Dr. Ian Christopher Levy

 

Lexington Theological Seminary

631 South Limestone Street

Lexington, KY 40508

ilevy@lextheo.edu

 

  MEDIEVAL COMMENTING ON ROMANS FOUR: OLD AND NEW LAW

 

            Medieval biblical commentators were very keen on distinguishing the three ages of law under which the human race has lived: Natural, Written, and that of Grace. Of special interest, most notably beginning in the twelfth century, is the relationship between the sacraments God had assigned to the Jewish people and those to Christians. The fourth chapter of Romans provides commentators an opportunity to examine questions of law and sacraments, for it is here that Paul recounts Abraham's justification by faith prior to the reception of circumcision. Many interesting discussions emerge on what it means to believe God; the distinction between iniquities and sins; that where there is no law there is no trespass; and the difference between a sign and seal. There are also the larger questions of circumcision's relationship to baptism and their relative functions with respect to the blotting out of sin and the reception of grace. As mentioned, the twelfth-century commentators prove perhaps the most interesting, for it is at this time that sacramental theology is really taking shape as a matter of doctrine and law, from Hugh of St. Victor's Sacraments of the Christian Faith (1137) to Gratian's Decretum (1142), and Peter Lombard's Sentences (1155). This paper will focus on twelfth-century commentaries in this context, thereby including such commentators as Peter Abelard, William of St. Thierry, Peter Lombard, and the Glossa Ordinaria of the Laon school. We will also have a look at some of the earliest commentators on Romans, like Origen and Ambrosiaster, with an eye on the impact of St Augustine. Finally, some space is allotted to Thomas Aquinas's thirteenth-century commentary and Summa so as to provide some perspective on where the questions were leading in the high middle ages.

 

                                               

 

 

PART ONE: THE COMMENTATORS

 

                                                            Romans 4:3-5

                        "Quid enim scriptura dicit, 'credit Abraham Deo et reputatum est illi ad iustitiam.' Ei autem qui operatur merces non imputatur secundum gratiam sed secundum debitum. Ei vero qui non operatur credenti autem in eum qui iustificat impium reputatur fides eius ad iusitiam."

            Romans 4:3-5, in which Paul recounts Abraham's willingness to trust, or believe, God stirred comments on just what it means to believe (credere). In Romans 4:3 Paul, quoting Genesis, states that Abraham believed God (credidit Deo) and it was reckoned to him as righteousness. And then in Romans 4:5 Paul says that faith is reckoned as righteousness to the one who believes in him (credenti autem in eum) who justifies the impious. This may be considered pertinent to our topic inasmuch as these verses will spawn discussions about the various levels of belief in relation to Natural Law, Written Law, and Grace.

Here (as elsewhere) we begin with one of the earliest and most influential Latin commentators, active between 366-384, known to us now as Ambrosiaster. While generally believed throughout the middle ages to have been St Ambrose, Erasmus concluded in the sixteenth century that this was not Bishop of Milan, but some otherwise unknown entity, thus christened 'Ambrosiaster.'[1] For Ambrosiaster the aforementioned distinctions of belief are not yet in place. Abraham did not have glory before God because he was circumcised or had abstained from iniquity, but because he believed. Ambrosiaster places the emphasis squarely on human free will here. To believe or not to believe is a matter of will. No one can be compelled to believe what is not manifest, he says, but only invited to believe. The justification of the impious refers to the gentiles who believe in Christ apart from the works of the law; by faith alone they are righteous before God.[2]

Augustine's comments on Romans were quite brief, the product of his early career.[3] His own remarks on Romans 4:3-5 conclude that God grants grace to sinners so that through faith they might live justly, which is to say that they might work well. That people can work well is itself the result of having received grace and so must be attributed to God. Augustine makes no mention here of different sorts of belief.[4] And yet observations scattered in other works proved to have a significant affect on medieval commenting on Romans Chapter Four. In fact, it was Augustine's commentary on the Gospel of John that set the tone for many later comments on Romans 4:3-5. When commenting on John 7:17, Augustine established what became a classic distinction regarding the different forms of belief. Here he argues that resolving to do the will of God refers to believing: "This is the work of God, that you might believe in him (credatis in eum) whom he sent (Jn 6:29)." It is one thing to believe God (credere ei), says Augustine, and another to believe in God (credere in eum). Even the demons believe God, but they do not believe in him. Simply to believe God amounts to believing that what he says is true, while to believe in God means that by believing one loves him (amare), cherishes him (diligere) and enters into him so as to be incorporated into his mystical body. And because Augustine says that this is what Paul means by belief in Romans 4:5, so the definition finds its way into later commentaries on that Epistle. Moreover, Augustine states that this is the faith which God requires of us, and only finds among us because he has first given it. It is the same faith which Paul is speaking of in Galatians 5:6, namely a faith which works through love.[5] It should be noted that a sermon on the Creed attributed to Augustine lays out a three-fold definition which will also be incorporated in later Romans commentaries, whereby credere illi means to believe what God says is true; credere illum is to believe that God exists; and credere in illum is to love God.[6] The Venerable Bede (673-735) will follow this three-fold distinction in his commentary on the Epistle of James.[7]

Despite its later influence, two Carolingian commentators ignore this distinction. The commentaries of Rabanus Maurus (780-856) are largely compilations of patristic sources. When commenting on Romans 4:3-5 he does not really concern himself with the nature of belief itself. He is content to follow Ambrosiaster and Augustine, and simply states that Abraham was justified because he believed.[8] Haimo of Auxerre (active 840-860) was more original and his work was widely read even into the twelfth century. Yet he was not concerned with this distinction either.[9] Abraham's belief refers to his obedience to God's commands, seeing as he left his homeland and believed God's promise about Isaac and then Christ. Abraham's justification, which Haimo equates with the remission of sins, occurred through the faith by which he believed. God justifies the impious not by works but by faith; before the foundation of the world [Eph 1:4] he decreed to save the human race apart from preceding merits.[10] By the tenth century Atto of Vercelli (d. 961) does follow Augustine's lead in his own Romans commentary. Because Paul does not want to give the impression that faith is reckoned as righteousness for everyone indiscriminately, he is clear about the sort of belief that leads to justification. Romans 4:5 is the key, for this promise applies only to those who believe in the one who justifies the impious (credenti in eum). Hence Atto points out that to believe God (credere Deo) means to adapt one's faith to his promises, while to believe in God (credere in Deum) is to invest all one's hope in him.[11] Bruno the Carthusian (1032-1101) the schoolman from Rheims,[12] finds that Paul 'proves' one cannot be justified through the law, but only through faith. Yet Bruno omits any talk of the two forms of belief. He simply states that Abraham deserved to be justified through the faith by which he believed God. At various times and places God promised this to him and he never doubted, but always believed. Having spoken to Abraham, God now applies this standard to all. Thus Romans 4:5 would seem to mean that if someone puts away the works of the law, and believes in the one who justifies the impious, then his faith will be reckoned as righteousness and he will be justified by faith alone apart from all merit. Bruno also offers an alternative reading, however, that will find later support. Perhaps Paul means that while justification does come by faith alone apart from the law, nevertheless the person who has time to work will not be rewarded simply by grace alone. Indeed he should be rewarded for the works he does henceforth since through their merit they serve to assist grace. Yet for those with no such time, like children who die soon after birth, then faith alone will suffice.[13]

To move to the twelfth century is to reckon with the Glossa Ordinaria, a product of the Laon school, which proved to have a lasting influence on medieval biblical commenting. Augustine's commentary on Romans and Galatians were employed by the Gloss, as well Jerome's work on Galatians, Ephesians, Titus and Philemon. But the source most relied upon for the Glossa Ordinaria's Pauline Epistles was Ambrosiaster, who had written the first complete commentary on the Epistles. Of the Carolingian authors, the Gloss makes ample use of Haimo of Auxerre.[14] The Gloss comments on Romans 4:3 and Romans 4:5 separately, and never remarks specifically on the disparity between the fact that Abraham credidit Deo, which is a lesser form of belief, and that God justifies the impious one who credit in eum. Presumably, Abraham embraces both forms, as he believes what God says is true and also enters into God through love. The marginal gloss on Romans 4:3 is reminiscent of Bruno. Belief itself was a sufficient cause of Abraham's justification and so too for others. But those who have time to work will not receive their reward by grace alone, but also as a debt due their work. And for people with no time faith alone will suffice for justification and thus for salvation in keeping with the grace established for all people generally as well as with what God had established for people living before the Law.[15] The comments in the marginal gloss on Roman 4:5 follow the three-fold distinction of belief, noting that Paul did not say credit ei, which simply means to believe that what the speaker is saying is true, something the wicked do as well. Nor did he use a phrase credit illum, for that is just to believe that God exists, which the demons also believe. But rather, following Augustine, credit in eum, thereby loving God and entering into him.[16] The Gloss sets the tone for the rest of the twelfth-century commentators.[17]

Peter Abelard (writing on Romans 1135-1139) also runs through the three types of belief, appealing directly to Augustine's commentary on John.[18] But he also expands upon the content and results of belief. Abraham believed the divine promises no matter how great and incredible, whether this involved leaving his homeland to multiply in another, or trusting in the promise of a son. In keeping with Augustine, Abelard speaks of this as the true faith which works through love. By believing, Abraham freely followed the commands of God. And this is the obedience of faith which makes a person righteous before God, not circumcision or the other corporeal observances which the written law would later command.[19]

For the Cistercian William of St. Thierry (writing on Romans 1138-1145), who also follows the three-fold distinction, to believe in God is itself the work of grace, though noting that Christ works in us and not apart from us. Abraham, he says, exhibited the perfect form of belief, offering himself in complete obedience to God such that his faith was reckoned as righteousness. Abraham credidit Deo when believing the promise about his seed, and credidit in Deum when he obediently went off into an unknown land or offered up his son.[20]

Peter Lombard first commented on the Epistles around 1140 and then revised his work in the later 1150s.[21] Here he also cites the three types of belief found in the Gloss Ordinaria. Following Augustine, the first sort is the faith God requires of us, the faith that justifies the impious. Works are only good when done for the sake of God. And so, faith must come first; for if they do not begin from that basis the work cannot have been done well. He also follows Augustine's own comments on Romans 4:4, that through grace God grants sinners the faith by which they might be justified, so that through faith the just might live, which means to work well.[22]

The monastic commentator, Herveus of Bourg-Dieu (1080-1150) elaborates on the basic principles found in the Glossa Ordinaria. On Romans 4:3 he notes that Abraham believed God who promised that his future seed would be manifold; and because he firmly believed it was reckoned as righteousness. In other words, says Herveus, through his trust Abraham was not only freed from original and actual sin, but was reckoned righteous by God. And if works had not preceded his faith they nevertheless would follow.[23] This leads Herveus into an attempt to reconcile Paul's words with James 2:14-26, which we will not pursue here. On Romans 4:5 he argues, in keeping with his reconciliation of Paul and James, that the person who is justified by faith must not thereafter grow lazy when it comes to doing good works. When a person does good works, after having been justified by the faith he freely received, he does not receive eternal recompense by grace, namely by faith alone, but in keeping what is owed his works. Hence when Paul says that it is not to the one who works he is referring to the who, following baptism, has no time to work or cannot do so owing to some infirmity. In other words, no can merit the initial gift of grace by way of works, for by definition, says Herveus, it is freely given. And in that sense faith is sufficient.[24] Then follows the standard three-fold distinction of belief as he notes that the impious man who does not believe rightly may indeed give to the poor, desire no one else's wife, and commit no fraud; but this is of no avail, since he does none of these things with the proper intention. Such works are not good, precisely because they do not proceed from a good root. Only the person one who is justified by faith performs works of piety and justice.[25]

Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) observes that the righteousness which God reckons to Abraham is not that of exterior works, but the interior faith of the heart which God alone sees. In this vein, he speaks of the act of faith (actus fidei) in keeping with the classic three-fold distinction of belief. Thus he points out that to believe in God refers to a faith that is properly ordered to its end, which it achieves through charity, since believing in God means to enter in to him and this is what charity accomplishes.[26] These distinct forms of belief would become a mainstay of medieval theology as the schoolmen came to distinguish between formed and unformed faith, namely between simple belief in the truths of the faith and a faith that is perfected by charity. An unformed faith can coincide with mortal sin, whereas a formed faith cannot. Similarly, the theologians made a distinction between credulitas and fiducia, the former being a merely intellectual assent and the latter a confidence in God to save.

 

                                                Romans 4:7-8

"Beati quorum remissae sunt iniquitates et quorum tecta sunt peccata. Beatus vir cui non imputabit Dominus peccatum."

Here Paul is quoting from Psalm 31:1-2 (Vulgate). It is worth repeating the passage in order to highlight the key terms which will elicit much commentary. "Happy are those whose iniquities (iniquitates) are forgiven (remissae), and whose sins (peccata) are covered (tecta); blessed is the man against whom the Lord will not impute (imputabit) sin."

Origen (185-254) sees here an internal ordering of the soul. The conversion of the soul begins with its abandonment of evil with the result that it merits the forgiveness of iniquities. It then begins to do the good, thereby covering its previous sins with good works. When it will finally reach perfection, so as to cut off every root of evil such that no trace can be found, then it will find blessedness when the Lord can impute no sin.[27]

Ambrosiaster argues that to forgive, to cover, and not to impute, all amount to same thing. Yet by speaking in this way Paul is displaying the richness of God's mercy, for when God covers he forgives, and when he forgives he does not impute. And given the variety of sins, Paul speaks of three grades. The first is iniquity or impiety when one fails to acknowledge God; the second refers to a grave sin in works; and the third to a light sin in works. Yet all three are obliterated in baptism.[28] Ambrosiaster specifically rejects the notion that this passage could refer to penitence, inasmuch as it speaks of the happy person (beatus), though penitents labor for the forgiveness of sins with much distress. Nor could it apply to martyrs, seeing as they acquire glory through suffering. Rather, says Ambrosiaster, the prophet foresees the happy age that will arrive with the coming of Christ, and announces to the blessed a time when, without toil and works, their sins will be forgiven through baptism, meaning that they will be covered and not imputed. Yet now, the Apostle, in the fullness of time, filled with more grace than the prophets, speaks of baptism where there is not only remission of sins, but also justification.[29]

Pelagius's Romans commentary came down to the medieval commentators in an interpolated version attributed to Jerome.[30] According to pseudo-Jerome/Pelagius, what is repented of is not retained, and what is covered does not appear, and thus is never imputed. He then distinguishes between the three words. Some say sins are forgiven through baptism, covered by works of penance, and not imputed through martyrdom. Others say that, having forgiven sins through baptism, one must increase in charity towards God which will then cover a multitude of sins, so that henceforth they are not imputed, while by daily good works past evils are overcome.[31] He does not himself opt for one reading or the other.

Gregory the Great (540-604), commenting on Psalm 31, seems to have influenced future Romans commentators when he made the case that the iniquities forgiven are the 'original iniquities' cleansed through baptism; while the sins covered are those 'actual sins' which occur after baptism. Like Origen, he also says that sins are covered when one superimposes good works upon the evil.[32]

Haimo likely has Gregory's comments in mind when he says that "Happy are those whose iniquities are forgiven," refers to all sins (peccata) forgiven in baptism, while "those whose sins are covered," refers to those forgiven through penance after baptism. He may also be following Gregory and/or Origen when he notes that a thing is covered when it is not seen, and in that sense we hide our sins when superimposing the good works of righteousness upon evil deeds by way of a worthy penance. Haimo points out that some authors say that iniquity (iniquitas) refers to what comes before the law, while sin (peccatum) refers to what comes after; or that iniquity belongs to thoughts and sin to deeds. And then, likely appealing to Origen's comments on Romans 4:15 (see below), he notes that some others say that iniquity is committed against the law and sin against nature and conscience. But Haimo seems reluctant to follow this strict divide and observes that one term is very often substituted for the other.[33]

Atto observes that the Psalmist is speaking of three things here: to forgive iniquities, cover sins, and not impute sin. He notes that some say iniquities are forgiven through penitence and not imputed in martyrdom. But one must remember, says Atto, that the text does not say, 'in whom sins are not found,' but rather: 'whose sins are covered.' Thus he chooses to follow Gregory's position that sins can be covered not only through confession, but by superimposing good works, such that God will not notice them, which is to say that he will not punish them. This is what the Psalmist meant when he said: "Turn away your face from my sins (Ps 50:11)." And we should believe that all this occurs in baptism, for there can be no greater happiness than to labor free from penitence and attain the remission of all one's sins.[34]

For Bruno, the whole Psalm cited by Paul is meant to commend the grace of God, thus proving that no one can be justified except through grace. Here the Rheims master will draw a distinction between concupiscence, actual sin, and original sin. In fact, the question of original sin and its consequences received increased attention by the late eleventh century and would become a mainstay among the commentators. Indeed, one might argue that the scholastic doctrine of original sin was developed within the tradition of biblical commenting. Bruno argues that the iniquities which are forgiven refer to the tinder of sin (fomes peccati), namely the inborn concupiscence, or inclination to actual sin. This is forgiven and debilitated so that it cannot pass into action, provided that the baptized use their strengthened free will. But just because concupiscence is forgiven this does not suffice for salvation unless the past sins are also forgiven. Bruno thus offers his own annotated reading such that Paul speaks of those "whose [actual] sins are covered" in baptism, which means that the Lord does not see them to punish. And finally: "Happy is the one to whom the Lord will not impute [original] sin."[35]

In the Glossa Ordinaria the marginal gloss states that iniquities refer to original sin (peccatum originale), explicitly equated here with the fomes peccati, which can be called concupiscence, the law of the members, or the weakness of nature. Here we also get a more thorough treatment of the effects of baptism in relation to original sin. Prior to baptism there exists both guilt (culpa) and punishment (poena), while afterwards there is only punishment. The Gloss informs the reader that it is called original sin because it is contracted from the corrupt condition of our origin, and because we are conceived under the corrupt law of concupiscence derived from the sin of the first man.[36] The Gloss will follow Ambrosiaster, though without attribution, in delineating the three grades: the iniquitous failure to acknowledge the creator, sins in works, and the lighter sins which are not imputed.[37]

Abelard finds that Paul is speaking generally here about both Jews and gentiles. He too will distinguish between the various terms employed. Iniquity is forgiven when its punishment (poena) is pardoned through grace, which could otherwise have been exacted according to justice. And this grace, says Abelard, is the foundation upon which the salvific edifice is built. Sins are forgiven through the tears of penitence when the sinner is reconciled to God and liberated from the pains of gehenna. Thereupon the sins are covered when satisfaction follows penance in this lifetime, though this satisfaction may also be said to extinguish the purgatorial pains of the age to come. Abelard ponders the change in number from Beati quorum to Beatus vir. The Blessed Man is none other than the man who is united to God in the one person of Jesus Christ. He is the Blessed Man of Psalm 1:1 who does not stray into the counsel of the wicked, having never contracted any debilitation from the corruption of sin. Thus he is the one to whom the Lord imputes no sin, for he was neither conceived in sin nor did he commit any sin. The blessedness achieved can refer to the three classes of the saved: children saved in baptism and saints through martyrdom; penitents who correct their sins through condign satisfaction; and lastly the Savior alone. When Paul speaks of those whose iniquities are forgiven he is referring to children who, according to the Psalmist (Ps 50:7) are conceived in iniquity and yet are saved from incurring the damnation of original sin. As for the others, they have covered their past sins by the satisfaction of good works.[38]

Unlike the scholastic twelfth-century commentators, William the Cistercian monk, is not interested in the question of original sin here, and instead emphasizes that these verses speak to grace apart from all merit; the remission of sins is freely given. Like Origen, he observes the order by which iniquities are first forgiven and then sins covered. In conversion there is the relinquishing of evil which merits the remission of past evils; and thereupon the individual evils are covered over by more and more good deeds. William will also follow Origen in noting that iniquity is anomia in Greek, thus referring to what is against the law, while sin is committed against nature.[39]

The other monastic commentator, Herveus, also avoids the whole question of original sin. He too is content to follow Origen in saying that iniquity refers to working against or outside the law, and so in Greek is called anomia. Sin, on the other hand, refers to working against what nature teaches and lapsing from what conscience dictates. In this way iniquity pertains to the Jews and sin to the gentiles. Herveus admits, however, that in one sense iniquity could also apply to the gentiles since they were without the law, and thus anomia. He concludes that in baptism iniquities are forgiven, meaning blotted out, and sins are covered, since they are no longer looked upon with respect to punishment.[40]

For Lombard, like the Gloss, the iniquities refer to original sin, understood as concupiscence. Adults will continue to be moved by concupiscence even when they are regenerate, but it will not reckoned as sin (peccatum). Nevertheless, following Augustine, their offspring are born fettered by original sin.[41] Lombard too notes that it is called original sin because it is contracted from the corrupt condition of our origin. Because we are descended from Adam through the propagation of the flesh we are bound by sin.[42]

Aquinas breaks sin down into three categories: original sin, actual mortal sin and actual venial sin. The iniquity refers to original sin because it is the lack of original righteousness. It was through this equanimity that human reason was subjected to God, the inferior powers of man subjected to his reason, and his body to the soul. This equanimity is lost through original sin with the result that reason is no longer subject to God, the lower powers rebel against reason, and the body is led from obedience to the soul into corruption and death. Original sin is said to be forgiven, says Aquinas, in the sense that by grace it will not be punished, even though it does remain throughout this life in the form of concupiscence. Actual mortal sins are covered from the divine gaze such that God does not see them to punish. And while venial sins are light they still manage to keep people apart from God.[43]

 

                                                            Romans 4:11

            "Et signum accepit circumcisionis signaculum iustitae fidei quae est in praeputio."

This verse also bears repeating: "He received the sign (signum) of circumcision as a seal (signaculum) of the righteousness of faith which he had while still uncircumcised." Origen drew what would become a popular distinction between the sign and the seal. The sign refers to an instance when one things appears and another is indicated, an example being Christ's words about Jonah in Matthew 12:39, as well as what Simeon said of Christ in Luke 2:34.[44] Carnal circumcision, therefore, was a sign of spiritual circumcision. Something is called a seal, however, when a protective guard is set in place in order to preserve a thing for a period of time, and may not be unsealed except the person who impressed it. Thus the seal signified the righteousness of faith which Abraham deserved to receive even when as yet uncircumcised, as well as the promise that he would be the father of many nations. And this could only be unsealed after the fullness of gentiles has come in and all Israel is saved (Rom 11:25-26).[45]

Ambrosiaster does not refer to Origen's distinction, but he does note that the power of circumcision has no dignity in itself, thus functioning only as a sign. Believers are called to accept the sign so that they might imitate the faith of Abraham.[46] Nor does Pseudo-Jerome refer to Origen's distinction. He simply remarks that circumcision is not superfluous, seeing as it is a sign of righteousness, though it cannot increase it.[47]

We noted that Augustine never produced a really extensive exposition of Romans, and what he did produce was not indicative of his more mature thought. Hence his influence on later Romans commentators could be felt through separate works. In fact, Augustine set the tone for much medieval commentary regarding the purpose and effectiveness of circumcision when arguing for the reality of original sin in his debate with the Pelagian bishop, Julian of Eclanum. In his oft-quoted On Marriage and Desire, Augustine asks how one accounts for the institution of circumcision on the eighth day, the neglect of which is so severely punished (Gen 17:14), if there really were no original sin. Circumcision was instituted among the people of God as the seal (signaculum) of the righteousness of faith (Rom 4:11), thereby signifying the cleansing from sin and functioning as baptism does today. Abraham is proof that there was justification by faith prior to circumcision. And very important for later discussions, Augustine makes it clear that the ancients were justified by the same faith in Christ. Thus the eighth day is a symbol (sacramentum) of the eternal eighth day, or age, when the ancient righteous will be saved in Christ.[48] Augustine's equation of the stone knife used in circumcision with Christ the rock who cuts away sins, posed in a sermon on Philippians 3:3-16 (nos enim sumus circumcisio), would be taken up by Bede and then by many future Romans commentators.[49] Also of lasting influence was Augustine's argument in the City of God that it would indeed seem unjust for an infant to be condemned simply for having broken the covenant of circumcision (seeing as he had no control over this) were it not for the fact that he was already guilty of having broken the original covenant by having sinned in Adam.[50] Hence one finds that the Glossa Ordinaria's comments on Genesis 17:4 are indebted to Augustine when answering the question why a child should perish when his parents neglect to circumcise him. The answer being that the covenant is not based upon works, but upon the its origin in the first man which children have rendered void, since all sinned in Adam. Indeed, all are born sinners and so all perish if not liberated through regeneration.[51] This comment, albeit not on Romans but on Genesis, marks what will be the consensus among twelfth-century theologians and lawyers.

Other Church Fathers proved influential on this subject as well, even as their remarks are not drawn from Romans commentaries. Gregory established that what the water of baptism does for Christians so among the ancient gentiles faith alone accomplished for children, and power of sacrifice for adults. For the race of Abraham this was accomplished through mystery of circumcision.[52] In this vein, Bede would betray the influence of Augustine, offering what became a classic means of distinguishing the relative effectiveness of circumcision and baptism. In a homily written for the celebration of Christ's circumcision (Lk 2:21) he argued that circumcision was the cure for the wound of original sin during the time of the Law, just as baptism is in the age of grace. And yet because circumcision could not open the gates of heaven prior to Christ's passion, the faithful Israelites would have to wait in peaceful expectation for their entrance into glory. Moreover, he ties the strict stipulations of the covenant in Genesis 17:14 to Christ's words to Nicodemus in John 3:5 on the necessity of being born again through water and the Spirit.[53] Thus each age had its initiatory sacrament which proved a sine qua non for salvation.

As for the medieval commentators, Haimo (like Ambrosiaster) will accept that circumcision is a sign of righteousness, but not a means of increase. It is meant to signify the righteousness of Christ which comes by faith. He also recites Origen's position on the sign and the seal. And following Augustine, he notes that it takes place on the eighth day, thereby signifying the Lord's resurrection. It had to remain as a type and figure until it was truly completed with the coming of Christ, at which point the seal of carnal circumcision under which it lay covered could be wholly abolished.[54] Atto also recounts Origen's distinction, noting that all the gentiles who follow in the footsteps of Abraham's faith will becomes his sons, having been circumcised in the heart rather than the flesh.[55] Bruno does not cite Origen's position explicitly and just notes that the seal, like the wax into which a seal is imprinted, contains within it what does not outwardly appear. Thus the circumcision of the flesh was a sign of interior righteousness, which few Jews would heed. The seal of the righteousness of faith is that righteousness which comes through faith.[56]

The Glossa Ordinaria also follows Origen, likely via Haimo, on the distinction between sign and seal. Like Augustine, the eighth day signifies the end of the age when all the oldness of guilt and punishment will be taken away. The Gloss offers five reasons for the institution of circumcision: for the sake of obedience; as a sign of Abraham's great faith; to differentiate the Israelites from other nations; to demonstrate charity of mind and bodily modesty; and because there could be no better way to signify that Christ removes original sin. That it occurs on the eighth day by means of a stone knife signifies that eighth age when the elect will rise and all their bodily and spiritual corruption will be cut away by Christ the rock (1 Cor 10:4). Moreover, this sacrament has a two-fold reality (res), namely the circumcision from present sins and the removal of all corruption in the future. Like Bede, the Gloss notes that circumcision was the remedy for original sin in its own time as baptism is now. And following Gregory, baptism avails for Christians as sacrifices and faith did for the gentiles, and circumcision for the Jews. As for the change of sacraments, the Gloss contends that this occurred because baptism is more perfect, more common, more full of grace, and open to women as well. Indeed, baptism not only forgives sins as circumcision does, but also augments virtues by conferring cooperating grace.[57]

For Abelard, circumcision is a sign of one thing and a seal of another. It is a sign of the carnal sons of Abraham and a seal of the spiritual sons, since he is both father of Jews according to the flesh and gentiles through faith. Abelard too recites Origen's theory, though he is explicitly reliant upon Haimo's commentary for it. He notes that a signaculum is like a sigillum which is impressed upon a thing that it might be hidden, and so refers to the invisible spiritual sons of Abraham who were yet to come. The sign of circumcision is a sign of the carnal Israel by means of which that people may be distinguished from the rest, while the seal of the righteousness of faith is the sacrament of the spiritual circumcision which only the faithful gentiles possess. But Abelard also finds another difference between the sign and the seal. The former is a large sign in the flesh comprising all the good and bad alike, while the seal is small and thus a sign of the righteousness of Abraham, since his heirs through righteousness are few in number. The one is exterior and refers to many and the other symbolizes the righteousness of just a few.[58]

Abelard has a good bit to say about circumcision. He follows Augustine and Gregory in saying that circumcision was for the ancients what baptism is for Christians.[59] He accepts Bede's position that circumcision forgiven the sins of the ancients, even as the gate of heaven remained closed. Likewise, those who had been baptized with Christ's baptism could not yet enter heaven prior to his passion. The circumcision of the flesh is a sign of the interior circumcision of the soul, just as the washing of the exterior baptism is a sign of the inner washing of the soul through the remission of sins. He also notes the fittingness of choosing this bodily member, since it is the means of transmitting sin to one's offspring. Following the first transgression the woman was not afflicted with a penalty like circumcision, for she would experience enough pain in her genitals, through which sin is likewise transmitted. Hence the pain of childbirth (Gen 3:16) would serve as the remedy for her original sin, just as circumcision did for men. It is also possible that male circumcision specifically signifies the blessed man (Christ) who alone was conceived without concupiscence, taking up a pure flesh wholly free from the foreskin of uncleanness. Abelard adopts the traditional position that circumcision takes place on the eighth day, thereby signifying the splendidness and beatitude of that day promised to the saints, to those alone who have lived innocently like children (Matt 18:3). It also signifies the day of resurrection when flesh will be resumed without the added corruption of sin, as that will be the true circumcision in the spoliation of the old man, now free from all carnal concupiscence.[60]

Abelard then proceeds to tackle the question as to whether infants who die before the eighth day would be damned inasmuch as they have not yet received the commanded circumcision (Gen 17:4), nor have had sacrifices offered on their behalf prior to the maternal purification on the fortieth day. This was clearly a topic of much discussion at the time. For his part, Abelard admits that it seems cruel to damn such children, seeing as they are prohibited from being circumcised until that eighth day. After all, the rite is obligatory and yet when they were in fact ready to receive it they had to wait until the appointed time. Nevertheless, Abelard points out that the Savior cannot institute anything which would stand in the way of salvation, nor enervate a remedy which would benefit so many people. Here he draws a parallel with the Christian sacrament of baptism, which underscores his rejection of the so-called baptism by desire. Some people will have to go without baptism when there is no water, since it was by water alone that the Lord instituted the sacrament. And in this case they cannot be saved unless martyrdom intervenes. Thus we enter the realm of the divine mystery: God alone knows why he elects and why he reprobates and would not allow the elect to die without the requisite sacrament. Based upon the authority of Scripture, which we hold to be unshakeable, says Abelard, we are not bold enough to assert that anyone of Abraham's seed was saved without circumcision once it had been instituted, unless perhaps they were killed on behalf of the Lord, as with the Holy Innocents (Matt 2:16-18). This would only apply to the seed of Abraham, however, since some of the faithful gentiles who lived after the institution of circumcision, though before the coming of Christ, died uncircumcised and yet were saved. By the rites of sacrifice which Job offered up for his sons their actual and original sin was expiated (Job 1:5), and so too for Abel and Noah (Rom 2:14). He looks to Isidore of Seville who had pointed out that the Jews were not alone in awaiting the coming of Christ. There were many holy people among the gentiles possessed of the gift of prophecy to whom Christ was revealed through the Holy Spirit.[61]

To better grasp Abelard's position a word should be said about his rather controversial view on the effects of the Fall dealt with in the context of Romans 5:12-19. For Abelard, sin strictly speaking means guilt (culpa); while more broadly it can mean punishment (poena). Thus, when reading the Latin of Romans 5:12 which speaks of Adam "in whom all people sinned (in quo omnes peccaverunt)," Abelard takes it to mean that all incurred the punishment for sin (poenam peccati incurrerunt).[62] Infants, he says, bear the punishment (poena) though not the guilt (culpa). And yet, since they are conceived in the sin (peccatum) of carnal concupiscence, which their parents incurred from the first transgression, they are need of the absolution of baptism. They are under the obligation of another's sin, just as they are under the faith of their godparents' intercessory confession. The one born under the obligation of sin is not yet able to make satisfaction for himself, but is cleansed by the sacrament of divine grace. One should not be surprised that what is forgiven the parents is still demanded of the children, however, since the vicious generation of carnal concupiscence transmits sin (peccatum) and thus deserves wrath. Hence Ephesians 2:3 refers to the wrath from which the First Parents were freed by their own satisfaction. Abelard offers the example of the poor man who may subjugate himself and his children to a lord, and then later acquire freedom for himself by some price or virtuous deed, while not acquiring the same freedom for his children. In this vein, the sanctified parents can bear sinful children just as the grain cleansed of chaff brings still forth tainted wheat.[63]

William follows Augustine in holding that all the righteous ancients were justified by the very same faith in Christ. While Christians believe in what was past, the faithful Hebrews believed in what was to come, revealed as it was to them by the Holy Spirit so that they might be saved. He notes that the circumcision of Abraham, like Christian baptism, was suited for its time, a seal of faith signifying the circumcision of the heart or the cleansing of one's conscience. Yet as the circumcised beget the uncircumcised and the baptized the unbaptized, so both sorts of parents transmit original sin (vitium originis). As such, were anyone to be saved he would require circumcision then just as one now needs baptism. William also recites Origen's position on the sign and the seal.[64]

Lombard notes that circumcision was merely a sign which demonstrated that Abraham already was righteous; it could not actually bring righteousness about. Circumcision had no great dignity unto itself, but was an exterior sign of inner circumcision, possessing a likeness to the thing signified. Just as the lust of the flesh is removed through circumcision, so the soul is stripped of all the defilement stemming from the first birth. Circumcision was thus received as a sign of justification by faith. He follows Origen on the seal hiding a mystery from enemies and preserved for friends, in this case the faithful. Circumcision was first proposed to Abraham so that it might be commanded under the law, and God tested him to see whether he would abide by it or not. Just as Adam received the commandment that he would not eat of the tree and thus prove his obedience, so circumcision was given to Abraham and his seed.[65] Lombard gives five reasons for the bestowal of circumcision, similar to those in the Glossa Ordinaria. First, so that by obedience Abraham might please God. Second, as a sign of Abraham's great faith, for he believed that he was going to have a son in whom all the gentiles would be blessed by faith, and through which spiritual circumcision might be fulfilled. Third, so that the Hebrew people might be distinguished from the rest of the nations. Fourth, that circumcision be applied to the male member through which mortal creatures are generated, and in which the libido usually dominates, thereby indicating that impudence must also be cut off. And fifth, because nothing could better signify that original sin is abolished by Christ. Every man is born with foreskin and with original sin; just as the circumcised one cuts off the foreskin of his origin, so the baptized one casts off the guilt of his origin and is thus liberated.[66]

Like Augustine, the Lombard notes that circumcision was instituted as a remedy against original sin which we contract from our parents, conceived as we are in concupiscence which dominates the generative member. And because in that member the first man knew the guilt of disobedience, so it was fitting that this member accept obedience. Following the standard line, it is to be done on the eighth day with a stone knife, because after the seventh day of this life all the elect will rise up into the eighth day when the corruption of spirit and flesh will be cut off by Christ the rock and we will be liberated from the servitude of corruption (1 Cor 10:4). And it is through Christ's resurrection which occurs on the eighth day that the souls of all the believers will be circumcised from their sins. Lombard follows the Glossa Ordinaria in saying that the sacrament/mystery (sacramentum) of circumcision signifies two realties (res), namely the circumcision from sin in the present age and the circumcision from all corruption in the age to come. He follows Bede (via the Gloss) on circumcision's ability to forgive sin without opening up the gates of heaven. And he takes after Gregory (via the Gloss) that what the water of baptism accomplishes for Christians, faith alone did for the ancients and their children. He must also address a question taken up as well by the Gloss: if circumcision brought about the remission of sins, just as baptism does, then what was the point of instituting this new sacrament? His answer follows the Gloss almost verbatim. Like the Gloss he says that baptism was more perfect, more common, and more full of grace. But where the Gloss continues to speak of what baptism can do, Lombard phrases the distinction in terms of circumcision could not do. It could only forgive sins; it did not confer the grace necessary for good works, nor did it even bestow, let alone increase, virtues.[67] Noteworthy is that Lombard refers to circumcision as a sacramentum here in his Romans commentary, while in his Sentences he will argue that it cannot be a sacrament in the strict sense of the word, since it could not confer grace. Perhaps he is using the word sacramentum more broadly here in the sense of 'mystery.' At all events, he does make it clear that the rite of circumcision was inferior to baptism because it could only forgive sins and not confer grace. This point will be repeated in his Sentences and later contested by Thomas Aquinas (as we shall see).

Aquinas incorporates Origen's reading without mentioning him. But he does not draw the distinction between the signum and the signaculum so clearly as Origen and the other medieval commentators. He notes that circumcision is called a signaculum for two reasons. In the first place it is like an expressed signum which has a likeness to the thing signified (Ezek 28:12). Thus circumcision had such a likeness to the faith of Abraham, first with respect to the thing believed; for as he believed in the multiplication of his seed, so it is fitting that he would receive the sign in the member of generation. Second, it pertains to the effect of this faith, which is the removal of guilt signified by the removal of the superfluous foreskin. But it is also called a signaculum because it is a signum of something now hidden which will be revealed later to friends. Closed up under the seal of circumcision was the secret of Christ's incarnation from the seed of Abraham.[68]

Like the rest of the ceremonial law, circumcision was instituted for two reasons, says Aquinas. And here we see the sort of precise classifications typical of thirteenth-century scholasticism, though the contents are not really new. First of all, it was instituted for the sake of divine worship to which ceremonies of this sort dispose people. There is then a sub-class of three reasons for circumcision, the first of which being that it signifies the faith and obedience by which Abraham subjected himself to God, such that those who accepted that circumcision would observe that same faith and obedience. That is why it was done in his generative member so as to signify the faith he had in his future offspring. Second, it expresses in a bodily sign what must be done spiritually. For just as from the member of generation, which principally serves concupiscence, the superfluous foreskin is cut off, so the superfluous concupiscence is removed from the human heart. Third, it was through this sign that the people who worshipped God would be distinguished from all the rest. The second main reason for circumcision, and all the other ceremonial rites, is that it functions in comparison to Christ as a figure is compared to truth, and a shadow to the body (Col 2:17). And so it is that bodily circumcision signifies the spiritual circumcision that must take place through Christ. Secondly, it signifies the resurrected body of the elect from whom passibility and mortality will be removed. Following Augustine, that it took place on the eighth day signifies the eighth age of the resurrection, for in the seventh age they rest in Christ. And finally, the stone knife signified that the spiritual circumcision occurs through Christ the rock (1 Cor 10:4).[69]

            Aquinas approvingly cites Bede via the Glossa Ordinaria that circumcision provided the assistance against the wound of original sin in the time of the law, just as baptism does now in the age of grace.[70] But he notes that some (Peter Lombard) say grace was not conferred in circumcision. For the grace of God cannot abide without righteousness, and if righteousness were through the law then Christ died in vain (Gal 2:21). Aquinas admits that this line of thinking does present a problem, for if justifying grace came by way of circumcision then Christ died in vain. On the other hand, Aquinas is sure that there is never remission of sins without grace (Rom 5:1). If that is the case then there must be some way by which grace was conferred via circumcision. He then cites those who say that the grace given in circumcision pertained to the privative effects, namely the removal of guilt, not to the positive effects such as the operation of righteousness. Aquinas rejects this solution, however, on the grounds that in the order of nature the positive effects of any form precede the privative effects. As light does not dispel darkness except through that which it illuminates, so then grace expels guilt by justifying. Thus it is better to say that circumcision as a work performed in itself (ex ipso opere operato) did not possess an effective power either for the removal of guilt or for the operation of righteousness; it was only a sign of righteousness. Rather, it was through the faith of Christ, of which circumcision is a sign, that original sin was taken away and the help of grace conferred to bring about righteous conduct. And that is why circumcision had to be abolished, since it was but a sign of what was to come. The same sign cannot apply to the present, the past, and the future. Baptism, therefore, is a sign of present grace which has a more abundant effect of grace, because the nearer and more present the agent is, the more effectively it operates.[71] In other words, the ancient Hebrews who accepted circumcision as a sign of the coming grace of Christ were indeed justified by grace, though not through the rite of circumcision itself, but rather through their faith in what that rite signified.

 

                                                            Romans 4:15

            "Lex enim iram operatur, ubi enim non est lex nec praevaricatio."

We have seen that Origen's comments on Romans 4:15 were employed by commentators on Romans 4:7-8. For he noted that iniquity (iniquitas) is that which is committed against the law, and so in Greek it is called anomios, meaning 'without the law.' Sin (peccatum), however, is committed against what nature teaches and conscience refutes.[72] Ambrosiaster does not refer to Origen here, nor does he make any distinction between Jew and gentile as later commentators would. He is more concerned with contrasting law and faith. The law was given so that it might render delinquents guilty. But faith is a gift of God's mercy, so that having been made guilty through the law, they would find pardon. Hence faith brings about joy. Paul is not speaking against the law here, says Ambrosiaster, but rather places faith before it, since those who could not be saved by the law are saved by the grace of God through faith. Punishment is generated through the wrath of the law and wrath is born of sin. Thus Paul wants to leave the law behind and flee to faith which forgives sins in order to save. As for Augustine, in his Romans commentary he simply states that this pertains to the punishment meted out to whomever is under the law, but does not elaborate on the status of gentiles.[73]

For Haimo this verse can be taken in two ways. It can mean that where there is no natural law there is no transgression of this law. Or it could be that where there is no Mosaic law, then even if someone sins (peccet) there is still no transgression (praevaricatio); nor is it imputed to him who does not have this law. Hence where precepts of the law exist there is an occasion for transgression, and where there is transgression then greater the wrath of God. And yet it can also mean that where there is no Evangelical Law, as among the pagans, there is no transgression, although they were still not immune from the wrath of God, since they could know the creator through the created order (Rom 1:20). Along these lines, Haimo accepts the idea that there was no transgression among the gentiles who lived without the law of Moses.[74]

The Glossa Ordinaria follows Ambrosiaster in saying that the law works wrath in rendering delinquents guilty, yet notes that this is not because it is the efficient cause of wrath, but rather because it cannot provide the assistance of grace. The Gloss also follows Origen in saying that there can only be transgression where there is law. Paul does not say there is no iniquity, since every iniquitous person does indeed fail to keep the law. And while it is true that those people who did not receive the law can be called iniquitous, they cannot be called transgressors.[75] Abelard too says this refers to those who did not receive the legal precepts, and specifically notes that praevaricatio means transgressio. These people incur no guilt, seeing as they do not voluntarily obey such precepts.[76] William reckons transgression to be a double sin. Without the law there is simply sin (peccatum). But within the confines of the law there is sin as well as transgression of the commandment, and so wrath falls upon the transgressor. As such, there can be no inheritance from the law seeing as it only brings wrath.[77] Lombard follows the common line that those who did not receive the law can be called iniquitous, but not transgressors.[78] Herveus also finds that those without the law can be called iniquitous, not transgressors. Both groups are judged according to their merits, but the wrath of God is greater among the transgressors who knew the law and sinned anyway.[79]

Aquinas points out that some might think that the wrath which the law works applies to observation of the ceremonial law during the time of grace (Gal 5:1-6). But, he says, it may also apply to the moral law; not that precepts of the moral law command anything that would bring down the wrath of God upon those who worthily observe it, but because it does not furnish the grace to fulfill what it commands (2 Cor 3:6). For it is the Spirit which helps our inner weakness. What Paul means is that, although someone who has not received the law could sin (peccare) by doing something contrary to what is naturally just, he is a not a transgressor unless he specifically transgresses the law. Yet every sinner can be called a transgressor if he transgresses the natural law. And because it is more serious to transgress the natural and written law than the law of nature alone, so when the law was given without assisting grace it increased transgression, thereby prompting greater wrath.[80]

 

                                                Romans 4:18

"Qui contra spem in spem credidit ut fieret pater multarum gentium secundum quod dictum est ei, 'Sic erit semen tuum, sicut stellae coeli et arena maris.'"

One should note that many of the medieval commentators included "the stars of the sky and the sands of the sea (Gen 22:17)" in their citation of Romans 4:18, though this is a variant reading of what is otherwise a shorter text in the Vulgate. Haimo concludes that the stars and the sand were spoken of 'hyperbolically by way of a trope.' Human beings cannot count them, of course, though it is true that God can. Haimo reports one doctor as saying that the stars and sand refer to all believers generally from among the Jews and the gentiles. Another doctor says the stars refer only to the elect from both peoples, while the sand are all the infidels and non-believers weighed down by sin.[81] 'Stars' is fitting, says Haimo, for by their light they illuminate the earth like the elect who seek after heaven (Phil 3:20). The sand refers to those heavy, sterile and reprobate people who, by the weight of their sins, are bogged down and bereft of good works.[82] Atto comments on the shorter Romans text, actually pointing out that Paul had offered a briefer version of the Genesis texts, thereby leaving out the reference to the sand and stars. Hence Attto's text must not have included this longer variant. He also notes that this saying must be taken 'hyperbolically,' for even counting from the first human being to the last there have not been so many as the stars and the sand. Rather, it is because they are just as innumerable.[83] For Bruno, the stars are the spiritual sons of Abraham, conspicuous by the light of virtues, while the sand means the unfruitful carnal sons.[84] The Glossa Ordinaria's biblical text also includes the stars and sand, and its interlinear gloss notes that the stars signify the innumerable good, while the sand means the evil. The marginal gloss offers something else again, stating that Abraham first knew that God is three in one, and on account of this merit of faith he received the remission of all his sins. After he was justified, he then received the promise from God so that he would become the father of many nations.[85]

Abelard offers a bit more extended comment. The Jews are compared to the stars, illuminated by the law through faith and restrained by the law from the flux of worldly desires, as though made celestial beings in their hope. On the other hand, the gentiles were bound by no law and followed their concupiscence freely, seeking as they did after earthly desires. And yet it was from among the gentiles that the faith of Abraham would bear the most fruit. To them the words of promise were made, and so it is fitting that the stars and the sand would distinguish the three orders of the Church. The stars are those on fire and glowing. These are the more sublime orders, namely the continent, who are contemplatives burning more fervently with divine love, and the preachers who illuminate others with their doctrine. The sand of the sea signifies the married who dwell as if in the sea, meaning in damp places, indulging in their dissipation and carried away by the current of worldly cares, thereby enduring their bitterness.[86]

Lombard simply states that the good are signified by the stars and the evil by the sand.[87] For Herveus, in the 'mystical' sense, the stars refer to the spiritual sons dwelling in heaven, shining above with the radiance of the virtues; while the sand refers to either the Jews or the carnal Christians whose hearts cast them into the low places as they bear no fruit of good work.[88] And for Aquinas, the stars may be compared to the righteous who have proceeded from the seed of Abraham, and the sand to sinners, seeing as the fluctuations of the world are like those of the sea.[89]

 

                                    PART TWO: THE COLLECTIONS

 

Hugh of St. Victor

Hugh of St. Victor was at once a biblical exegete and a systematic theologian. In about 1137 he compiled his massive treatise, The Sacraments of the Christian Faith, in which he set out God's plan to remedy the illness of human sin. The sacraments are the means of grace, the medicine dispensed by the divine physician for the restoration of the human race. And like a careful doctor, God knows just which remedies were appropriate for the unique conditions of his patients. For Hugh, the sacraments of the Natural and Written Law were signs or figures of those now dispensed in the age of grace. But, even as signs, they were a genuinely effective means for conveying salvation in their own day.[90] Sacraments of the Natural Law, such as tithes, sacrifices and oblations, were not imposed by necessity, however, and it is for this reason that one did not incur the guilt of transgression for not performing them. Rather, they were intended to encourage devotion and were not imposed to obtain salvation.[91] And yet the purpose of inducing such devotion was to remove the guilt of the first contempt.[92] Notwithstanding the fact that these sacraments across the ages were able to convey grace, Hugh makes it clear that the same Savior, same grace and same faith were at work in them all. But because the Savior was so far away during the ages of Natural Law and Written Law the sacraments still retained an air of obscurity about them.[93]

            Much of what we find in Hugh has been encountered in the commentary tradition. Hence when it comes to circumcision, Hugh allowed that the faithful people who did not belong to Abraham's seed were under no obligation to be circumcised, and so could continue in a faith which operated by love just as they did in the age of the Natural Law, and in this way be saved. Yet among the Jews, circumcision was instituted to liberate the people from the results of the first transgression. Hugh will speak of three circumcisions in a manner similar to the Gloss. The first is the external circumcision of the flesh, which is the bare sign or sacramentum. The other two pertain to the reality or power conveyed (res/virtus). Of these, one pertains to the present time as the soul lays aside iniquity, and the other refers to age to come when the corrupt body is put aside. And like the commentators, Hugh also sees the stone knife's referent to Christ the Rock (1 Cor 10:4) and the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world (John 1:29). Likewise, the flesh of the foreskin was deemed suitable as a remedy against original sin, inasmuch as we contract it from our parents through that bodily member. As for women, Hugh notes that they were saved by their faith in circumcision, and were purified by sacrifices, oblations and other ceremonies, thereby accepting circumcision by faith, and participating through veneration along with those who accepted it in the flesh.[94]

Hugh is actually more lenient than most on the question of male children who go uncircumcised despite the covenant established in Genesis 17:14. He is willing to grant that boys who died before the eighth day may well have been saved by the faith of their parents, or by interventions of sacrifices. Circumcision was not imposed males unless they reached the eighth day, meaning that children who fail to live that long are not really transgressors. Furthermore, this would seem rather unfair to males, seeing as one sex is no worse than the other. More than this, however, Hugh will argue that even if parents, out of negligence or contempt, had not circumcised the boy on the eighth day, this could be corrected by being circumcised later, and in that way be salvific.[95] Like his contemporaries, Hugh follows Bede on the faithful ancients awaiting glory, since it is Christ's passion that sanctifies baptism. Though he notes that circumcision could have done this too had Christ's passion been added to it so as to cooperate in the work of sanctification.[96] Nevertheless, once the age of the Written Law comes to and end, and from the time that the precept of baptism had been set forth (Jn 3:5 and Matt 28:19), this new sacramental institution had to be observed by all, Jew and gentile alike.[97]     

 

Summa Sententiarum

The Summa Sententiarum (c. 1138-1142) is an anonymous theological compilation from the circle of Hugh of St. Victor, though likely the work of Odo of Lucca. It takes the standard line that the Natural Law, and subsequently the Written Law, provided a remedy for original and actual sin. The process began with the sacrifices of Abel and Noah and the rest of the faithful, and continued with the command of circumcision given to Abraham. Much of what the Summa had to say about circumcision is already found in the Romans commentaries. It was instituted for original sin; performed in the proper member; the eighth day symbolized the resurrection which is the perfect circumcision when flesh is liberated from the servitude of corruption; and the stone knife invokes 1 Cor 10:4 and John 1:29. Like Hugh (and the Gloss) the Summa will speak of three circumcisions, distinguishing the one sacramentum from the two res. As for what remedy women would have against original sin it is said faith, oblations and sacrifices.

The author notes that the fate of children who died before the eighth day is often inquired about, as well one might imagine given its implications for baptism. He concludes that they were in fact damned, following Bede's connection between John 3:5 and Genesis 17:4. Though this was surely an unpleasant prospect for anyone to contemplate, the Summa says it is better to leave this to the judgment of God than to be afraid to give a straight answer.[98] The Summa is at times in dialogue with Peter Abelard.[99] It specifically criticizes Abelard's position that even adults desiring to be baptized will be lost if they die beforehand, unless martyrdom intervenes. Like Hugh, the Summa argues that while God decreed that the sacraments would confer salvation, God is not bound to the sacraments and can still grant salvation without them.[100] As for the fate of unbaptized infants, however, it seems that they are not saved, since they lack the faith that would otherwise be sufficient for adults. Still, there is some consolation that they will suffer only the lightest penalty. On the other hand, God's mercy would avail for the unbaptized children of faithful parents killed in a pagan siege, since they were killed for Christ's sake in the manner of the Holy Innocents. But this must be left to divine judgment.[101]

 

Gratian's Decretum

Gratian's canon law collection known as the Decretum, or The Concordance of Discordant Canons, completed by about 1142, also reflects the position of the twelfth-century commentators on questions of original sin and the relationship between baptism and the various rites which preceded it. When considering the sacrament of baptism Gratian first establishes its necessity. Appealing to the Glossa Ordinaria's remarks on John 3:5,[102] the rubric for Dec. III, De cons, Dist. IV, C. 1, states: "Without the visible sacrament and the invisible faith no one is saved." Thus in keeping with the traditional understanding of a sacrament as comprising a visible and invisible component, the canon goes on to say that there must be the visible sacrament of water for the washing of the visible body, just as there must be the invisible doctrine of faith for the sanctification of the invisible soul.[103] Following Ivo of Chartres's earlier law collection, Gratian draws on the staunchly Augustinian North African bishop Fulgentius (468-533) to form the text of a canon stating that everyone conceived through the sexual union of a man and woman, and thus born with original sin, is subject to impiety, and as such is naturally born a child of wrath (Eph 2:3). No one can be liberated from this condition except through the faith of humanity's mediator, Jesus Christ. Moreover, one must firmly believe that not only those who have attained the use of reason, but even children who have begun to live in their mother's womb, will be punished with eternal fire if they pass from this age without the sacrament of baptism given in the name of the Trinity. For even though they have no sin through their own action, nevertheless they draw condemnation on account of their carnal conception.[104] Following Ivo again, Gratian appeals to Gregory's position that the water of baptism does for Christians what faith and sacrifices did for pagans, and circumcision for Jews.[105] Again, in keeping with Ivo, another canon appeals to Augustine's On Marriage and Desire which, as we have seen, set the standard for many of the biblical commentators. Circumcision was instituted among the people of God as a signaculum of faith in the righteousness of God, effectively blotting out original sin for children and adults, just as baptism effects regeneration now.[106]

 

Roland of Bologna

Roland produced his Sentences in about 1150, a work that reflects his indebtedness to the teachings of Peter Abelard, as well as criticism on some significant points.[107] Here he deals with circumcision at the outset of his treatment of the sacrament of baptism, and like all the rest follows Bede in saying that circumcision did for Old Testament Fathers what baptism does for Christians, though it could not open the doors to heaven prior to Christ's passion. Proof of this, he says, is that however many were baptized with Christ's baptism before his passion still descended into hell. Thus it is not the baptism itself, but the passion that opens the doors. And in this sense circumcision was really no less effective than baptism.[108] While following the principle that circumcision was the remedy for original and actual sin, Roland notes that it was not commanded for women, since they had nothing to circumcise. When considering the consequences of the first sin, his remarks are reminiscent of Abelard, arguing that it was actually punished more severely in the woman than in the man when the Lord said she would bear children in pain (Gen 3:16). But seeing as that was not just, God then added the pain of circumcision for men. Though it may also have been so arranged, because it would be through a woman that the one [Christ] who needed no purgation would descend, though not through a man.[109]

Having admitted that circumcision was no less effective than baptism, Roland offers four reasons for the change of sacraments similar to what we have seen in the commentaries. Circumcision was imperfect, since it was given to men and not to women. Thus God willed to remove this imperfection and grant a sacrament for both sexes. There was also the difficulty because of the pain involved, while in baptism no pain is experienced. Baptism could serve join the two walls (Eph 2:21), seeing as gentiles abhorred circumcision and did not want any part of it. And it also served to signify the circumcision of our minds and of our spiritual body.[110]

Roland seems to have in mind Peter Abelard and/or his adherents when refuting those who say that sin is not forgiven to children in baptism, precisely because they have no sin (peccatum) to forgive, by which they mean no actual sin (nullum habere actu). Nevertheless, the child still needs to be forgiven his liability to punishment, seeing as he is liable (reus) for the sin (peccatum) of the First Parent, which while not in the child, nonetheless renders him subject to eternal punishment (poena). This is not sin, they say, but the punishment for sin (poena peccati). It is that punishment which is blotted out in baptism, thereby absolving their liability to eternal punishment. Roland counters this position, arguing that sin (peccatum) is in the child not only by way of liability but also in actuality. Original sin in its form as propensity (fomes) remains even after baptism (Rom 7:23), though through baptism it does cease to be sin in some sense. Here Roland has recourse to Augustine: it is not that the fomes is not there anymore, but rather that it is not reckoned as sin (peccatum).[111] As for children who die while being carried to baptism, Roland concludes that they are not saved by the faith of their parents. Thus if they die before being baptized they are surely damned. As for the reception of baptism he states that it can be received by will alone (voluntate tantum), in reality alone (re tantum), and in both reality and will (re et voluntate). The first applies only to adults and those of the age of discretion who die on the way to baptism with the intention of being baptized. The second refers to reluctant infants who weep and are recalcitrant during their baptism. And the last refers to adults and those of discretion who both want baptism and receive it.[112] Hence while Abelard had rejected baptism by desire, Roland approves it here in the first sort of reception.

 

 

 

Peter Lombard's Sentences

Having commented upon the Pauline Epistles around 1140 and then again in the later 1150s, Lombard would draw on that material for his own epoch-making theological compilation, or Sentences, c. 1155. Indeed, much of what we find here is the stuff of medieval commentaries, if not all from his own. Brady provides a list of sources for the Sentences: first and foremost Lombard's own glosses; then the works of Augustine he would have known in themselves; the Glossa Ordinaria; the works of Hugh of St. Victor; the Summa Sententiarum; the works of Peter Abelard; the canon law collections of Ivo of Chartres and Gratian; John Damascene; and various other sources.[113] Indeed, much of what we find here has already been encountered in his Romans commentary.

Addressing the sacraments in Book Four, Lombard must first deal with their purpose before distinguishing those of the Old Law from the New. Unlike Hugh, who granted the old rites genuine sacramental power, Lombard held that the carnal sacrifices and ceremonial observances of the Old Law were instituted to signify, and for this reason they were only signs and not really sacraments in the strict sense of the term. They could not justify those who performed them and were thus mere signs of the sacred things which they could not furnish.[114] Looking to Augustine's comments on Psalm 73 the old rites could only promise, while those of the New Law confer salvation.[115] And yet Lombard is willing to grant that circumcision was once the remedy against the wound of original sin, just as baptism is now, appealing to Augustine and Bede.[116] He seems to have the Summa Sententiarum in mind when noting that some say for men living before circumcision, and for women before and after, sacrifices and oblations brought about the remission of sins. But Lombard prefers to say that women were justified through faith and good works, and children through the faith of their parents, and parents through the power of their sacrifices, appealing to Gregory's remarks in his Moralia.[117] Lombard offers the standard reasons for why and in what manner circumcision was instituted: as a sign of faith; in the foreskin because this is the member dominated by concupiscence; on the eighth day and with a stone knife (1 Cor 10:4 and John 1:29). As to why it was abolished in favor of baptism, that is because baptism is more common and more perfect. As in his Romans commentary, he maintains that whereas circumcision could only forgive sins, baptism confers grace and bestows the assistance and augmentation of virtues. For one must remember that Abraham was justified by faith, of which circumcision was just a signaculum, conferring nothing to him inwardly.[118] As to whether children dying before the eighth day could still be saved, Lombard draws a parallel with children dying before baptism, thus concluding that they would perish. On this score he had appealed to Bede's comparison of Christ's dictum in John 3:5 to the mandate in Genesis 17:4. But then, looking for a way to soften this position a bit, Lombard concedes that the law might allow for a child on the verge of death to be circumcised before the eighth day, as the Church permits with baptism.[119] As for children who now die without baptism, Lombard finds that the overwhelming testimony of the saints proves they are damned. Indeed, not even the faith of the Church can suffice without the sacrament, even if they were being carried to baptism. Believing that he is citing Augustine, he actually appeals to the text of Fulgentius cited in Gratian's Decretum which held that children who die in the womb suffer eternal damnation despite the fact that they have not sinned through their own deeds, since they have contracted original sin through their carnal conception.[120]

 

                        Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae

When Aquinas deals with the question of circumcision in his Summa Theologiae he notes that baptism is called a sacrament of faith because a profession of faith is made in baptism, and through baptism one is gathered into the congregation of the faithful. This is indeed the same faith held by the ancient fathers. Hence the natural connection between the two rites, as circumcision too was a sort of profession of the faith which drew one into the society of the ancient faithful. Circumcision, therefore, was preparatory to baptism and prefigured it.[121]

Aquinas takes up the question whether circumcision conferred grace. His remarks are similar to those in his Romans commentary, but offered in more detail. He notes how all agree that original sin was forgiven through circumcision. Yet he also points out that both Lombard's Sentences and the Gloss Ordinaria claim that circumcision could only forgive sin and not confer grace. As we have seen, Aquinas here too rejects this on the grounds that only grace can forgive sin. He then runs through some of the same arguments as in his commentary which seek to explain circumcision's conferring of grace. According to some, grace was conferred to the effect of remission of sins, but without the positive effects which allow one to fulfill the law. Aquinas rejects this, arguing here that circumcision conferred upon boys the faculty needed in their own time to achieve glory, which is itself the ultimate effect of grace. And similar to his remarks in Romans, he notes that positive effects are prior to privative; thus the form does not exclude something unless it first informs the subject. Others have argued that grace is conferred in circumcision to render some positive effect, which is to make one worthy of eternal life. But, they say, it still does not render all the effects, since it is incapable of restraining concupiscence or fulfilling the commandments. Aquinas admits that he too once held this position when commenting on the Sentences, but has now come to the conclusion that this is not true. For the least amount of grace is sufficient to resist concupiscence and to destroy all mortal sin. And the least amount of charity loves God more than any desire for lucre. His conclusion here in the Summa is similar to that of his Romans commentary. Grace was conferred in circumcision with respect to all of its effects, through in another way than in baptism. For in baptism grace is conferred by the very power of the baptism itself, functioning as an instrument of Christ's already accomplished passion. Circumcision, however, conferred grace insofar as it was a sign of Christ's future passion, such that the person who received circumcision professed that same faith, whether an adult for himself, or another on the child's behalf. Here, Aquinas appeals directly to Romans 4:11 to make the point that circumcision signified justification by faith. And because baptism operates instrumentally by virtue of Christ's passion, and circumcision does not, so baptism imprints the character which incorporates one into Christ and confers grace more abundantly than circumcision, since the effect of the already present reality must be greater than the hope for it.[122]

 

                                    CONCLUSION

We have seen the way in which questions pertaining to Jew and Gentile, Law and Grace, as well as the Law of Nature, were formed over centuries of commenting on what we now call the Fourth Chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Romans. In fact, there were no such chapter divisions prior to the beginning of the thirteenth century, but the thematic continuity is nonetheless present in this case owing to the centrality of Abraham, the father of the Jewish and gentile faithful who was justified before the reception of the Written Law. We have seen how certain themes and symbols become imbedded, such that they were recounted time and again not only in the commentaries, but in the systematic works which are themselves the product of the commentary tradition.

Perhaps the most striking theme is the question of circumcision, taken up by the commentators and then the later theological and legal collections. Of course, it is only natural that the commentators would deal with it, seeing as it is central to the passage and crucial to the issue of justification with respect to the law and grace. But that it received sustained attention in connection with the precept of Genesis 17:4 is undoubtedly because of its ramifications for the theology of baptism. The twelfth century witnessed the first sustained effort to establish the nature and number of the sacraments. As the word 'sacrament' itself was more strictly defined, so they had to meet specific criteria to qualify among the selected rites of the Church deemed essential for salvation. And in a Christendom striving for greater social and religious cohesion it would only be a matter of time before the sacramental life of the Church would become a matter of law and not merely the province of theological speculation. Indeed, theology and law were quickly being merged as evinced by Gratian's Decretum and the subsequent commentaries upon it. Thus as the baptismal rite, itself the entrance way into both the mystical body of Christ and Christian society, received intense scrutiny, so too did the rite which prefigured it. They were spoken of together so often, not merely because they formed a neat symbolic parallel, but because the medievals recognized a seamless continuity in the life of God's people. And here we should not neglect what was said about the sacrifices and oblations which held together faithful Jews and gentiles long before the Advent of Jesus Christ. It would have made no sense for a medieval theologian to treat baptism as a solitary subject, as if it had no connection to the salvific history which began with the very creation of the human race. What we have seen here when looking at Romans Chapter Four is that for the medievals the Church did not really begin with the Incarnation, though it certainly did begin with the work of the Word. Like St Augustine, the medieval theologians were insistent that there has been only one salvific faith, one shared by Abraham, Job, Moses and Paul. Faith in the one Word has always united the people of God, albeit in different sacramental manifestations, until its culmination in the passion and resurrection of the Incarnate Word.

 

                                               

 

 



[1] On the career and possible identity of Ambrosiaster, cf. Alexander Souter, Earliest Latin Commentaries on the Epistles of Saint Paul (Oxford: 1927), 42-43.

[2] Ambrosiaster, PL 17;82c-83a.

[3] Cf. Expositio quarumdam Propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos in PL 35;2063-2088; Epistolae ad Romanos Inchoata Expositio in PL 35;2087-2106.  

[4] Augustine, Expositio quarumdam Propositionum, PL 35;2066.

[5] Augustine, Tract, in Ioh. XXIX,6-7; CCSL 36;287.

[6] Sermo de Symbolo, PL 40;1190-1191.

[7] Bede, PL 93;22a.

[8] Rabanus Maurus, PL 111;1349.

[9] On Rabanus and Haimo cf. Beryl Smalley, Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Notre Dame: 1978), 37-46.

[10] Haimo, PL 117;394c-350b.

[11] Atto, PL 134;165c.

[12] The Pauline commentaries attributed to Bruno may in fact be the product of a member of his school. For more on Bruno and his influence cf. Jean Chatillon, "La Bible dans les Ecoles du XII siècle," in Le Moyen Age at la Bible ed. P. Riché and G. Lobrichon (Paris: 1984), 172-175. For the sake of consistency we will refer to the author of the Romans commentary as Bruno.

[13] Bruno, PL 153;43d-44c.

[14] E. Ann Matter, "The Church Fathers and the Glossa Ordinaria," in The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West Vol. 1, ed. Irena Backus (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 83-111, at p.107.

[15] Biblia Latina cum Gloss Ordinaria (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992), 282. Cf, PL 114; 481d. Cf. Bruno's remarks on the one who has time to work in PL 153;44b.

[16] Gloss Ordinaria, 282. Cf, PL 114; 482b.

[17] For the dates and circumctances of the twelfth-century commentators cf. Marcia Colish, Peter Lombard vol. 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994), 155-225.

[18] Abelard, CCCM 11, 123-24. Cf. Augustine, CCSL 36;287.

[19] Abelard, CCCM 11; 123-24.

[20] William, PL 180;582c-d.

[21] Cf. Colish 1:23-20; and Ignatius Brady, ed. Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae vol. 1, prolegomena (Rome: 1971), 82-88.

[22] Lombard, Romans, PL 192;1367c-d. Cf. Augustine, PL 35;2066.

[23] Herveus, PL 181;644.b.

[24] Herveus, PL 181;645c-d.

[25] Herveus, PL 181;646a-b.

[26] Aquinas, In Epistolam ad Romanos, in Opera Omnia vol. 20 ed. S. E. Fretté (Paris: 1889), 437.

[27] Origen, PG 14;965c-d.

[28] Ambrosiaster PL 17;83b-c.

[29] Ambrosiaster, PL 117;83c-84a.

[30] Cf. Souter, 205-230; and Theodore de Bruyn, Pelagius's Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 27-35. Cf. Bruyn's translation, 84-88..

[31] Pseudo-Jerome, PL 30; 663d.

[32] Gregory, PL 79;558d-559b.

[33] Haimo, PL 117; 395; c-d. Cf. Origen, PG 14;966a.

[34] Atto, PL 134;165c-166a. Cf. Gregory, PL 79;558d-559a.

[35] Bruno, PL 153; 44d-45a.

[36] This basic definition is not unique to the Glossa Ordinaria. It bares a similarity to Anselm of Canterbury's definition in his On the Virgin Conception and Original Sin in PL 158;433.

[37] Glossa Ordinaria, 282. Cf. PL 114;482d. The Gloss on Psalm 31 in PL 113;887a follows Pseudo-Jerome in speaking of iniquities existing before faith and baptism and sins after. They are covered so that they will not be revealed in judgment and thus not imputed with respect to punishment.

[38] Abelard, CCCM 11, 124-25.

[39] William, PL 180;583a-b.

[40] Herveus, PL 181;647a.

[41] Lombard, Romans, PL 192;1368d-1369a. Cf. Augustine, De nuptiis et concupiscentia II,11,24; CSEL 42;276-277.

[42] Lombard, Romans, PL 192;1369c.

[43] Aquinas, Romans, 438.

[44] Origen, PG 14;968a.

[45] Origen, PG 14;998b-c.

[46] Ambrosiaster, PL 17;84c.

[47] Pseudo-Jerome, PL 30;664a.

[48] Augustine, De nuptiis et concupiscentia II,11,24; CSEL 42;276-277.

[49] Augustine, Sermo 169 in PL 38;916. Cf. Bede Homelia 11; CCSL 122;79.

[50] De Civitate Dei XVI,27; CCSL 48, 531-532.

[51] Gloss, PL 113; 123d.

[52] Gregory, PL 75;635.

[53] Bede, Homelia 11; CCSL 122;74-75.

[54] Haimo, ibid., 396c-397a. Cf. Augustine, De nuptiis et concupiscentia II,11,24; CSEL 42;276-277.

[55] Atto, PL 134;166b-167b.

[56] Bruno, ibid., 45c.

[57] Gloss Ordinaria, 282. This section is not recorded in the PL.

[58] Abelard, CCCM 11, 128-129. Haimo PL 117;396c-d.

[59] Abelard, CCCM 11, 129-130. Augustine, De nuptiis et concupiscentia II,11,24; CSEL 42;276-277; and Gregory, PL 75;635b.

[60] Abelard, CCCM 11, 130-131.

[61] Abelard, CCCM 11, 132-133. CF. Isidore, PL 83;570b.

[62] Abelard, CCCM 11, 157.

[63] Abelard, CCCM 11, 173.

[64] William, PL 181;585c-586a. Augustine, De nuptiis et concupiscentia II,11,24; CSEL 42;276-277.

[65] Lombard, Romans, PL 192;a-b.

[66] Lombard, Romans, PL 192;1371c-d.

[67] Lombard, Romans, PL 192;1372a-c

[68] Aquinas, Romans, 439.

[69] Aquinas, Romans, 440.

[70] Bede, Homelia 11; CCSL 122;74-75.

[71] Aquinas, Romans, 441. Cf. Glossa Ordinaria, 282. This is not recorded in the PL.

[72] Origen, PG 14;966a.

[73] Augustine, PL 35;2067.

[74] Haimo, PL 117; 398b-c.

[75] Glossa Ordinaria, 282. Cf. PL 114;483b.

[76] Abelard, CCCM 11, 145.

[77] William, PL 180;586d.

[78] Lombard, Romans, PL 192;1374b-c.

[79] Herveus, PL 181;650b.

[80] Aquinas, Romans, 442.

[81] I have not been able to locate these sources.

[82] Haimo, PL 117;400b.

[83] Atto, PL 134;169d-170a.

[84] Bruno, PL 153;47b.

[85] Glossa Ordinaria, 283. Cf. PL 114;483c. Cf. also the Gloss on Genesis 15:5 in PL 113;121a where it states that the carnal and earthly are the sand because so arid; and those filled with good works shine like the stars.

[86] Abelard, CCCM 11;148.

[87] Lombard, Romans, PL 192;1376c.

[88] Herveus, PL 181;652c.

[89] Aquinas, Romans, 444.

[90] De Sacramentis Christinae Fidei I, 11, 1; PL 176;343b.

[91] Hugh, I, 11, 3, PL 176;344b.

[92] Hugh, I, 11, 4, PL 176;344d.

[93] Hugh, I, 11, 6, PL 176;354d.

[94] Hugh, I, 12, 2, PL 176;349b-350c.

[95] Hugh, I, 12, 2, PL 176;350d-351a. 

[96] Hugh, II, 6, 3, PL 176;448b-c. Cf. Bede, CCSL 122;74.

[97] Hugh, II, 6, 5, PL 176;451a.

[98] Summa Sent. IV, c. 1,  PL 176:119a-120a. Cf. Bede CCSL 122;74. 

[99] Cf. David Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard (Cambridge: 1969), 198-213.

[100] Summa Sent. V, c. 7; PL 176;133d. Cf. Abelard, CCCM 11, 132-133.

[101] Summa V, c. 6, PL 176;132d-133a.

[102] Gloss, PL 114, 366d. The Gloss does not state this negatively, but only that it is by the visible sacrament of the water invisibly understood that the sacrament is accomplished.

[103] Decretum III, De consecratione, Dist. IV, C. 1; Friedberg 1:1361.

[104] Decretum III, De consecratione, Dist. IV, C. 3; Friedberg 1:1362. Cf. Ivo of Chartres, PL 161;73. For Fulgentius cf. CCSL 91a; 753.

[105] Decretum III, De consecratione, Dist. IV, C. 5; Friedberg 1:1362. Cf. Ivo, PL 161;80. Cf. Gregory, PL 75;635.

[106] Decretum III, De consecratione, Dist. IV, C.6; Friedberg 1:1363. Cf. Augustine, De nuptiis, II,11. Cf. Ivo, 161;80.

[107] Cf. Luscombe, 244-253.

[108] Die Sentenzen Rolands, ed. A. M. Gietl (Herder, 18891), 194-195. Cf. Bede, CCSL 122;74.

[109] Die Sentenzen Rolands, 195. Cf. Abelard, CCCM 11; 130.

[110] Die Sentenzen Rolands, 196-197.

[111] Die Sentenzen Rolands, 201-202. Cf. Augustine, PL 35;2071.

[112] Die Sentenzen Rolands, 208-209.

[113] Cf. Brady, prolegomena, 118-122.

[114] Lombard, Sentences IV, D. 1, C. 4, A. 3, ed. Brady, vol.4, 233-234.

[115] Lombard, Sentences IV, D. 1, C. 6: 236. Cf. Augustine CCSL 39, 1006.

[116] Lombard, Sentences IV, D. 1, C. 7: 236. Augustine, De nuptiis et concupiscentia II,11,24; CSEL 42;276-277.

[117] Lombard, Sentences IV, D. 1, C. 8: 237. Cf. Summa, PL 176; 119c.

[118] Lombard, Sentences IV, D. 1, C. 9: 238-239. Cf. Ambrosiaster, PL 17;84c.

[119] Lombard, Sentences IV, D. 1, C. 10: 239. Cf. Bede, CCSL 122;74.

[120] Lombard, Sentences IV, D. 4, C. 4, A. 12: 259.

[121] Aquinas, ST III, Q. 70, a. 1.

[122] Aquinas, ST III, Q. 70, a. 4.