevent autocratization than maintaining a strong economy; see Boese et al. 2021 and Triesman 2024 for recent reviews.
- 24 e.g., Quaranta and Martini 2016; Classen and Magalhães 2022.
- 25 e.g., Bernard et al. 2001; Knutsen 2014; Krishnarajan 2019; Triesman 2023; although Maeda 2010 shows that the effect of the economy on democratic breakdowns is exclusively via coups and not via incumbents weakening democracy from within.

## Trust in the United States versus China

Emily Noh<sup>1</sup>

Over two in five Grenadians trust the United States versus one in four who trust China.

Grenada has been on the radar of both the United States and China. Less than a decade after its independence in 1974, United States-led forces invaded Grenada to counter a military coup in the country.<sup>2</sup> China has aided infrastructure development, funded a \$40 million national stadium, and helped draft a national development strategy in Grenada.<sup>3</sup> In 2018, Grenada joined China's Belt and Road Initiative, which funds and builds infrastructure in countries worldwide.<sup>4</sup>

How trustworthy do Grenadians view these two big powers? I find that while Grenadians trust the United States more than China, a significantly larger portion of the public is undecided on the trustworthiness of China compared to that of the United States.


In 2023, LAPOP's AmericasBarometer measured the trustworthiness of the United States and China by asking:

*The government of the [United States /China]. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?*<sup>5</sup>

Grenadians are significantly more trusting of the United States than China in 2023. Over two in five (46%) trust the United States versus a little over one in four (26%) who trust China. However, Grenadians have similar levels of distrust of both China and the United States. Over two in five adults (43%) do not provide an opinion on how trustworthy China is.

Overall, in Grenada, public opinion on the United States and China currently sways more toward the United States—but a significant portion of the public seems undecided on how trustworthy they view the Chinese government.

### Grenadians are more trusting of the United States than China



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2023

### Notes

- Emily Noh is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt University and a LAPOP affiliated researcher.
- Britter 2023; Tyler and Hoffman 1983; Brown 2016.
- Kinzer 2013; Synergia Foundation 2017; Chen and Yu 2023; Office of the Prime Minister of Grenada 2005.
- Sacks 2021.
- Respondents chose among 1 "very trustworthy," 2 "somewhat trustworthy," 3 "not very trustworthy," 4 "not at all trustworthy", and 5 "don't know/no opinion." To compare those who indicated trust, distrust, and no opinion, I recode responses 1 and 2 into a "yes, trustworthy" category and 3 and 4 into a "no, not trustworthy" category.



# Governance and Politics

Matthew M. Singer

This chapter examines the current state of democratic support in Grenada through the 2023 AmericasBarometer. It begins with indicators of specific support that focus on how the public views the political elite in the country and their responsiveness to public concerns and the level of corruption among them. It then looks at how the public views the quality of elections in Grenada, including their trust in the electoral process, their confidence that votes are counted fairly, and the belief that their votes are secret.

The AmericasBarometer also measures the public's trust in the parliament and in political parties, two key mechanisms of public representation. Further, respondents take a more global view of democratic performance and describe their satisfaction with democracy in Grenada. Finally, the chapter examines diffuse support for democracy by looking at whether Grenadians view democracy as the best system of government.

## MAIN FINDINGS

- **Specific support for democracy in Grenada is high compared to other countries in the hemisphere, especially the belief that politicians listen to the public, trust in elections, and trust in political institutions.**
- **However, while trust in elections and the parliament have risen over time, satisfaction with democracy has fallen in Grenada.**
- **Strong belief that democracy is the best system of government has fallen but remains at the hemisphere's average.**
- **While the youngest respondents have moderate levels of specific support for democracy, there is a large age-gap between how older and younger Grenadians value democracy, a gap that was not present in the previous AmericasBarometer round.**

**49%**  
of the public feels politicians care what they think, a significant increase compared to 2016.

Grenada last held elections in 2022. This election repeated the pattern of two-party dominance that has been the pattern in Grenada for the past two decades. Grenada’s two largest parties have combined to win more than 99% of the vote in every election since 2009, and the last time that a third party won a seat in the legislature was in 1995. The 2022 election, like those that came before it, was free of violence or accusations of fraud and deemed free and fair by outside observers from the Organization of American States<sup>1</sup> and CARICOM<sup>2</sup> and resulted in the peaceful transfer of power to a new governing party. Outside observers also recognize that political rights to organize, to campaign freely, and to criticize the government in public or the press are protected in Grenada.<sup>3</sup> While its political system is majoritarian in nature, Grenada meets the definition of a democracy.

Recognition that Grenada is a democracy is not limited to outside observers and election watchers. The 2023 AmericasBarometer survey includes a question asking “In your opinion, is Grenada a democracy?”. A large majority of Grenadians (66%) believe that Grenada is a democracy. Only four countries included in the 2023 survey had higher agreement that the country was democratic.<sup>4</sup>

Democracy is likely to be stronger and more durable, however, when democratic values run deep. Support for democracy can take two forms. In the first, the public evaluates how well democracy is functioning at a given moment at providing high-quality representation, reducing corruption, and meeting basic standards of democratic quality. When


the public perceives that democracy is effective and they are satisfied with its performance, this generates political stability. In contrast, concerns about democratic effectiveness can generate protest movements,<sup>5</sup> support for outsider and populist candidates who promise to bring democracy back to the people,<sup>6</sup> and support for constitutional reforms.<sup>7</sup> A second source of democratic support, in contrast, is a normative commitment to democratic principles. Democracy is more stable when the public believes that democracy is the best system of government and places value on holding elections. If normative commitments to democracy are weak, this may create space for undemocratic actors to undermine the democratic system,<sup>8</sup> especially if a weak commitment to democracy combines with poor evaluations of democracy’s current performance.<sup>9</sup>

**VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL ELITE AND CORRUPTION ARE POSITIVE AND IMPROVING**

The AmericasBarometer provides two questions about how the public views the actions of the political elite. The first looks at their responsiveness to public concerns. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement “Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think.” Roughly 49% of the public agree that politicians care what people think (Figure 3.1). This is a substantial increase from the 2016 round of the survey when only 28% of the public had similarly positive views of elite responsiveness. Cross-time differences are particularly noticeable in the percentage of the public

Support for democracy can take two forms: specific, when the public approves of democratic leadership and performance; and diffuse, when the public is committed to abstract democratic principles and values.

Figure 3.1 Public belief that politicians care what people think has increased in Grenada since 2016



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2016-2023

that strongly agrees that politicians are interested in what people think, which increased from 6% in 2016 to 16% in 2023.

Half of Grenada’s public (49%) that gave a positive answer to this question is a substantial increase over the previous round of the AmericasBarometer. It is also large in a comparative perspective: among countries included in the 2023 AmericasBarometer, only El Salvador has a larger share of its population that believes that politicians care about their interests (Figure 3.2)

A second measure of how the public views the political elite focuses on whether they are seen as corrupt. Respondents were asked:

*Thinking of the politicians of Grenada... how many of them do you believe are involved in corruption? None, less than half of them, half of them, more than half of them, all?*

Substantial segments of the public see politicians as being corrupt, with 34% of the public believing that either “more than half” or “all” of the politicians in the country are corrupt while 39% of the population thinks that less than half or no politicians are corrupt. However, the proportion of Grenada’s residents who believe that politicians in the country are corrupt is relatively low compared to other countries in the hemisphere (Figure 3.3). The 34% of the public that thinks


**34%**  
of Grenadians think most politicians are involved in corruption, the second-lowest rate in the region.

that more than half of the politicians in Grenada are corrupt is smaller than the share of the public that thinks most politicians are corrupt in every country in the 2023 AmericasBarometer, except for El Salvador.

These two measures show that while there is room to increase public confidence in politicians’ honesty and responsiveness, views of public officials in Grenada are quite high. There are also limited differences in how the public views politicians within the country. There are no significant differences in either of these questions across Grenada’s regions. There are also few demographic differences in how the public views politicians; there


are no significant differences in beliefs in political responsiveness or corruption perceptions across gender, education, urban/rural residency, or skin color.<sup>10</sup> There are, however, two groups that have lower opinions of Grenada’s politicians. The belief that politicians listen to the public is lower among Grenada’s younger cohorts than it is among its older ones. Then while overall perceptions of corruption are relatively low, Grenada’s poorest residents are most likely to believe that politicians are corrupt.

**Figure 3.2** Belief that politicians are responsive to the public in Grenada is higher than in most countries in the 2023 AmericasBarometer



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer 2023

**Figure 3.3** Perceptions of political corruption are lower in Grenada than in most other countries in the 2023 AmericasBarometer



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer 2023

### PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN ELECTIONS IS HIGH

A second form of specific support for democracy is how the public views elections. This barometer of public support is especially important given that Grenada’s elections were just held in 2022. The AmericasBarometer asks:

*To what extent do you trust elections in this country?*

Respondents answered using a scale from 1 “not at all” to 7 “a lot.” Roughly 53% of the public has levels of trust that are above the midpoint of the scale,<sup>11</sup> while 27% have levels of trust that are below that midpoint. This level of trust in elections

is well above the level of support in most countries in the 2023 AmericasBarometer; in the average country in the 2023 survey, 38% express trust in elections in their country above the midpoint of the scale (Figure 3.4). Only three countries in the 2023 AmericasBarometer have greater trust in their elections than Grenadians do in theirs.

Trust in elections is sufficiently widespread, so even supporters of the losing party in Grenada’s last election have high levels of trust in the country’s electoral processes. As in most countries, supporters of the party that won the last election have a more positive view of elections than are supporters of the losing party: 67% of NDC supporters have trust

In Grenada, a majority of those who identify with both major political parties say they trust elections. This is a strong sign of commitment to democracy.

The belief that the vote counting process is fair is high in Grenada. Less than 9% of Grenada’s residents think that votes are never counted fairly, while 35% think that they are always counted fairly and are higher than in the average country in the survey where only 30% of the country believes that votes are always counted fairly.

There is less confidence, however, in other aspects of Grenada’s electoral process. In particular, the public was asked whether votes in Grenada are secret:

*Politicians can find out who each person voted for. Would you say it happens always, sometimes, or never?*

Those who say that politicians can never find out how people voted (28%) outnumber those who believe politicians always can find out how someone voted (19%). However, the share of the public that believes that politicians can never find out how you voted is below the 29% who are confident in ballot secrecy in the average country in the 2023 AmericasBarometer.


While trust in Grenada’s elections and the belief that votes are counted fairly and are secret are widespread in Grenada, some groups are more convinced that elections function well. Confidence in all three areas of the electoral process is significantly higher among older residents of Grenada than they are among younger cohorts. The most educated are also more likely to have confidence in Grenada’s elections or to believe that votes are counted fairly or are secret.<sup>13</sup> Finally, the wealthy are most trusting of Grenada’s elections than the poor are, although they do not differ in their beliefs that votes are secret or counted fairly.

in elections while 50% of NNP supporters do.<sup>12</sup> Yet, the level of electoral trust even among NNP supporters is well above the average country in the survey.

The AmericasBarometer further explores how the public evaluates electoral administration by asking about different aspects of the election process. Respondents were first asked about the vote counting process with the question:

*Votes are counted correctly and fairly. Would you say it happens always, sometimes, or never?*

**Figure 3.4** A majority of Grenadians trust elections in their country, which is higher than most countries in the 2023 AmericasBarometer



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer 2023



### PUBLIC TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS IS HIGH

Representative democracy requires more than elections; it requires a well-performing parliament and political parties to represent and aggregate public opinion. The AmericasBarometer asks respondents:

*To what extent do you trust the Parliament?*

*To what extent do you trust political parties?*

Respondents again answered using a seven-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “a lot.” As in most countries, trust in the parliament is higher than trust in political parties. While 47% of the public has trust in parliament above the midpoint of the scale, 38% has a similarly high level of trust in political parties. Both of these levels of trust are high in comparative perspective; only one country in the current survey wave has significantly higher levels of trust in the parliament than Grenada does, and no country has higher levels of trust in political parties (**Figure 3.5**). The current high level of trust in the parliament in Grenada is relatively new, as trust in the parliament has grown

substantially from the 33% who trusted the parliament in 2016 when this question was last asked.<sup>14</sup>


There are significant differences in institutional trust across age groups.<sup>15</sup> Levels of trust in both institutions are lowest for those in the 26-35 and 36-45 age cohorts, with the highest levels of trust in those in the 56-65 and 66+ cohorts. However, the percentage of those aged 26-35 that trust Grenada’s parliament (38%) and political parties (32%) is well above the level of trust in the legislature (30%) or political parties (19%) in the average country in the 2023 survey. The wealthy are also more trusting of the parliament than those with less wealth are, but those differences are small and there is not a similar difference in trust of parties along wealth lines.

### MOST RESIDENTS BELIEVE GRENADA IS A DEMOCRACY, BUT SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY HAS DECREASED SLIGHTLY

While views of specific institutions and processes are important, ultimately democracy is a package. And while there is widespread consensus that Grenada is a democracy, how much is the public satisfied with how democracy is functioning in the country? The AmericasBarometer survey asks respondents to evaluate the current state of democracy in the country through the question:

*In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Grenada?*

**Figure 3.5** Trust in parliament and trust in political parties in Grenada are high in comparative perspective



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer 2023

Representative democracy requires a well-performing parliament and political parties to represent public opinion. Only one country in the 2023 round has significantly higher levels of trust in the parliament than Grenada does, and no country has higher levels of trust in political parties.

**55%**  
of Grenadians are satisfied with the way democracy works.

The majority (55%) of the Grenadian public is satisfied with democracy, although only 5% feel “very satisfied” (Figure 3.6). Satisfaction with democracy also is higher in the country than in many other neighboring countries (see the Spotlight following this chapter). Only five countries have levels of satisfaction with democracy that are higher than in Grenada. However, while the majority are satisfied with democracy, the proportion of the public that is satisfied is lower in 2023 than it was in 2016.


As with many of the other indicators of how the public evaluates democratic practices in Grenada, satisfaction with democracy has a curvilinear association with age: it is highest among the oldest cohorts and then declines among younger cohorts before rebounding slightly among those aged 18-25.<sup>16</sup> Satisfaction with democracy is also significantly higher among those with higher levels of education.

**STRONG BELIEF THAT DEMOCRACY IS THE BEST SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT HAS FALLEN**

While the other indicators in this chapter focus on how the public views democratic institutions and actors in Grenada, the AmericasBarometer also measures support for democracy in the abstract. One key indicator is the question of whether people agree or disagree with the statement “Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.” Most Grenadians support democracy, with 60% giving


a response above the midpoint of the 7-point scale (Figure 3.7). The share of the public that is above the midpoint of the scale has not changed since the 2016 survey wave. However, the proportion of the public that strongly agrees that democracy is the best system of government (i.e., a value of 7 on the 1-7 scale) has declined 9 percentage points since the last AmericasBarometer wave in Grenada in 2016. In that same period, the share of the public who express the two highest levels of disagreement with democracy (1 or 2 on the 1-7 scale) increased from 6% of the public to 13%.

**Figure 3.6** The majority of Grenadians are satisfied with Grenada’s democracy, but satisfaction with democracy has fallen since 2016



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2016-2023

**Figure 3.7** Strong support for democracy in Grenada has fallen since 2016



Source: LAPOP Lab AmericasBarometer Grenada 2016-2023

Older Grenadians are much more likely to agree that democracy is the best system of government than younger respondents. This divergence is a relatively new phenomenon: in 2016 there were few differences by age, but support for has increased among the older cohorts and decreased among the younger ones.


While the share of the public who are above the midpoint remains a majority and is much larger than the share who are below the midpoint, opinions of democracy have become more negative.

public satisfaction with democratic institutions and actors than most countries in the Americas, the public's normative commitment to democracy is not as deep.

While belief in democracy has fallen at the margins in Grenada, it remains strong compared to many other countries in the Americas. In the average country in the 2023 survey wave, 59% of the public believes that democracy is the best system of government (Figure 3.8) and 24% of the population has the strongest agreement (7 on the 1-7 scale) that democracy is the best system. Support for democracy is slightly above each of these survey averages. However, while Grenada stands out as having higher levels of


Like in most other countries, support for democracy is higher among the most educated.<sup>17</sup> However, the most striking differences in democratic support are due to age—older respondents are much more likely to agree that democracy is the best system of government than younger respondents (Figure 3.9). This divergence across age cohorts is also a relatively new phenomenon: in 2016 there were few differences by age, but support for has increased among the older cohorts and decreased among the younger ones.

**Figure 3.8** Support for democracy in Grenada is just above average among countries in the Americas



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer 2023

**Figure 3.9** Belief that democracy is the best system of government is more stratified by age in 2023 than it was in 2016



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2016-2023

## Conclusions

Democracy is under stress in many parts of the Americas. Leaders have been impeached, traditional parties have decayed, and populists have been elected instead, and protests in many countries are widespread. Underlying these dynamics in many places are low levels of public satisfaction with democracy and a falling belief that democracy is the best system of government. For the countries that were included in both the 2014 and 2023 AmericasBarometer surveys (which does not include Grenada but includes 17 Latin American countries, as well as Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname, and The Bahamas), satisfaction with democracy in the average country has fallen from 55% to 39% and agreement that democracy is the best system of government has fallen from 66% to 59%. Many people in the Americas are dissatisfied with how democracy is functioning and, while majorities still support democracy, cracks in that support may be falling.

Against this backdrop, the 2023 AmericasBarometer highlights several positive trends in Grenada. Specific support for democracy in Grenada is high compared to other countries in the hemisphere, especially the belief that politicians listen to the public and are not corrupt, trust in elections, and trust in political institutions. The belief that politicians listen to the public and trust in the parliament, the two variables that were also measured in the previous AmericasBarometer survey in Grenada, have increased. Then while satisfaction with democracy has fallen, it remains well above the regional average. Levels of satisfaction are often lower for the poorer or less educated citizens and are consistently stratified by age but are high across most groups. While many individuals see room for democracy to improve and for institutions to be strengthened in Grenada, public pressure for radical changes to the democratic order is likely to be smaller in Grenada than in many other countries in the hemisphere.

The public's positive view of democratic institutions and actors documented in this chapter reflects the strong economic performance and low crime rate documented in the previous chapters and the low levels of perceived corruption documented above. Specific support for democracy is often closely tied to how the public views economic performance, insecurity, governance, and other outcomes under the current system.<sup>18</sup>

In the case of Grenada, multivariate analyses do not find a significant association between feelings of insecurity and trust in elections, the parliament, parties, or satisfaction with democracy. Feelings of insecurity are, however, positively correlated with how the public views the economy compared to the last year and the belief that few politicians are corrupt.<sup>19</sup>

Grenada's low crime rate relative to its neighbors also likely contributes to the high levels of satisfaction with its democracy. Multivariate analyses reveal a positive and significant association between public satisfaction with democracy in 2023 and several factors: the proportion of people who feel insecure in their neighborhood, those who believe the economy is improving, and those who think few politicians are corrupt.<sup>20</sup> Inasmuch as Grenada's economy can continue its recovery and crime and corruption can continue to be perceived as rare, public support for democratic institutions should remain high.

The clean and fair election of 2022 is also likely to have buoyed public support for democracy. Satisfaction with democratic institutions usually increases after elections, especially if those elections are free and fair.<sup>21</sup> Grenadians who think that votes are usually counted fairly, for example, also tend to have greater trust in elections, in the parliament and parties, and greater satisfaction with democracy. Maintaining public support for democracy requires that the institutions of democracy continue to work well, and so steps that can increase the shares of the public that believe that votes are secret and are counted fairly should strengthen support for the democratic system.

Yet public support for democracy as the best system does not have its roots in short-term outcomes with the economy or crime.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, the correlations between levels of belief that democracy is the best system of government and views of the economy or feelings of insecurity are not statistically significant.<sup>23</sup> Instead, support for democracy is associated with public trust that elites are not corrupt.<sup>24</sup> Building this trust in Grenada and in other countries where there is room for it to increase takes time and continued investments in good governance.

Finally, a consistent finding across this chapter is that while views of democratic performance in Grenada are largely positive and commitments to democracy are solid on average, there are strong generational differences among the public, such that older respondents tend to have more positive views than do those in their thirties and twenties. This does not reflect differences in economic outcomes between the age groups because the data in Chapter 2 did not uncover significant age differences in Grenadians' short-term economic fortunes. Nor are experiences with crime different across age groups in Chapter 1. As a result, the specific factors that explain these generations' dissatisfaction are easily apparent from existing data. But these lower levels of satisfaction with democracy and especially in beliefs in democracy among the young adults create the possibility that foundation levels of democratic support will erode in Grenada if these younger generations do not come to believe that democracy will deliver for them as it has for older generations.



## Notes

- 1 See Organization of American States 2022.
- 2 See Caribbean Community 2022.
- 3 e.g., Freedom House 2023; U.S. State Department 2022.
- 4 Costa Rica, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico are the four countries with greater belief that their country is democratic. A large number of countries have equal levels of belief that their country is democratic.
- 5 e.g., Quaranta 2015 and Katsanidou and Eder 2018. While many protestors are democratic and many dissatisfied individuals withdraw from politics instead of protesting, dissatisfied but engaged citizens are the most likely to protest (Christensen 2016).
- 6 Doyle 2011; Pauwels 2014; Roberts 2019; Rooduijn et al. 2016; Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013; Voogd and Dassonneville 2020.
- 7 Jou 2013.
- 8 e.g., Claassen 2020. although the evidence on this point is contested; see the discussions between Tai et al. 2024 and Claassen 2022 on the evidence in Claassen 2020.
- 9 e.g., Booth and Seligson 2009.
- 10 To measure the correlates of how the public views political responsiveness and how they perceive corruption, I modeled each of these variables as ordered logit models as a function of urban/rural status, gender, education level, household wealth, age cohort, partisanship (differentiating those without partisan identification, those who identify with the NDC, those who identify with the NNP, and those who identify with other parties), and skin color. Significant correlations are those that differ from 0 at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
- 11 Or, in other words, answered 5, 6, or 7 to the question.
- 12 e.g., Anderson et al. 2005; Singer 2018, 2023. In fact, in multivariate analyses conducted in this chapter, there is a significant gap between NDP and NNP supporters in levels of belief that politicians listen to the people and are not corrupt and in trust in the parliament and political parties. There is not a significant partisan gap, however, in belief in democracy as the best system across the two parties.
- 13 I modeled each of these variables as ordered logit models as a function of urban/rural status, gender, education level, household wealth, age cohort, partisanship (differentiating those without partisan identification, those who identify with the NDC, those who identify with the NNP, and those who identify with other parties), and skin color. Significant correlations are generally those that differ from 0 at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). The significance of the correlation between education and trust in elections varies by how the categories in the education variable are measured and in some cases is only significant at the  $p < 0.10$  level.
- 14 The question about trust in political parties was not asked in Grenada in 2016.
- 15 I modeled each of these variables as ordered logit models as a function of urban/rural status, gender, education level, household wealth, age cohort, partisanship (differentiating those without partisan identification, those who identify with the NDC, those who identify with the NNP, and those who identify with other parties), and skin color. Significant correlations are generally those that differ from 0 at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
- 16 Democratic satisfaction was modeled as an ordered logit model as a function of urban/rural status, gender, education level, household wealth, age cohort, partisanship (differentiating those without partisan identification, those who identify with the NDC, those who identify with the NNP, and those who identify with other parties), and skin color. Significant correlations are those that differ from 0 at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
- 17 See Finkel and Smith 2011 and Singer 2018 for evidence on the effects of education on democratic support in third-wave democracies. For this analysis, I modeled belief in democracy as an ordered logit model as a function of urban/rural status, gender, education level, household wealth, age cohort, partisanship (differentiating those without partisan identification, those who identify with the NDC, those who identify with the NNP, and those who identify with other parties), and skin color. Significant correlations are those that differ from 0 at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
- 18 For a recent review of the evidence that economic performance and representation generate specific support for democracy, see Singh and Mayne 2023.
- 19 All the ordered logits in this chapter were replicated with controls for the perceived state of the economy, perceived levels of insecurity, and the belief that politicians were corrupt. Correlations are significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level (two-tailed).
- 20 Estimated from a regression model of percent of the public that is satisfied with democracy in the country on the percent of respondents that thought the economy was improving, who felt insecure in their neighborhood, or who believe that more than half the politicians are corrupt. Significance is tested at the  $p < 0.05$  level (two-tailed).
- 21 See Nadeau et al. 2000 and Blais and Gélinau 2007 for evidence that elections increase satisfaction with democracy generally; and see Moehler and Lindberg 2009, Fortin-Rittberger et al. 2017, Singer 2023, and Higashijima and Kerr 2024 for evidence that this effect is limited when elections are not free and fair.
- 22 For recent evidence on the weaker effects of performance on diffuse support, see Claassen and Magalhães 2022.
- 23 Estimated from a regression model of percent of the public that believes democracy is the best system on the percent of respondents that thought the economy was improving, who felt insecure in their neighborhood, or who believe that more than half the politicians are corrupt. Significance is tested at the  $p < 0.05$  level (two-tailed).
- 24 Levels of belief in democracy is significantly correlated with perceived levels of corruption in the country in the regression described in the previous note. This is consistent with a more general pattern where corruption reduces support for democracy; see Claassen 2020.

Emily Noh

Over one in two Grenadians are satisfied with democracy, ranking high in the region but decreasing significantly from 2016.


Grenada is a parliamentary democracy that has regularly held free and fair elections for the past four decades and consistently ranks high on political rights and civil liberties.<sup>1</sup> Since the communist revolution of 1979 and the subsequent invasion and occupation by the United States in 1983, the country has had multiple peaceful transitions of power. In the 2013 general election, the then-opposition New National Party swept all 15 seats in parliament and did so again in the 2018 general election. The New National Party then went on to lose the 2022 general election, yielding power to the National Democratic Congress.<sup>2</sup> Consistent with these strong democratic practices, Grenadians are among LAC's most satisfied with the country's democracy.

Since 2016, LAPOP's AmericasBarometer has measured satisfaction with democracy in Grenada by asking the following question:

*In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Grenada?*

Here, I code responses into a dichotomous variable to measure overall satisfaction.<sup>3</sup> Ranking fifth in the region, Grenada has one of LAC's highest levels of satisfaction in 2023 and is one of only five countries in LAC where over half the population is satisfied with democracy.


### Grenada has one of LAC's highest levels of satisfaction with democracy



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer 2023

### Less than three in five are satisfied with democracy in 2023, decreasing significantly from 2016

% In general, would you say that you are ... with the way democracy works in Grenada



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2016-2023

Even though it ranks high in the region, a significantly lower proportion of Grenadians are now satisfied with democracy compared to 2016. Fewer than three in five Grenadians (55%) are satisfied with democracy in 2023, decreasing significantly from 63% in 2016.

What individual characteristics are associated with satisfaction with democracy in Grenada? On average, older, more educated, and wealthier adults are more likely to be satisfied.<sup>4</sup> While about one in two individuals in their mid-20s to mid-40s (50-52%) are content with democracy, a significantly higher proportion of individuals who are 56 or older (62-63%) are satisfied. At three in five (61%), those with a superior level of education are more likely to be satisfied with democracy than those with secondary (51%) or no or

primary education (52%). Compared to the lowest wealth group (50%), individuals in the top two wealth groups (59% and 61%) are more likely to be satisfied with democracy. Gender and urban residence are not statistically related to satisfaction with democracy in Grenada.


Overall, public opinion aligns with Grenada's consistent and strong democratic practices. More than half of Grenadians are satisfied with democracy in the country, making it one of only five countries in LAC where the majority of its people are content with democracy. Although still ranking high in the region, satisfaction with democracy declined in Grenada compared to 2016. Individuals in their mid-50s or above, more educated individuals, and wealthier adults are more likely to be satisfied with the country's democracy.

More than half of Grenadians are satisfied with democracy, ranking the country among the highest in LAC. However, satisfaction has decreased significantly since 2016, with fewer than three in five expressing contentment in 2023 compared to 63% in 2016.

**Older, more educated, and wealthier Grenadians are more likely to be satisfied with democracy**

• % who are satisfied with democracy

— 95% confidence interval



Source: LAPOP Lab, AmericasBarometer Grenada 2023

**Notes**

- 1 Freedom House 2023; Central Intelligence Agency 2023.
- 2 BBC 2013; Greaves 2018; Straker 2022.
- 3 Specifically, responses were coded into a binary measure by combining “very satisfied” and “satisfied” into one category, while placing the “dissatisfied” and “very dissatisfied” into a baseline category.
- 4 I performed a logistic regression where the dependent variable is coded as 1 if a respondent is either very satisfied or satisfied with democracy in the country and 0 if not. I include sociodemographic predictors in the model: gender (women vs. men/other), age cohorts, wealth, place of residence (urban vs. rural), and education (none/primary vs. secondary vs. superior).

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## TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR THE 2023 AMERICASBAROMETER IN GRENADA

This survey was carried out between February 28 and July 15, 2023, as part of LAPOP's 2023 AmericasBarometer. It is a follow up to LAPOP's AmericasBarometer Grenada survey of 2016. The 2023 survey fieldwork was carried out by Development Policy and Management Consultants (DPMC) on behalf of LAPOP. Key funding came from Vanderbilt University, USAID, and the Inter-American Development Bank.

Questionnaire pretesting took place from January 31 to February 2, 2023, and interviewer training took place from February 21 to 22, 2023. Pilot surveys were conducted on February 23, 2023. A full copy of the 2023 AmericasBarometer Grenada questionnaire can be found at LAPOP's website at [www.LapopSurveys.org](http://www.LapopSurveys.org).

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,553 people involving face-to-face interviews conducted in English. In the 2023 round, LAPOP used the SurveyToGo© (STG) software, running on Android tablets and phones, to conduct 100% of the interviews.

The survey used a complex sample design, including stratification and clustering. The sample was developed by LAPOP, using a multi-stage probability design, and was stratified by three major regions of the country: St. George, Eastern Region, and Western Region & Carriacou. The sample is representative at the national level and of the three regions. Each stratum was further sub-stratified by size of municipality<sup>1</sup> and by urban and rural areas within municipalities. Respondents were selected in clusters of six in urban and rural areas. Reported statistics or statistical analyses should be adjusted for the design effect due to the complex design of the sample.<sup>2</sup>

The sample frame used for the sample is the 2011 Population Census. The sample is representative of voting age population at the primary stratum level, by urban/rural areas, and by size of the municipalities. Petite Martinique was excluded from the design. During fieldwork a total of six clusters were substituted in Grenada.

The sample consists of 125 primary sampling units and 250 secondary sampling units (sampling points) across the set of all parishes in Grenada. A total of 327 respondents were surveyed in urban areas and 1,226 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is  $\pm 2.5$ . Margin of sampling errors are not adjusted for weights. The final sample achieved in the survey is self-weighted.

For more details on the methodology used in Grenada, see the complete technical report at <https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/grenada.php>.

<sup>1</sup> The sample design includes three different strata of municipalities classified according to their size: (1) small municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants, (2) medium-sized municipalities with between 3,000 and 10,000 inhabitants, and (3) large municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants.

<sup>2</sup> For more information visit <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-designs.php>



## AMERICASBAROMETER DATA AND REPORTS AT A GLANCE

### DATA

The AmericasBarometer datasets feature a common core set of questions that have been asked from 2004 to present day. In addition, LAPOP has datasets that date back to the 1970s. Data files are free and publicly available for download.



Users can also access AmericasBarometer data through our Data Playground. This data analysis tool is free and interactive. It is particularly useful for those individuals unfamiliar with advanced statistical software programs. Data Playground users can analyze AmericasBarometer data through tabulations of a single variable, cross-country comparisons on a map, and cross-tabulations of two variables.



### REPORTS

LAPOP produces numerous reports on the AmericasBarometer and other projects. Our goal is to provide analysis and evidence for scholars and practitioners on public opinion and democratic governance.

*Insights* reports are short briefs produced by students, network affiliates, our researchers, and our faculty. The series is used by journalists, policymakers, and scholars.




*Standard Insights* engage social science research and AmericasBarometer data to develop and assess theories regarding links between public opinion and democracy.

*Topical Insights* use project data to provide evidence and context on a current event.

*Methodological Insights* offer windows into our cutting-edge approaches, report on our innovations, and engage scholars who work at the survey research frontier.

*Global Insights* introduce findings from LAPOP-affiliated research outside the Americas.

*Spotlights* present quick snapshots of AmericasBarometer questions across countries, time, and subgroups.



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Country reports are book length, contain more extensive analyses, and are organized thematically to address findings relevant to democratic governance, strengthening, and stability. They include a focus on topics that stakeholders, especially USAID Missions, identify as important in the local context.

The following AmericasBarometer datasets (■) and reports\* (●) are available for free download on our website ([www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop](http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop)):

	2004	2006	2008	2010
Regional	●	●	●	●
Mexico	●	●	●	●
Guatemala	●	●	●	●
El Salvador	●	●	●	●
Honduras	●	●	●	●
Nicaragua	●	●	●	●
Costa Rica	●	●	●	●
Panama	●	●	●	●
Colombia	●	●	●	●
Ecuador	●	●	●	●
Bolivia	●	●	●	●
Peru		●	●	●
Paraguay		●	●	●
Chile		●		●
Uruguay			●	●
Brazil				●
Venezuela		●	●	
Argentina				●
Dominican Republic	●	●	●	●
Haiti		●	●	●
Jamaica		●	●	●
Guyana		●	●	
Trinidad & Tobago				●
Belize				
Suriname				
The Bahamas				
Barbados				
Grenada				
St. Lucia				
Dominica				
Antigua and Barbuda				
St. Vincent and the Grenadines				
St. Kitts and Nevis				
United States		■	■	■
Canada		■	■	■

\*2023 AmericasBarometer country reports will be available in early 2024.

	2012	2014	2016/17	2018/19	2021	2023
Regional	●	●	●	●	●	●
Mexico	●	●	●	●	●	●
Guatemala	●	●	●	●	●	●
El Salvador	●	●	●	●	●	●
Honduras	●	●	●	●	●	●
Nicaragua	●	●	●	●	●	●
Costa Rica	●	●	●	●	●	●
Panama	●	●	●	●	●	●
Colombia	●	●	●	●	●	●
Ecuador	●	●	●	●	●	●
Bolivia	●	●	●	●	●	●
Peru	●	●	●	●	●	●
Paraguay	●	●	●	●	●	●
Chile	●	●				
Uruguay	●					
Brazil						
Venezuela						
Argentina	●					
Dominican Republic	●	●		●	●	●
Haiti	●	●				●
Jamaica	●	●	●	●	●	●
Guyana						
Trinidad & Tobago						●
Belize						●
Suriname	●					●
The Bahamas						●
Barbados						
Grenada						●
St. Lucia						
Dominica						
Antigua and Barbuda						
St. Vincent and the Grenadines						
St. Kitts and Nevis						
United States			■	■	■	■
Canada			■	■	■	■

## SURVEY METHODOLOGY FOR THE 2023 AMERICASBAROMETER

The AmericasBarometer is a multinational, multiregional, and multicultural (3MC) public opinion survey of democratic values and behaviors of voting-age citizens and permanent residents in the Western Hemisphere.

Respondents are selected through national probability samples in Latin America and the Caribbean, and through nonprobability panels in the United States and Canada. The project uses a standardized core questionnaire and country-specific modules to collect data via face-to-face household surveys, except in Haiti and Nicaragua, where the project uses computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI), and in the United States and Canada, where the project uses self-administered Web surveys. The per-country average sample size of 1,512 respondents enables national and subnational estimations of key population variables.

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## QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

The AmericasBarometer survey instruments consist of a core questionnaire and country-specific modules that measure attitudes regarding, experiences with, and behaviors within political, economic, and social systems. The core questionnaire is a set of structured items that permit valid comparisons across time and space. Country-specific modules measure opinion on context-specific sociopolitical phenomena. As in every round, new questions are designed through workshops with input from country experts and leading scholars in the field. While the average face-to-face questionnaire includes 152 questions and lasts 45 minutes, the average CATI questionnaire includes 77 questions and lasts 20 minutes. The main questionnaire topics in 2023 are democratic values, system support, the rule of law, gender, and migration intentions.

## COGNITIVE PRETESTS

The core questionnaire and country-specific modules are thoroughly pretested with a three-stage iterative cognitive interviewing process. First, LAPOP cognitive interviewers carry out a handful of in-depth tests of new modules to develop early drafts of questionnaire items. Second, LAPOP extensively trains research assistants and consultants to conduct cognitive interviews of the full core questionnaire in selected countries from different regions of the Americas to ensure context variation. Third, a similar process is carried out in all countries for each country-customized questionnaire. For the 2023 AmericasBarometer, local survey institutions recruited pre-test participants, and, in some cases, a small incentive was offered for their participation. Most cognitive interviews were conducted remotely using video or phone calls.

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## SAMPLING

LAPOP uses a stratified, multistage, and clustered sampling strategy to draw national probability samples in countries where the survey is administered face-to-face. LAPOP-trained enumerators interview any eligible respondent available at the time of the survey. A single respondent is selected in each household and no revisits are required. In face-to-face studies, LAPOP uses “frequency matching,” a technique that ensures that the samples achieved mirror the national distributions of age and gender in the sampling frame. Frequency matching is implemented at the cluster level. In countries where the survey is conducted via CATI, LAPOP uses random-digit dialing (RDD) of mobile phones. In cases of unanswered calls, each number selected into the sample is called at least five times before it is discarded.

## WEIGHTS

The 2023 AmericasBarometer sample design strategy in face-to-face studies produce self-weighted observations, with a few exceptions. Datasets in Ecuador, Trinidad & Tobago, The Bahamas, and Brazil use calibration weights to compensate for sample size deviations. LAPOP computes these weights using population distributions by strata for urban and rural population, gender, and age. Weights for Haiti and Nicaragua (CATI) are calculated by estimating baseline probabilities adjusted for eligibility and non-response, then calibrated to the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer country samples on gender, education, age, and region. Cross-time and cross-country weights are standardized so that each country/year has the same effective sample size.

## INTERVIEWER, SUPERVISOR, AND AUDITOR TRAINING

In the 2023 AmericasBarometer is designed as an opportunity for fieldwork personnel to grow their knowledge base and to standardize data collection and monitoring practices. Training workshops include an in-person component, where LAPOP-trained fieldwork personnel instruct interviewers and quality control auditors on logistics, security protocols, and fieldwork monitoring; a virtual component, where LAPOP representatives review the full questionnaire and country samples with each team; a set of pre-recorded training videos that review best practices in survey research, ethical principles, and operations with the data collection platform; and a full pilot of the survey, where fieldwork personnel practice what they have learned before launching the actual survey. Training sessions typically last two full days and all trainings conclude with a learning assessment that interviewers have to pass (>80% correct answers) in order to be certified to work on the project.

## QUALITY CONTROL

The 2023 AmericasBarometer uses LAPOP’s Fieldwork Algorithm for LAPOP Control over survey Operations and Norms (FALCON). FALCON collects multiple types of paradata, including voice recordings and interviewer images, question and questionnaire timing, and interviewer performance indicators. These paradata indicators are monitored daily during data collection so that any corrections or cancellations resulting from a failure to meet quality control standards are made while fieldwork is in progress. Final datasets include high-quality interviews only. Each technical report for an AmericasBarometer survey summarizes the results of this process.



## Acknowledgements

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One way LAPOP achieves its mission of knowledge transfer and capacity building is by involving students in all aspects of the AmericasBarometer. While they gain experience with cutting-edge survey methodologies, they also contribute to the project's success. At the graduate level, the project benefited from engaging the Vanderbilt political science comparative politics graduate student community in various discussions and activities; these students are Sofia Berrospi, Lucas Borba, Shashwat Dhar, Guilherme Fasolin, Margaret Frost, Martin Gou, Facundo Salles Kobilanski, Preeti Nambiar, Emily Noh, Mariana Ramírez, Sofía Rivera, and Alexander Tripp. This round also benefited from the involvement of undergraduate students, including Daniel Ardity, Danni Chacon, Ade Forrest, Audrey Heffernan, Jazmín Los, Adin McGurk, Marco Navarro Stanic, Tomás Majeovsky, Chase Mandell, Krishna Podishetti, Allie Rounds, William Royster, Hedid Rojas Salinas, Samuel Schulman, Carson Viggiano, Evan Wilkerson, and Stanley Zhao.

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Noam Lupu  
Liz Zechmeister  
Nashville, Tennessee  
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The AmericasBarometer is carried out by LAPOP Lab, a center for excellence in international survey research based at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, TN. LAPOP has deep connections to the Latin America and Caribbean region, established during more than five decades of public opinion research. The AmericasBarometer is possible due to the activities and support of a network that spans the Americas. To complete each round, LAPOP partners with individuals, survey firms, universities, development organizations, and others in up to 34 countries within the Western Hemisphere.

Project efforts are informed by LAPOP's mission: to produce objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion; to innovate improvements in survey research; to disseminate project findings; and, to build capacity.

The AmericasBarometer project receives generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. Other institutions that have contributed recently to multiple rounds of the project include Environics Institute, Florida International University, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Over the years, the project has benefited from grants from the United States National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development in Brazil (CNPq), the Ford Foundation, the Open Society Foundations, and numerous academic institutions across the Americas.

The 2023 AmericasBarometer was carried out via face-to-face interviews in 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries, phone surveys in Haiti and Nicaragua, and online surveys in Canada and the United States.

All samples are designed to be nationally representative of voting-age adults. In all, more than 41,524 individuals were interviewed in this latest round of the survey. The complete 2004-2023 AmericasBarometer dataset contains responses from over 385,000 people across the region. Common core modules, standardized techniques, and rigorous quality control procedures permit valid comparisons across individuals, certain subnational areas, countries, regions, and time. AmericasBarometer data and reports are available for free download from the project website: [www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop](http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop). Individuals can also use that website to query the data via an interactive Data Playground. Datasets from the project also can be accessed via "data repositories" and subscribing institutions across the Americas.

Through such open access practices and an extensive network of collaborators, LAPOP works to contribute to the pursuit of excellence in public opinion research and ongoing discussions over how programs and policies related to democratic governance can improve the quality of life for individuals in the Americas and beyond.

LAPOP's AmericasBarometer takes  
the Pulse of Democracy in Grenada

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