SBL November 2004, San Antonio

 

Romans through History and Cultures Seminar

 

Levinas, the Jewish Philosopher meets Paul, the Jewish Apostle:

 

Reading Romans ‘in the Face of the Other’

 

 

I. Introduction

 

Before I start this daring project a few issues need to be clarified:

 

  1. This is not a paper about Emmanuel Levinas. As I am neither a philosopher nor a specialist in LevinasÂ’s philosophical approach this would be a pretentious venture.
  2. Levinas himself has neither interpreted Romans, nor any other of the Pauline letters. He only refers occasionally to the apostle and when he did he commented on traditional Christian perceptions of Paul.  
  3. In this paper I am thus not analysing a Levinasian interpretation of Romans but as a Pauline scholar I am  reading Romans taking seriously into account aspects of Levinas’s emphasis on the primacy of  ethics and responsibility for the other.
  4. In thus reading Paul’s letter to the Romans ‘in the Face of Emmanuel Levinas’ there are themes and issues resonating in both men’s writings which, I am convinced,  could have stimulated a fascinating dialogue between the two (and their co-workers) if  they could have met overcoming the gap of space and time. With a little help (not from Derrida)[1] but from our imagination[2] I would like to bring aspects of both men’s writings into a virtual dialogue of learning, debate, agreement and disagreement, associations and analogies, disputation and consensus over concerns they might not directly share but which might prove more related to each other than suspected at first glance. (A relatedness which, in my opinion, is rooted in their shared Jewish heritage.) The intention of this virtual dialogue cannot be to bring them into final harmony or agreement but to participate in the ongoing process of negotiating meaning in interpretation. [3]

 

To begin with (section II) I will summarize general aspects of Levinas’s thinking which to me seem most relevant for the purpose of our ‘reading of Romans in the face of the other’,  and will then analyse briefly how these resonate with aspects of the history of interpretation of the letter.

 

In the second part (section III) I will take up the role of interpretation or ‘scriptural reasoning’ in Levinas’s work, particularly in his Talmud readings, proposing the thesis that with fresh inspiration from Levinas, Romans could be read as an example of Pauline scriptural reasoning.

 

In the third part (section IV) I will focus on the emphasis on the priority of ethics which Levinas advocates throughout his entire work. I will advocate the thesis that similar  to Levinas and in accordance with Jewish tradition and in distinction from many  Pauline scholars, Paul throughout Romans prioritizes ethics, the relationship with the other, over against doctrine. The argument of Romans throughout chapters 1-15, not only in chapters 12-15, is inherently driven by ethical concerns, that is, concerns for the other in his/her abiding difference.

 

Particular attention will be paid to Levinas’s focus on the other as the call to unconditional responsibility, and also on the perceived as the locus of the in-breaking of transcendence; this will be compared with Paul’s emphasis on Christ as the focus of the relationship of  believers to the God of Israel as there are aspects, similar and yet distinct, resonating in the emphasis of both.

 

 

II Levinas, the Jewish philosopher and Paul the first ‘Christian’ Theologian – in Confrontation or Conversation ?

 

 Levinas’s thinking cannot be described easily. It resists and is intended to resist any systematization that is not developed in a systematic form following traditional (philosophical) ways of reasoning. It is a thinking which could be described as unfolding in ever new ways variations of basic issues. This is by no means incidental, as we shall elaborate later in this paper, but it is rather consistent with what Levinas’s philosophizing is all about. Philosophical thinking is not free from pre-philosophical presuppositions and Levinas did not perceive his philosophical approach as a means in and for itself but as related to life and experience prior to and beyond philosophical reflection. Any philosophical approach presupposes pre-philosophical experience. Levinas’s own approach is rooted in Jewish life and thought. He himself is aware that it was in Jewish thinking that he had found ethics to be the primary experience. [4]  Levinas is both personally and philosophically deeply influenced by his living through the Shoah.

 

2.1. Levinas and Universalizing Ontology

 

One of his main concerns is the distortion violence imposes on humans and by which their identity is destroyed. He is concerned about totalitarian tendencies which he regards as inherent in the Western philosophical tradition and its emphasis on universalism.[5]  In approaches which are trying to grasp the totality of being in systems of cognition Levinas uncovers and thus exposes the notion of assimilating the other to the already known, that is to become the same. This process thus leads to annihilating the other into the same. In the Western philosophical tradition the process of knowing is essentially perceived as being attached to ‘being’ – to that which it is acquiring knowledge about. Inherent to the concept of ‘Being’ there is the form of knowledge to apprehend it. Knowing then is the coalescence of my thinking/reasoning with the form of being – or as Hegel has formulated ‘Erkenntnis ist die Uebereinstimmung des Geistes mit sich selbst’ – ‘the process of knowing is the movement of being itself’.[6] Knowing is thus a process of identification. The ‘I’ ends up identifying that which is different/the other with myself or with something already known. Thus whatever exists in the world even though not yet known by me, could become part of my knowledge of the world, could be integrated by me, it could become my possession.[7]  Knowing is a self-centred process, an ‘egologie’. Levinas describes this process not merely in negative terms. To live life in this world is to live from something. To live means to be in need of something – breathing and nourishment. To live means to depend on that which we are not. Distinct from others Levinas perceives this dependency not as an enslavement or as lacking something. He sees it as the source of enjoyment. He states

 

The life that is life from something is happiness. Life is affectivity and

sentiment; to live is to enjoy life. To despair of life makes sense only

because originally life is happiness. Suffering is a failing of happiness;

it is not correct to say that happiness is an absence of suffering.

Happiness is made up not of an absence of needs, whose tyranny and

imposed character one denounces, but of the satisfaction of all needs.[8]

 

Nevertheless this ‘living from something’, this integrating of aspects of ‘the world’ into ‘my world’ is not yet life itself.

This egocentric enjoyment, whereas crucial to life as one particular aspect,is the source of dehumanizing violence when it is applied to other humans, that is, when it is universalized and made into the general principle of knowing. To recognize and respect the other and his needs on the basis of the analogy that he/she is the same as I am, is based on the assumption of knowledge. Knowing the other on the presupposition that he/she is similar to me means, according to Levinas, to grasp he/her, reducing him/her to the same. To integrate the other into my life means to assimilate him/her to myself, into my world. This, according to Levinas is a form of violence against the other not in teaching violence but in trying to ‘know’/understand the world in assimilating it to the same, to the already known, to myself.  To know something means to grasp it totally, that is to assimilate it to the already known. The alterity of the other is assimilated into the same, the identical. For Levinas the process of knowing as a process of identification is enclosing the other into the totality of the same, and as such the source of violence.[9]  He states

 

            Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other

to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the

comprehension of being. This primacy of the same was Socrates’ teaching: to receive nothing of the Other but what is in me, as though from all eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from the outside – to receive nothing, or to be free. ……Cognition is the deployment of this identity: it is freedom….The neutralization of the other who becomes a theme, an object – appearing, that is, taking its place in the light – is precisely his reduction to the same…….To know amounts to grasping being out of nothing or reducing it to nothing, removing from it its alterity.[10]

 

This implies that the other is not seen or encountered as the other in his/her alterity but reduced and assimilated to the same. Reducing the other to sameness is a means of adapting difference and particularity to concepts of universal meaning. Universalism is achieved by suppressing diversity. Ontology, according to Levinas is thus perceived as a philosophy of power and injustice.[11]

 

 

2.2 Levinas and the other

 

Over against the totalizing tendency of universalizing ontology Levinas formulates his famous emphasis of the radical alterity of the other – an alterity which he perceives as so radical that he uses the term ‘metaphysics’ for it.  Nothing links me to the other, he/she is the stranger who interrupts my life, “disturbs my being at home with myself”[12]. But the face of the other is nevertheless the radical call to responsibility. The relation to the other cannot consist in grasping or knowing. To know the other is to enter into a relationship, to encounter the other is prior and beyond any knowing. To relate to the other always already means to be called, to be called into responsibility for the other, for the other’s life. Thus ethics is prior to anything else. Ethics is the first philosophy. [13]This responsibility has nothing to do with assimilating the other to myself, but to enter a relationship to absolute alterity, the other transcends myself in this encounter. He/she is always more than I can expect, can encompass. Richard A. Cohen notes that

 

For Levinas the breakthrough of the other into the self is so fundamentally and so essentially out of order that it is “otherwise than being or beyond essence.” The other is always more than the self bargains for, more than the self wants, more than what the self can handle. [14]

 

The other is delimiting my limitations. She/he encounters myself in a way which exceeds ‘the idea of the other in me’[15] . Any images or analogies that are already formed in me are destroyed at the moment of immediate encounter. The face of the other overflows any image – it expresses itself. [16] The other is breaking into the totality of a world I can encompass via knowledge, it renders totality in fact impossible as in its alterity it refers to the idea of infinity. ‘..the existent breaks through all the envelopings and generalities of Being to spread out in its ‘form’ the totality of its ‘content’, finally abolishing the distinction between form and content.’ [17] To encounter the other implies to receive something from outside, from beyond myself. This disturbs and uproots myself in any totality of knowledge or experience. I have nothing that comes merely from within and of myself.

 

In rendering the idea of totality impossible the emphasis of the radical alterity of the other also questions the notion of universalism. Radical alterity implies particularity. To meet the other face to face can only mean to meet him in her/his particularity. There is no general ‘other’ in this terrestrial existence, there is in fact nothing ‘general’ or ‘universal’ existing in this sensible world. I can meet the other only as a particular human being at a specific moment in time in a particular place. Thus history cannot be ‘…the privileged plane where Being disengaged from the particularism of points of view…..is manifested.’[18] To integrate everyone into universal concepts (e.g. a universal spirit unfolding itself in the course of human history) actually means to ignore the alterity of the other, that is the other him/herself. Integration into a general universal humanity is, according to Levinas, an act of cruelty and injustice. [19]

 

 

2.3. Levinas and Communicating with the other

 

The relation with the other, the encounter face to face is not only a disruption of my being at home with myself, it is a call and as such it is already discourse.[20] The face of the other calls me. I am chosen to respond, into responsibility. I am inescapably responsible for the other. Not because he/she is of the same genus as I am but because he/she is precisely different. As such ‘the face of the neighbour signifies for me an unexceptionable responsibility, preceding my consent, every pact, every contract.’[21]

As the face of the other calls me and I am called to respond, a discourse is established.

 

In as much as the other is not assimilated to me in relating to me, language  establishes and transcends the difference between me and the other. Language does not presuppose sameness or generality but rather presupposes difference, it presupposes interlocutors which are and remain different, it presupposes the separation of terms, that is, language presupposes plurality. A discourse is interaction between others constituting community rather than presupposing it. It is the experience of something unknown or as Levinas formulates traumatism of astonishment. It is the means via which I can respond to the call of the other, by which I can give to the other. In speaking I and the other are creating a common world.[22]

 

This ‘perception’ of humans and human society derives not exclusively but primarily from the Jewish traditions Levinas sees himself rooted in.[23] For Levinas, as Cohen has expressed it ‘ …..each human being, regardless of differences…….is “created” in “the image and likeness of God.” Humanity would be constituted not by the embrace of a unitary idea or hidden substructure, but across encounter – face-to-face. Though it may be incomprehensible, the trace of transcendence passes here through the very heart of humanity.’[24] As Jewish traditions first of all are scriptural traditions the necessity of interpretation is a given. Interpretation is not to be equated with explanation. Explanation is an objectifying approach to life, appropriate in a scientific perception, whereas understanding aims at self-understanding , a focus which humanities and religion share. Far from advocating a literalist or fundamentalist reading of the Scriptures Levinas does not reject rational critical approaches in interpretation but he  emphasizes that these cannot be exhaustive. [25] (Levinas even sees a similar naïveté in both fundamentalist and literalist as well as in critical readings of the Scriptures[26]) Distinguishing between pure criticism and exegesis, Levinas perceives Jewish spirituality as exegetical. There is no Judaism without Scriptures and vice versa. But it is never Scriptures pure that is encountered but always Scriptures interpreted. Reading Scriptures is a continual process of interpretation and reinterpretation of multiple readers and readings, a process of negotiation and renegotiating meaning in life.[27] 

 

2.4 Levinas and Universalization in Pauline Interpretation

 

These emphases of Levinas’s philosophizing stand in stark contrast to an image of Paul which views him as the first Christian theologian who freed Christianity from the narrow bonds of Judaism and its reliance on good works to enable it to attain its true self-understanding as the religion of the pure spirit and grace, as F.C.Baur depicted it. This image though criticized in the last three decades from various perspectives which may be summarized under the heading of the ‘New Perspective’[28] is still having significant impact in Pauline interpretation and has experienced  a revival in recent scholarship which is reacting against approaches in the vein of the New Perspective.[29] Scholars such as Westerholm and Barclay emphasize that the emphasis on ethics, on the doing of the will of God in Judaism actually stands in irreconcilable contrast to Paul’s emphasis on salvation by grace which can only accessed to by faith in Christ irrespective of works of the law. Jewish identity is thus an obstacle to being in Christ and has to be given up. In Christ the particularities of specific identities are overcome and thus should be obliterated. Christ then is the model to be imitated,[30] a model which is perceived as something absolutely new which has no relation to anything terrestrial, being exclusively determined by the revelation of God. To be one in Christ implies to be the same in Christ. Moreover, faith  is perceived as something that has to be believed in – a system of doctrine one has to believe in in order to be saved. Ethics is an outcome of  this affirmation or knowing and accepting of doctrines of faith. Romans in perspective’s such as Westerholm’s and Barclay’s then once again as in Bornkamm comes close to be perceived despite being a real letter, as ‘Paul’s last will and testament’[31] an outline of his almost ‘systematic theology’. There could hardly be a stronger contrast to Levinas’s philosophizing than this image of Paul.[32]

 

The perception of Paul as the champion of universalism at the expense of particularity, and as the theologian for whom ethics is an appendix to the right faith, needs Judaism in a derogatory way as  a negative foil in order to formulate the new faith in Christ positively. Paul is seen as having separated or being in the process of separating himself from his ancestral faith and practice in his interpretation of the Christ event. The Christ event and first century Judaism are perceived as being in an opposition to each other which is mutually exclusive. For Paul, in this perception, there is only room for one and the same way of faith and life in relation to the one God, that is through Christ, and this means at the expense of historic Israel. There is no room for difference, no room for the other. The alterity of the other is deplored as a defect which has to be extinguished as it threatens the oneness of being in Christ and the universal truth of Christ. Perceived in this way it is difficult if not impossible to read Paul and his letter to the Romans in particular in the face of the other without violent implications. It is difficult to enter a dialogue with the other when his/her alterity and thus integrity is not respected. A dialogue necessarily fails when there is only the option of either me or the other. This not only applies to the relationship of Christ believers and Jews. But the relationship between Jews and gentiles in Christ and between Christ believers and non Christ believing Jews in the first century has a paradigmatic character for a Christ defined and, for what was later to become, ‘Christian’ identity and its relation to the other who remains and

wants to remain different. This relationship is the testing case for the openness of Christianity not only to Jews, to Jews first, but to other ‘others’, to alterity which cannot be integrated into the totality of any system. Paul’s letters, and Romans in particular, are pertinently addressing the issue of this relationship. Romans is actually of crucial significance for Christian self-definition/understanding since it is the only place where Jews as Jews (and not merely as Christ believers) are seriously discussed in relation to the gospel.   

 

But as scholars of and beyond the New Perspective have demonstrated, the universalistic and thus exclusivist reading is not the only possible reading of the Pauline letters, including Romans.[33] There is ample historical and sociological evidence that it can well be argued that faith in Christ and being rooted in his ancestral faith and culture were not perceived as being incompatible by Paul. Not only this, there is also sound reason to argue that Paul strongly emphasized the inherent necessity of the relatedness of faith in Christ to Judaism and its Scriptures. [34] This may even be viewed as being the main issue in his argumentation in Romans. Paul is seen as being deeply rooted in first century Judaism, his life, thoughts and activity as interwoven with the traditions and practices of his ancestors and contemporaries which was based on the Scriptures.[35] The perception of Paul’s life and activity as being rooted entirely within the symbolic universe of first century Judaism (which was not uniform but encompassed differing groups even though the contemporary term pluralism might not be quite appropriate) and thus as not using Judaism or the ‘Other’ as a negative foil for ‘faith in Christ’ opens up the option of reading Paul/Romans in the face of the other.  Levinas, the Jewish philosopher and Paul, the Jewish Apostle could actually be related in a dialogue over their shared tradition, as ‘others’, who are and remain different, but are nevertheless related via this tradition.

 

 

III Romans and Scriptural Reasoning

 

Read from this perspective there are a number of themes and issues of Levinas’s approach which resonate with Romans all of which cannot be addressed within a paper of this length. I will focus on some aspects I consider relevant without claiming to address even these exhaustively. Taking Levinas seriously this claim is neither an aim worth trying to achieve nor is it actually possible to achieve since he emphasized that to encounter the other means to respond, to be responsible to the other rather than trying to understand him/her in the categories of my own experience or thinking. To discuss a theme or issue exhaustively would imply the enclosing within an closed system, the closed system of my own thought and experience, thus not respecting the alterity of the other but assimilating it to the already known. As Levinas has formulated it ‘Knowledge as a perception, concept, comprehension refers back to an act of grasping……..Knowledge is re-presentation, a return to presence, and nothing may remain other to it.’[36] A virtual encounter between Paul and Levinas cannot claim to deal with the issues addressed exhaustively. It is a conversation which hopefully in answering some questions at the same time raises new questions which keep the conversation open and lively.

 

The first issue I will address is the issue of communication between ‘others’. A second issue will be the reasoning or conversation over shared Scriptural tradition in relation to contemporary problems and questions.  

A third issue will be the priority of ethics.

 

 

3.1 Letter Writing as a Process of Mutual Communication

 

The fact that Paul is writing letters to his communities demonstrates that he is involved in an ongoing process of communication with them. This communication usually had begun in a face to face encounter, when Paul and later Christ-believers had first met. The relationship thus established and the communication thus initiated continued and was nurtured through the means of letter writing. This was the main function of Paul’s letters as Eva-Maria Becker recently has emphasized ‘ So the letter serves primarily as a substitute for an oral communication, that is, for a conversation and thus claims no apostolic authority but has above all a communicative that is an inter-communicative function.’[37]  The letters are thus perceived as being part of oral communication, serving the purpose of maintaining the relationship. They are literary products[38] only in so far as they were the only ways and means by which the oral communication could be maintained. They could be described as ‘long distance oral communication’.[39] Paul presupposes that his letters on reception are presented to the group of Christ believers orally. His letters thus address the recipients directly on the issues discussed, not in the style of an abstract or more distanced essay. He is involved and wants to involve the recipients in the conversation. He does not elaborate about something from an objective perspective, but he is engaged in a discussion with them concerning issues that really matter between them. Paul is addressing real people, in a specific historical context and communicating with them about issues arising from that relationship.[40] Although communication through letters cannot have the same directness and mutuality as immediate oral communication, letter writing nevertheless is the only written form of communication which allows for dialogue and mutuality. Letter writing is not a one way process but allows for real interaction in both directions, especially since the letter bearer could elaborate on the contents of the letter.  [41]

 

 

Although a number of suggestions have been made regarding the character of Paul’s letter to Rome, it has been demonstrated convincingly, in my view, that Romans is a real letter.[42] The aspects of letters as means of ‘long distance communication’ thus also apply to it. The difference from the other letters consists only in the fact that Paul has not yet been able to meet the Christ believing groups in Rome personally. The communication between the addressees and the sender rather than starting with a meeting face to face begins via long distance mediation. This does not render the relationship a literary construction or merely virtual, it is nevertheless a real relationship and a real process of communication that is established. Paul indicates strongly that he intends to meet them face to face; it has been argued that the issues addressed in Romans emerged not from some theoretical doctrinal, but from actual, problems within the Christ believing groups in Rome and their situation;  some links already exist between these groups and Paul as the list in Rom 16:1 ff. indicates. Romans, as the other letters, can be perceived as a written example of an interactive, dialogical and mutual process of communication between groups of Christ believers and Paul. The diatribe style of Romans supplements this perspective. [43] It is not a proof text for a one way communication or an outline of the main doctrines of Christianity  nor is it Paul’s last will and testament, but rather another example of the interactive process within which early Christ believers tried to work out and negotiate what to live in Christ meant and implied in their actual lives.

 

Paul’s letters including Romans are indications of a concrete historical communication process. In Levinasian terms this implies that those involved in this process had established real relationships within which the other was not assimilated to the same but the alterity of the other was maintained and respected otherwise it would be no relationship at all. To meet the other without assimilating him/her to the same means being already in communication. As noted above Levinas, perceives the encounter face to face already as establishing a discourse since the other as a face already speaks to me. He states ‘…..the relation between the same and the other …..is language. For language accomplishes a relation such that the terms are not limitrophe within this relation, such that the other, despite the relationship with the same, remains transcendent to the same.’[44] The function of Paul’s letters in the process of communication thus  indicates that those communicating with each other did so as people who met the other as other without trying to assimilate them to themselves. Levinas states ‘The fact that the face maintains a relation with me by discourse does not range him in the same; he remains absolute within the relation.’[45]  This resonates moreover with his emphasis on discourse as emerging in true encounter, an encounter where truth can arise, ‘ Truth arises where a being separated from the other is not engulfed in him, but speaks to him.’[46] The letters of Paul, including Romans, are indicative of such a process between the apostle and his addressees.

 

 

3.2. The Hermeneutics of Negotiating Meaning in Romans

 

We will come to another of Levinas’s issues – that is, his practice of interpretation or as other’s have called it – his practice of scriptural reasoning.[47]  It emerges from Levinas’s focus on the pluralism of human society which he perceives as constitutive of it.  Community and society do not presuppose sameness but rather presuppose difference, the respect for and safeguarding of the integrity of the other in his/her alterity.[48] Pluralism is not only constitutive of society but of discourse at the same time. As interlocutors necessarily have to be and remain different any discourse presupposes plurality. A discourse over scriptural tradition thus cannot but reflect this pluralism. Multiple readings, expressions, commentaries then are not mere or unfortunate ambiguities but the necessary ‘manner’ and way of interpretation.[49]

 

In Romans we find an interpretative discourse of scriptural tradition. In none of Paul’s letters do we find as many obvious allusions to the Scriptural tradition as here. We get glimpses of the process of the search for meaning in the aftermath of the Christ event. It is a discourse which unfolds entirely within the symbolic universe of the Scriptures of Israel and in close relation to others, living within this same symbolic universe,  that is Jews.

 

Paul’s reasoning is not only rooted in the Scriptures but is developed in association with, and in the context of, contemporary Jewish thinking and exegesis. Paul moves within the biblical thought world and uses its idiom and language but he did not receive his Bible in a vacuum. Paul encountered the challenge of Scripture through a Jewish filter. His thinking was directly influenced by the Scriptures but it was also influenced by his familiarity with contemporary Jewish reasoning. As B.Rosner notes ‘The signficance of many portions of the Pauline paraenesis can only be appreciated by taking full account of Old Testament background as well as the conceptual development of Old Testament ideas in early Jewish paraenesis.’[50] In my view this not only applies to the paraenetical sections of Paul’s letters but for his theologizing as such.  This means that we must acknowledge and take into account the fact that Paul shares common ground with fellow Jewish exegetes, despite other differences from them. Gone then is the image of Paul, the isolated exegete using the Old Testament for his own gospel purposes in a manner which, whilst emphasizing his rootedness in Scriptures, simultaneously suggests that his gospel hermeneutic radically distances him from all contemporary Judaisms. To acknowledge Paul’s relation to contemporary Jewish thinking is merely to put Paul in his social context, to recognize the sociality of his reading and reasoning.[51]  For Paul’s gospel to be intelligible and compelling to fellow Jews meant that he had to address them in terms they could understand, that is through the traditions they shared. But since in Romans  he is not addressing Jews as such then it is clear that the Jewish scriptures also have fundamental importance for gentiles in Christ. 

 

Moreover, the hermeneutical significance of the fact that Paul devotes substantial space in Romans to non-Christ believing Jews cannot be underestimated. Here is a superb example of Paul taking the alterity of the other seriously into account.  What is significant is not merely the details of his opinions but rather the fact that he addresses the theme at all. This is a clear indication that he shared and lived in the symbolic universe, the ‘cultural-linguistic system’ of first century Judaism[52] and thus he could he could not envisage moving beyond it.[53]  He is tied in with the future of his own people and their identity even though they disagree concerning the Christ.

 

Romans as the letter with numerous scriptural citations and allusions particularly demonstrates Paul’s entrenchedness within his ancestral tradition. It is not something he refers to or deals with – he is living it – in his interpretation of the Christ event.

Moreover, he apparently presupposes his addressees to be familiar with the Jewish Scriptures, ( cf Rom 1:2  o] proephggei,lato dia. tw/n profhtw/n auvtou/ evn grafai/j a`gi,aij; 7:1 "H avgnoei/te( avdelfoi,( ginw,skousin ga.r no,mon lalw/( o[ti o` no,moj kurieu,ei tou/ avnqrw,pou evfV o[son cro,non zh/|È) [54] even though he explicitly addresses only gentiles in this letter.[55] He sees no need to explain to them why he is referring to the Jewish Scriptures as this apparently is self-evident to both. From this I conclude that the incoming  of the gentiles through Christ meant to root them in this scriptural symbolic universe. Paul takes it for granted that the authority of Scripture extends to his gentile Christ communities and that it should be formative for their identity in Christ.   As Stanley perceives it, it is beyond doubt that ‘Paul regarded the words of Scripture as having absolute authority for his predominantly Gentile congregations.’[56]  Paul expects gentiles who live in Christ to enter the symbolic universe of the Scriptures. More to the point however, and even when he differed from his Jewish contemporaries, Paul’s reliance on the authority of Scripture is something he shares with, and that is wholly in line with, contemporary Jewish practice.[57] Sameness or uniformity are not ideals of early Jewish interpretation nor of later rabbinic interpretation.[58] That Paul and contemporary Jews disagreed over certain issues is not yet reason enough for a parting of the ways but part of their common tradition of Scriptural reasoning.

 

 3.3 Scriptural Reasoning in Romans

 

To say that Paul lived in and with the Scriptures indicates that these are not ‘used’ to prove a previous argument or add more authority to it. It rather views the apostle as living, thinking and acting from within this symbolic universe whilst working out the implications of life in Christ for his gentile communities. The authority of the Scriptures as that which shapes his perception of the world is thus presupposed in this perception of Paul’s way of reasoning.[59]

 

In order to demonstrate the difference scriptural reasoning makes in  the interpretation of Romans we will first consider the list of seemingly arbitrary proof texts in Rom 3:9 ff. and then later proceed to a discussion of Rom 9:24ff..  

 

 

3.3.1 Scriptural Reasoning in Romans 3:9 ff.

 

Most interpreters read the sequence of scriptural verses as being introduced by Paul here to prove the accusation which all are charged with in 1:18-3:8, that is gentiles (1:18-32) as well as Jews (2:1-29) are all ‘under sin’ (3:9).[60] The verb proh|tiasa,meqa then is read as referring back in a sequential sense to what Paul has stated previously. But as some scholars have pointed out this does not really fit Paul’s prior argumentation.[61] It certainly seems strange that Paul would have to introduce such a long and heavy scriptural ‘proof’ for something he himself had already elaborated on at such length before. Thorsteinsson in  his study on Romans 2, in my view convincingly, demonstrates that proh|tiasa,meqa is more likely referring to the literary sequence following in 3:10f, reading the pro-  in a temporal sense  thus  meaning ‘what has been demonstrated at an earlier period in time’. It then introduces a new sequence in the text rather than being the conclusion or summary of what immediately preceeds,1:18-2:29 or -3:8. [62] Paul is not summarizing a previous argument which accuses all of being sinners. He rather is aware that from a scriptural perspective the contemporary time they are living in is a time dominated by sin – forcing them all, gentiles and Jews, to live ‘under sin’. To live under Roman rule, contrary to its claim of establishing peace and well-being for all, means to live under a regime of apparent and structural violence and oppressive power. [63] This is demonstrated by the Scriptures rather than proved.[64] proh|tiasa,meqa here is indicating that there is clear scriptural evidence in Paul’s view for what he is saying rather than setting out to a charge in a juridical sense.

 

The scriptural references are describing the effects ‘sin’ has on the life of people who have no option but to live under its rule. The references should not be taken as citations Paul arbitrarily picked up to prove his case. Referring to these verses implied that the literary as well as some supposed historical context would resonate with these. It is significant then to take into account that the verses referred to are lamentations of oppressed Israel crying to God for help and vindication. This is acknowledged by Dunn in his commentary but rather than continuing to think down that line he argues that ‘Far from being a ground of complaint against Israel’s oppressors which the righteous can hold before themselves in pleading before God….the scriptural catena functions as an indictment of both Jew and Gentile……..Paul is probably deliberately attacking the sort of attitude……which found expression in the Psalms cited by Paul.’[65]  Whilst I think there is no doubt that Paul perceives the power of sin as universal and thus affecting both Jews and gentiles, I cannot find any sound reason why the primary expression of the Psalms referred to should be twisted into its contrary by Paul. In the light of Dunn’s reading which emphasizes that chapter 2 – 3:8 primarily serves to prove the ‘misconceived Jewish claim to distinctiveness’ and that ‘the main thrust of his [Paul’s] attack is still to expose the falseness of the typical Jewish presumption of distinctiveness as far as righteousness/unrighteousness is concerned’,[66]  such an interpretation of the Psalm references may seem logical and necessary. But it renders the Jew once again the paradigm of the universal human sinner!

 

Conversely a reading in the vein of scriptural reasoning takes the resonating of the original context of the Psalm verses seriously into account (which by the way means also to the take the text as other – in its alterity – seriously as a partner in conversation). To read the Psalm verses in the first instance as lamentations of Israel about their situation as deprived of life in abundance by violent powers draws our attention to the situation of those who are victims of that power. To be victims does not render them righteous or without sin. They too, as well as the agents of violent power are ‘under sin’. The domination of violence/sin can be escaped neither by the oppressor nor by the victims. But to state that sin affects all is not the same as saying that it affects all in the same way. To say that those ‘under sin’ are not righteous, do not understand, do not do good deeds is not the same as to state that they are shedding blood, as pursuing ways of destruction and misery and not knowing the ways of peace (despite claims to the contrary). Paul here describes in Rom 3:9-16 different effects of being ‘under sin’ which do not apply to all in the same way. The agents of ‘sin’, those exercising domination, oppression and violence are inherently accused by these lamentations, but as part of these Psalms these are rather cries for deliverance than accusations of the perpetrators. Paul thus does not make a universal indictment against sinners but he describes the terrible effects of ‘sin’ and the tragic but inescapable circumstances under which both, Jews and gentiles, are force to live.

 

It is possible that Paul here is arguing here against a gentile misconception that by becoming Jews they could escape from this domination of sin. Paul is demonstrating to them that there is no escape from this domination, not even through doing the works of Torah. (This also might be a gentile misconception of Judaism and not a Jewish misunderstanding !) And for them now to find a way out of this tragedy is not in becoming Jews and taking on the Torah as Jews  but through Christ.[67] If we presuppose that Paul here is addressing gentiles then he is opening their eyes to the tragedy they live in. The Torah cannot be a means to get out of this – but it is the means via which one can come to the recognition of sin – the Torah reveals the true nature of the rulers of this kosmos, the all pervasive power of sin.

 

We have here an example of Paul’s dealing with Scriptures which moves beyond a mere use of Scripture as proof text or addition to something already said or as proof that what he says is in accordance with the authoritative source of faith. He is thus not proving accusations against universal sinners previously made.  Instead of simply accumulating a list of varied proof texts as additional support for previous arguments, Paul is rather elaborating for his gentile audience the tragedy of living under sin. This then refers to the rule of the Pax Romana and the function of the Torah in revealing the true nature of this system of violence contrary to its own claims for universal peace. In parallel to Levinas we see Paul arguing from within and with Scriptures[68], closely relating them to contemporary constraints and vice versa, thus illuminating both. In distinction from Levinas one could say that in a way Paul is teaching gentiles in Christ scriptural reasoning in the light of the Christ event.

 

 

3.3.2 Scriptural Reasoning in Romans 9:24 ff

 

The second example we will consider is Rom 9:24ff. This demonstrates with a string of scriptural citations the mercy of God on those whom he has called not from the Jews only but also from the gentiles. Paul begins by citing Hosea 2:25 ‘Kale,sw to.n ouv lao,n mou lao,n mou kai. th.n ouvk hvgaphme,nhn hvgaphme,nhn\’ Because this citation seems designed to support an argument for the inclusion of gentiles as well as Jews, scholars have claimed that Paul now applies Scriptures that originally referred to Israel to believing gentiles.  The ‘not my people’ are seen as the gentiles and Paul thus seems to adjust scriptural meanings to suit his own purposes. Dodd voices the sentiments of many commentators when he states ‘It is rather strange that Paul has not observed that this prophecy referred to Israel, rejected for its sins, but destined to be restored – strange because it would have fitted so admirably the doctrine of the restoration  of Israel which he is to expound in ch.11.’ [69] However, this citation is not what it might seem to be. It can be shown that the primary concern in this chapter (Rom 9) is with the historic people of God and their apparent lack of faith in Christ (rather than the inclusion of gentiles which at this point is brought in more as an aside). The inclusion of Gentiles has already been established in Rom 3-4 (and of course in Paul’s earlier letter to the Galatians).

 

When we consider the context more carefully we note that this citation is followed by two others which clearly can refer only to Israel. It seems strange that Paul would include a rather arbitrary reference to gentiles in such a grouping. A better explanation of Paul’s pattern of citation is that all three citations retain their primary reference to Israel and that the first citation referring to the ‘not my people’, whilst retaining its reference to Israel, can also by analogy be extended to include gentiles who in a more distinct sense are ‘not my people’.  Such an emphasis is much more in keeping with the original Hosea context where the mercy of God is a dominant theme. It would seem strange if in fact in a passage where the prophet refers to God’s merciful dealings with Israel but then in Paul’s version of the same passage Israel is simply left under judgment and the ‘not people’ – the gentiles – take her place. This is all the more surprising since Paul’s theme at this point in Rom 9 is demonstrated to be divine compassion. In Rom 9:15 Paul sets up a scriptural text to serve as it were as a major heading for the next section of his argument  Eleh,sw o]n a'n evlew/ kai. oivktirh,sw o]n a'n oivkti,rwÅ This is followed by other scriptural citations but the pattern of scriptural reasoning Paul uses here is one in which major scriptural citations dominate later scriptural citations which are subsidiary to the main heading. Thus subsidiary citations do not nullify the major thesis previously stated but stand under and serve to clarify the primary purpose of emphasizing divine mercy.

 

Most likely therefore Paul does not primarily use the Hosea citation to refer to gentiles. The primary reference is still to Israel. What Paul is claiming is that rejected Israel like the northern tribes in Hosea will be restored, and along with them another ‘non people’, the gentiles will also be blessed. In this reading Paul does apply the Hosea citation in a secondary sense typologically to gentiles also but only after it has served his primary purpose to argue for the restoration of Israel.[70]

 

In this passage we have seen Paul at work in his scriptural world. He moves within innumerable citations to illuminate and develop his argument step by step with major and minor scriptural premises; but he uses these creatively not in opposition to their original content and context but primarily to refer to Israel and only then by extension to gentiles. At this point in particular, because he dialogues so intensely with Scripture, a comparison could be drawn between Paul’s nuanced use of his Jewish scriptural heritage and the activity of jazz musicians. As Brown describes this, multiple rhythms are played simultaneously and in dialogue with each other – each member of the group has to listen to the other so as to respond and at the same time concentrate on his/her own improvisation. [71]   In parallel to this we might maintain that Paul plays with the multiple rhythms of Scripture with some improvisation and ingenuity. [72]

 

 

IV The Epiphany of the other/Other and the Primacy of Ethics

 

The primacy of ethics is a vast topic in Levinas and as I will argue, also in Paul. It cannot be dealt with substantially in this paper, so I will only give some brief sketch as to where a more detailed consideration of this aspect would lead to.

 

The respect for the alterity of the other and thus the primacy of ethics for Levinas are constitutive of human life and community. These do not follow from insights or cognition about some universal human condition but from the encounter with the other face to face. He maintains ‘…responsibility for the other pre-exists any self-consciousness, so that from the beginning of any face to face, the question of being involves the right to be………I do not grasp the other in order to dominate, I respond instead to the face’s epiphany.’[73] Inherent to this epiphany of the other’s face, Levinas perceives a transcendent dimension. In this epiphany and the response to the call transcendence breaks in, the Other per se. The primacy of ethics and transcendence are not separate dimensions but go hand in hand.[74]

 

The fact that PaulÂ’s letter to Rome does end neither with chapter 8 nor with chapter 11 is of utmost significance. Rather than being mere paraenetical additions to the central theological arguments advocated in the main body of the letter, chapters 12-15/16 are inherently part or even more the focus of the arguments previously made. William S. Campbell has strongly argued for the inherent relation of these chapters particularly with the end of Rom 11:30- 32. [75] The close relation between these and the previous chapters are indicative for what I would call the primacy of ethics in Romans.

 

Paul in chapters 9-11 tries to understand and come to terms with God’s ways with the other, that is, his fellow Jews who are not ‘in Christ’.  He finds some viable explanation in his reading of Hosea as well as in his olive tree metaphor. In both he strongly emphasizes the faithfulness of God and his promises towards Israel which encompass Christ believing as well non-Christ believing Jews. There is no doubt that Paul hopes all Israel will be saved. From the flow of his argument the direction can be guessed where Paul might like to proceed in this. There is an inclusive tendency in Romans which has a potential to erase the alterity of the other in one redeemed people.. But Paul does not proceed along that route and does not elaborate on how God will achieve the desired outcome. In good prophetic fashion Paul leaves the future of his people open to God. In citing the wisdom of Job he moves beyond his own comprehension of the divine purpose whilst acknowledging his full confidence in the faithfulness of God. But there is no closure on this vital issue. In this openness Paul and Levinas have much in common. Hoping for the salvation of all Israel, Paul is working through his own tradition in an effort to explore and correlate in the light of the Christ event, seemingly contradictory realities such as the incoming of the gentiles, the coming to faith of some and  the hardening of other Jews. It is clear however, that Paul is primarily disposed to hold to a hopeful outcome for his own people because of divine faithfulness and in face of contemporary evidence to the contrary; yet despite this hopeful optimism he stops short of claiming salvation exclusively in Christ for his own people and instead trusts them to the divine mercy. In this he follows the prophets of Israel. In entrusting the outcome to the One who is wholly Other in Rom 11:26 and 11:33ff he safeguards the integrity and alterity of the other and the transcendence of God. This is a unique and remarkable glimpse of the perception of the other outside the Christ believing group Paul reveals to us here.  In this reading Levinas would resonate.

 

To continue here with explicitly ethical issues indicates that for Paul to respond to the other, and to the transcendent Other cannot be separated. To encounter  the other/Other means to be responsible. Ethical living is thus not an addition to being in Christ but inherent in and integral to the call to respond in discipleship. We here find a primacy of ethics which though not identical is still similar to Levinas’s perception.[76] Thus the sequence of Paul’s argument in the transition from 11:36 to 12:1ff is not coincidental but necessitated by the reference to the mercy of God. To entrust the other to the divine mercy does not free us from the obligation to respond to the other but is in fact the basis of this responsibility. Paul begins to elaborate on this for the Christ believers in Rome in chapters 12-15. In these chapters the broad outline of living in relation to the other is set out. It is most likely that Paul has issues of living together within rather than without Christ believing groups in mind, but even for them he does not advocate sameness in Christ but emphasizes the necessity of mutually appreciating differences amongst them. We note especially 12:10 give pride of place to one another in esteem (NEB) where the other literally has priority and is esteemed in his/her alterity.  Likewise in 14:1 ff. the weak though they remain different must not be violated either by judging or causing to stumble but are to be welcomed and respected not despite, but with,  their convictions (Rom 14:5b, 13-15).[77]

 

 

V. Conclusion – Sharing Traditions in Difference

 

The flow of PaulÂ’s scriptural reasoning in Romans thus can be described as being driven by the responsibility for the other/Other,that is, by ethics.

In this primacy of ethics - and thus his advocating for the respect for the alterity and integrity of the other - Paul is in keeping with the traditions of his ancestors which are also basic for Levinas’s philosophical approach. This does not render Paul the Jewish Apostle and Levinas, the Jewish philosopher the same. Paul’s scriptural reasoning and prioritizing of ethics differs from Levinas not only but basically in the fact that he does so in the light of the Christ event. But they both are rooted in the same scriptural tradition, they are both engaged in a vivid and open and pluralistic process of interpretation which is driven by the primacy of ethics. They thus both can be perceived as participating in the process of negotiating meaning for their respective time and situation from within a tradition they share.  They contribute to an ‘exegetical pluralism [which] is a product of and tribute to the pluralism constitutive of human society[and] thus it is a reflection of lived ethics, the pluralism of the face-to-face.’[78]   

 

 

 

 

 

  



[1] See my paper ‘Let Everyone be Convinced in his/her Own Mind: Derrida and the Deconstruction of Paulinism’ in SBL Seminar Papers , Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature 2002, pp. 53-73.

[2] On the function of informed imagination or‚depth historiography’ see Peter Ochs in his Forword to David Weiss Halivni’s Revelation Restored: Divine Writ and Critical Responses.London: SCM Press 2001, pp. xvi f.

[3] On this see my That We May Be Mutually Encouraged: Feminism and the New Perspective on Paul. Harrisburg, PA: T&TClark International 2004, pp.4-42. Also  Richard A.Cohen, Ethics, Exegesis, and Philosophy: Interpretation after Levinas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001, pp.248ff.

 

 

[4] Cf an interview with Christian Deschamps in Entretiens avec le Monde, Paris 1984, p. 142

[5] Cf his preface to Totality and Infinity, trans.Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 8th edition 1992, ‘…violence does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance…..’ and ‘The visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality, which dominates Western philosophy.’ p.21

[6] Cf. Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press 1998, p.101

[7] Cf. Levinas ‘But in knowledge there also appears the notion of an intellectual activity or of a reasoning will – a way of doing something which consists precisely of thinking through knowing, of seizing something and making it one’s own, of reducing to presence and representing the difference of being, an activity which appropriates and grasps the otherness of the known……..Knowledge as perception, concept, comprehension refers back to an act of grasping.’ In ‘Ethics as First Philosophy’in Sean Hand, ed. The Levinas Reader.Oxford: Blackwell 1989, pp. 75-87, p. 76.

[8] Totality and Infinity,p.115

[9] Cf also Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, in Writing and Difference. London: Routledge reprint 2002 of the first edition of 1978, p. 59-153

[10] Totality and Infinity, p.43

[11] Totality and Infinity, p. 46

[12] Totality and Infinity, p. 39

[13] Cf. e.g. Totality and Infinity,Section III.B. ‘Ethics and the Face’, pp. 194-219 also his essay ‘Ethics as First Philosophy’ in Hand, Levinas Reader,pp.76-87.

[14] Ethics, Exegesis and Philosophy. p. 194.

[15] Totality and Infinity, p. 50

[16] Totality and Infinity, p. 51

[17] Totality and Infinity,p. 51

[18] Totality and Infinity, p.52

[19] He states that ‘Totalization is accomplished only in history – the history of the historiographers, that is among survivors. It rest on the affirmation and the conviction that the chronological order of the history of the historians outlines the plot of being in itself, analogous to nature. The time of universal history remains as the ontological ground in which particular existences are lost.’, Totality and Infinity,p. 55

[20] Totality and Infinity, p. 66 ‘The face is a living presence, it is expression…..The face speaks. The manifestation is already discourse.’ Also his  Schwierige Freiheit: Versuch ueber das Judentum, Frankfurt a.M.: Juedischer Verlag 1992, p. 17.

[21] Otherwise Than Being, Or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis.The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1981 ,p. 87

[22] Totality and Infinity. 76.

[23] Cf. ‘On the Jewish Reading of Scriptures’, in Emmanuel Levinas, Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures. Trans. Gary D. Mole. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1994, pp. 101-115. Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism.Trans. Sean Hand. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 1990.

[24] Cohen, Ethics, Exegesis and Philosophy.p.219

[25] Levinas is influenced by Rosenzweig here cf. Levinas ‘The State of Israel and the Religion of Israel’ in Sean Hand ed. The Levinas Reader, p. 263,  and Nahum N. Glatzer, ed. Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought, New York: Schocken Books 1967, p. 245

[26] See his New Talmudic Readings, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1999, p.95

[27] I am indebted to Richard A.Cohen’s excellent analysis of Levinas’s approach to reading Scriptures, cf. especially chapter 7 ‘Humanism and the right of exegesis’ in his Ethics, Exegesis and Philosophy, pp.216-265.

[28] The term is now applied to a number of distinct approaches which emerged after E.P.Sanders Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion, Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1977. They are diverse and amongst them are also critical differentiations and developments since Sanders’, so it is not always self-evident what the term actually encompasses. The New Perspective cannot be described as one homogenic school or system of thought about Paul but must be seen as a movement of interpretation. For an overview and critical evaluation see W.S.Campbell, ‘Significant Nuances in Pauline Interpretation’, also  my That We May Be Mutually Encouraged ,pp.123-160

[29] See e.g. John M.G.Barclay, ‘Paul’s Story: Theology as Testimony’, in Bruce W. Longenecker, ed. Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment. Louisville,KY: Westminster/John Knox Press 2002, pp.133-156, Stephen Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The ‘Lutheran’ Paul and His Critics. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 2004. 

[30] On this see my  ‘Be Imitators of Me as I am of Christ:  A Hidden Discourse of Power and Domination in Paul ?’ Lexington Theological Journal, Lexington, KY:  June 2004

[31] Guenther Bornkamm, ‘The Letter to the Romans as Paul’s Last Will and Testament’. Australian Bible Review 11, 1963, pp.2-14.

[32] Cf. his Vier Talmud-Lesungen.Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag Neue Kritik 1993, p. 154.

[33] Cf the overview in my That We May Be Mutually Encouraged, pp.123-160.

[34] See W.S. Campbell, ‘The Contribution of Traditions to Paul’s Theology’, in Hay David M. (ed.), Pauline Theology, Vol II,1 & 2 Corinthians. Minneapolis: Fortress Press 1993, pp. 234-254.

Mark D. Nanos, 'The Jewish Context of the Gentile Audience Addressed in Paul's Letter to the Romans', in Catholic Biblical Quarterly Vol 61, No 2, April 1999. Neil Elliott, ‘The Apostle’s Self-Presentation as Anti-Imperial Performance’ in Richard A. Horsley ed. Paul and the Roman Imperial Order, Harrosburg, PA: Trinity Press International 2004, pp. 67-88,Neil Elliott, 'Paul and the Politics of the Empire'  in Horsley Richard A. (ed.), Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel ,Imperium, Interpretation, Essays in Honor of Krister Stendahl, Harrisburg, PA : Trinity Press International 2000, pp. 17-39.

[35] See my That We May Be Mutually Encouraged, pp 142ff.

[36] ‘Ethics as First Philosophy’ in Sean Hand ed., The Levinas Reader, p.76 and 77.

[37] My translation of the German 'So dient der Brief zunaechst als Ersatz fuer eine muendliche Kommunikation,d.h. fuer ein Gespraech, und beansprucht keine apostolische Autoritaet, sondern hat primaer eine kommunikative bzw. interkommunikative Funktion.Â’ Schreiben und Verstehen: Paulinische Briefhermeneutik im Zweiten Kointherbrief.Tuebingen, Basel: Francke Verlag 2002, p.271.

[38] As such they also show certain signs of literary construction, which in a secondary sense have to be taken into account. I am concentrating here on the oral dimension. For more on both aspects see Becker, Schreiben und Verstehen, pp.132ff. also Carolyn Osiek, ‘The Oral World of Early Christianity in Rome: The Case of Hermas’, in Karl P. Donfried, Peter Richardson eds Judaism and Christianity in

First-Century Rome. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 1998, pp. 151-72. J.Dewey, ‘Textuality in an Oral Culture: A Survey of the Pauline Traditions’, Semeia 65,, 1994, pp. 37-65.

[39] Cf. Bernhard Oestreich, ‘Leseanweisungen in Briefen als Mittel der Gestaltung von Beziehungen

 (1 Thess 5:27) in NTS 50, pp.224-45, p. 224.

[40] Cf.Luther Stirwalt Jr. Paul the Letterwriter. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 2003, p. 108.

[41] Cf. ‚Briefe stellen inidrekte, medial bzw. schriftlich vermittelte kommunikative Prozesse dar, denen die Unmittelbarkeit und Wechselseitigkeit muendlicher Kommunikation fehlt. Dennoch ist die briefliche Kommunikation die einzige schriftliche Kommunikationsform, in der ein Richtungswechsel und damit eine dialogische Kommunikation ohne Schwierigkeiten moeglich ist.’ Becker, Schreiben und Verstehen, p. 121

[42] Cf e.g. W.S.Campbell, PaulÂ’s Gospel in an Intercultural Context, Jew and Gentile in The Letter to the Romans. Berlin, Bern, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 1992. Neil Elliott, The Rhetoric of Romans: Argumentative Constraint and Strategy and Paul's Dialogue with Judaism. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press 1990.

[43] Cf. Stanley K Stowers. The Diatribe and PaulÂ’s Letter to the Romans, .Chico,CA: SBL Dissertation Series 57, 1981, pp.75f.

[44] Totality and Infinity, p. 39

[45] Totality and Infinity, p. 195

[46] Totality and Infinity, p.62.

[47] The term ‘Scriptural Reasoning’ has come to prominence in postcritical theologies as expressed in the series Radical Traditions: Theology in a Postcritical Key edited by Peter Ochs and Stanley Hauweras. What is being proposed is a return to scriptural traditions, ‘with the hope of retrieving resources long ignored, depreciated, and in many cases ideologically suppressed by modern habits of thought.’ It is in the first instance a movement that began as an offshoot of the study of Judaism but parallel to this movement of Jewish thinkers there has now developed a movement that invites Jewish, Christian and Islamic theologians back to the texts of their respective traditions, recovering and rearticulating modes of ‘scriptural reasoning’. The movement is driven by questions concerning the place of theology and, more specifically, of scriptural faith in contemporary life. Significantly, the participants of this discourse locate themselves at home both within their respective faith communities as well as in Western universities. The move towards Scriptures does not imply a naïve return to some ‘original’ pure text or original truth, but neither is it an uncritical application of so-called ‘rational’ forms of thinking and reasoning in the Western philosophical tradition.  The movement finds significant affinities between Jewish forms of reading and reasoning and postmodern thought. It challenges the notion of there being  just one single discourse of reasoning and rationality, that is, that of Western science and logic, as the valid model for the ‘right’ way of thinking.  Cf. Peter Ochs and Nancy Levene eds., Textual Reasonings: Jewish Philosophy and Text Study at the End of the Twentieth Century.Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans 2003. See also Peter Ochs, ‘The Rules of Scriptural Reasoning’ in The Journal of Scriptural Reasoning Vol 2,No 1,May 2002, etext.lib.virginia.edu/journals/ssr

[48] See Emmanuel Levinas, Zwischen uns:Versuche ueberDenken an den Anderen. Muenchen:Hanser Verlag 1995, p. 258ff. German translation of Entre nous: Essais sure le penser-a-lÂ’autre.Paris: Grasset&Fasquelle 1991.Also Emmanuel Levinas,Of God Who Comes To Mind. Stanford,CA: Stanford University 1998, pp.143ff.

[49] Cf. Cohen, Ethics, Exegesis and Philosophy, p.248

[50] Paul, Scripture and Ethics, A Study of 1 Corinthians 5-7.Leiden: Brill 1994, p.181.

[51] Cf. David Ford, “Responding to textual reasoning: What might Christians learn?” in Textual Reasonings: Jewish Philosophy and Text Study at the End of the Twentieth Century. Ed. Peter Ochs and Nancy Levene. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 2002, pp.259-268, p. 265f.. Cf  J.H.Charlesworth on the diversity of Judaism,    Anchor Dictionary of the Bible,Vol 5 , ‘Article ‘Pseudepigrapha’ pp.537-40, “ The contradicting ideas should not be explained away or forced into an artificial system. Such ideas in the pseudepigrapha witness to the fact that early Judaism was not a speculative philosophical movement or theological system, even though the Jews demonstrated impressive speculative fecundity. The pseudepigrapha mirror a living religion in which the attempt was made to come to terms with the dynamic phenomena of history and experience.” p. 538.

[52] I am aware that this paradigm is only partly adequate to describe a religious tradition. It presupposes a static view of culture and religion, taking rules, terms, symbols and narratives as set. It does not account sufficiently for the fact that traditions are living networks which are constantly negotiated in continous conversations.Cf. Reasoning after Revelation,p.26f.

[53] Although being in Christ for Paul transforms his Jewish thought world it did not obliterate it.

[54] Cf. Runnar M. Thorsteinsson, PaulÂ’s Interlocutor in Romans 2: Function and Identity in the Context of Ancient Epistolography. Stockholm: Almqvist&Wiksell International 2003, p.36

[55] I cannot elaborate on the problem of the composition of the Christ believing groups in Rome. To me it is most likely that Paul addresses gentiles without excluding the presence of Jewish Christ believers in Rome. But they did not belong to Paul’s mission field and thus were not directly ‘meant’ by his letter. Cf. Mark Nanos, ‘The Jewish Context of the Gentile Audience Addressed in Paul’s Letter to the Romans’ Catholic Biblical Quarterly 61.2.April 1999, pp.283-304, also Thorsteinsson, Paul’s Interlocutor in Romans 2,pp.91f.

[56] Paul and the Language of Scripture,p. 338.

[57] Cf. Nanos, who sees PaulÂ’s discussions about the status and conduct of his gentile congregations as part of the Jewish debates about the relationship of gentiles with Jews. The Mysteryof Romans: The Jewish Context of PaulÂ’s Letter to the Romans, Minneapolis: Fortress 1996, pp.42ff.

[58] Cf.Daniel Patte, ‘In other words what is essential is not a correct (orthodox) theological doctrine but an openness to Scripture, a ‘listening to Scripture’ in the context of actual life. This in fact results in “a multiplicity of theological conceptions” not necessarily fitting with each other...’,  Early Jewish Hermeneutic in Palestine. SBL Dissertation Series 22, Missoula, Mon: Scholars Press 1975,p.75.

[59] This resonates with Levinas’s interpretation of scriptural tradition as Annette Aronowicz has stated, ‘It is quite obvious that Levinas has already decided …..that a meaning existed , a meaning for us………This decision made before the act of interpretating itself, lies at the heart of Levinas’s hermeneutic.’ ‘The Little Man with the Burned Thighs: Levinas’s Biblical Hermeneutic’, in Tamara Cohn Eskenazi et.al eds.,Levinas and Biblical Studies.Semeia 43,Atlanta,GA: Society of Biblical Literature 2003, pp.33-48, p.42.

[60] So among many James D.G.Dunn, Commentary on Romans 1-8, Dallas, TX: Word Boooks 1988, p. 148

[61] Cf. Jouette M.Bassler, ‘Divine Impartiality in Paul’s Letter to the Romans’, Novum Testamentum ,26,1984, 43-58, also

[62] Thorsstein, PaulÂ’s Interlocutor,p.235-36.

[63] Cf. e.g. Neil Elliott, ‘Paul and Politics of Empire’ in Richard A. Horsley ed., Paul and Politics, pp.17-39.

[64] I am following ThorssteinÂ’s view that the first pers.pl. here indicates a reference to the Scriptural tradition rather than to a group or individual, PaulÂ’s Interlocutor,p. 235.

[65] Romans, 1-8, p. 148

[66] Romans 1-8,p.147

[67] I do not mean to imply that there were Judaizers in the Roman context but rather that gentiles previously having turned to Judaism might be in doubt as to how to continue this relation. Cf. W.S.Campbell, The Rule of Faith in Romans 12:1-15:13: The Obligation ofHumble Obedience as the Only Adequate Response to the Mercies of GodÂ’, in Hay David M.and Johnson E.Elizabeth (eds.), Pauline Theology Vol III Romans. Minneapolis: Fortress Press 1995, pp. 259-286, p.277.

 

[68] The parallel with Levinas is that he distinguishes between Talmudic reasoning and using Scripture as proof text. See his Vier Talmud-Lesungen,p.41.

[69] Romans, 1932, p.160.

[70] Cf. W.S.Campbell, ‘Divergent Images of Paul and his Mission’ , in Reading Israel in Romans: Legitimacy and Plausibility of Divergent Interpretations .Ed. Cristina Grenholm and Daniel Patte. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International 2000, pp. 187- 211, pp. 198ff.

[71] Elsa B.Brown, ‚What Has Happened Here’, in Linda Nicholson ed., The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory New York, London: Routledge 1997. p.275.

[72] Cf. Also Ford, ‚Responding’ in Textual Reasoning,p. 259.

[73] ‘Ethics as First Philosophy’, p. 75.

[74] Emmanuel Levinas, Schwierige Freiheit: Versuch ueber das Judentum. Frankfurt a.M.: Juedischer Verlag 1992, p. 29, German translation of Difficile Liberte: Essais sur le Judaisme. Paris: Albin Michel 1963.

[75] Campbell claims ‘In 11:13f. Paul after a long discussion begun in 9:1, addresses himself pointedly to the Gentile Christians and specifically warns them not to boast over the fate of the unbelieving Jews…….This is no hypothetical situation and the dialogue style gives no warrant for the belief that Paul does not address himself to a real situation in Rome where current anti-Judaism was threatening the unity of the church. Paul's carefully constructed conclusion in 11:30-32, his exhortations in 12:1f and in 14-15 support this interpretation of ch 11. An even clearer indication in support of the above is the concluding scripturally substantiated imperative in 15:7f…….In view of the direct connection of 15:7f with 14:1f, it is clear that the division between the weak and the strong is one along Jew-Gentile lines and it is then easy to read back via 12:3 and to relate 9-11 with 4:16f and 6:11f to  particular set of circumstances in the Christian community in Rome.’  'Romans III as a Key to the Structure and Thought of the Letter', first published in Novum Testamentum 23/1981, pp.22-40, now in his Paul's Gospel in an Intercultural Context. Frankfurt a.M, New York: Peter Lang 1992, pp.25-42,p.33. Cf. also my That we May Be Mutually Encouraged, pp. 181ff.

[76]It is worth noting here that whereas in Levinas to encounter the other has a transcendent dimension open to the wholly Other, in Paul this transcendent dimension is found in the encounter with Christ. This is a difference between Levinas, the Jewish philosopher and Paul, the Jewish Apostle, which nevertheless does not set them in contradiction to each other as e.g. Mt 25:31ff. demonstrates.

[77] Cf. My article ‘Let Everyone Be Convinced in His/Her Own Mind: Derrida and the Deconstruction of Paulinism’,SBL Seminar Papers, Atlanta: Scholars Press 2002,pp.

[78] Cohen, Ethics, Exegesis and Philosophy,p.248.